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The past three decades have witnessed the rapid development of the Chinese housing market
1
, 
which is considered as a barometer of and an extremely crucial component of the whole 
Chinese economic system. Although some important findings have been obtained by previous 
research, many conclusions have been controversial and a comprehensive understanding of 
the mechanism and behaviour of the Chinese housing system is a worthwhile endeavour. 
The existing studies about the Chinese housing market are mostly confined to qualitative 
analysis, lacking the support of a theoretical basis and empirical research. This thesis aims to 
employ more recent econometrical methodologies, from both theoretical and empirical 
perspectives, to systematically analyse several prevalent issues of the Chinese housing market. 
More specifically, this thesis is going to explore the main determinants of house prices, the 
convergence and ripple effects of regional house prices, and the interactive relationship 
between housing conditions and individual’s subjective well-being. 
Some empirical findings can be drawn from this thesis: 1) by using the system GMM 
dynamic panel data models, the results indicate that Chinese house prices are mainly affected 
by factors related to government policies and speculative demand rather than the urbanization 
process, which is understandable in a non-fully market-oriented status quo; 2) there is 
evidence of very limited convergence of regional house prices by employing unit root tests,  
σ-convergence and β-convergence approaches; however, the alternative methods, such as 
panel regression models, Engle-Granger/Johansen cointegration tests and Granger Causality 
tests, imply that house prices can ripple out from some core cities to other cities; 3) the results 
of the Ordered Probit Models suggest that the housing conditions in urban areas play a 
significant role in peoples’ subjective well-being in respect of housing satisfaction and overall 
happiness; additionally, the effects of housing factors impact on different groups of residents 
in different ways. 
Due to the limitations of data sources in the early days, this thesis is the first to combine such 
a wide panel data series, on both the time dimension and geographic dimension, to study the 
Chinese Housing Market. Also, when analysing the convergence and ripple effects models, 
                                                 
1 ‘The Chinese housing market’ in this thesis refers to the housing market in urban China, because the rural area of China 
still implement the homestead system, which is completely different to the common concept of ‘housing market’ system 
across the world. Generally, the homestead system in rural China aims to allocate homestead land to rural individuals by the 
village committees based on the average principal. 
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this thesis transfers the original link indexes used by previous scholars into modified constant 
growth indexes, which improves the efficiency of empirical models to a greater extent. In 
addition, approaches using the system GMM method, σ- and β-convergence analysis, Engle-
Granger/Johansen cointegration tests and Granger Causality tests are first introduced into the 
study of the Chinese housing market, generally achieving good results especially in the 
determinants of house prices and the ripple effects of regional house prices. Moreover, except 
for the commonly used method of the Ordered Probit Model for the questionnaire survey 
research, this thesis produces the predicted value of housing satisfaction by using two-stage 
estimations, to investigate the effects of housing conditions and housing satisfaction on 
people’s overall happiness. Meanwhile, the approach of ‘money equivalent effects’ is also a 
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[1] The reform and opening up: this policy was carried out by Chairman Deng in 1978, 
which marked the date that the Chinese economy started to transform from the centrally 
planned economy to the market economy. 
[2] Shi Ye Dan Wei: quasi-government organizations. 
[3] Zhu Fang Gong Ji Jin: the Housing Provident Fund program. 
[4] Quanqian: refers to the property developers using many different ways to get financing 
from the market, especially the stock market and bond financing. 
[5] Quandi: buying and holding land in hand as much as possible. 
[6] Wudi: enterprises hold the land without selling or constructing any buildings 
[7] Wupan: property hoarding, means enterprises delaying selling their dwellings in order to 
get more profits from house price increases. 
[8] NBSC: National Bureau of Statistics of China. 
[9] Tube-shaped apartments: a typical housing style in China, which is a product of the 
Chinese state-owned enterprises welfare housing system in the 1970s and 1980s. These 
buildings are dormitories with a long corridor, shared toilets & kitchens, and the same size 
individual rooms, usually less than 20 m
2
 for each room. 
[10] An Ju Gong Cheng: the largest affordable/low-renting housing project supported by the 
governments. 
[11] ‘90-70’ Policy: in 2006, the central government issued a declaration that real estate 
developers are obligated to allocate 70% of the total area in each of their new housing 
projects to ‘affordable housing’, i.e., smaller than 90 m2 per unit. 
[12] Diwang: the highest records of land transfer fees. 
[13] Wenzhou Real Estate Corporation: speculators from Wenzhou, a rich and developed 
area in Zhejiang province, that build up groups to acquire buildings for speculation in big 
cities, such as Beijing and Shanghai. 
[14] Hukou: a unique Household Registration System in China with two types: official 
migration with Hukou transfer (or permanent migration), and unofficial migration without 




1.1 Research Motivations and Contributions 
As we know, China has become one of the fastest developing countries in the world. Even 
during the Asian and the Global Financial Crises, the Chinese economy has still maintained a 
very high-speed of growth.  As we can see from Figure 1.1, China’s GDP growth rates have 
only dropped slightly after the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis and 2007 Global Financial Crisis. 
Even during the crisis, the growth rates have stayed around 8%, which is still very impressive. 
Afterwards, China’s economy has recovered very quickly from the financial crisis. 
After 1997 Asian 
Financial Crisis
After 2007 Global 
Financial Crisis
 
(Data Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China http://www.stats.gov.cn/) 
Figure 1.1: GDP Growth Rate of China: 1991-2010 
The housing market relates to a significant industry for the whole economic system and has 
always been a barometer of the economy. Since the welfare housing system
2
 has been 
gradually phased out in the 1990s, the Chinese housing market has been through a rapid 
development over last two decades. In recent years, the fast urbanization has provided 
another favourable opportunity for the real estate market. Meanwhile, benefitting from land 
policy, financial support and local government policies, the high rate of return of the housing 
industry has attracted huge amounts of investments, to the extent that the Chinese housing 
market has sustained an increasing growth trend over recent times. 
                                                 
2 Under the welfare housing system, all land and housing resources were entirely owned, built and delivered by the state or 
state agents, such as local public entities and work units. 
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Real estate wealth has become one of the major factors promoting economic growth in China. 
It reflects not only the tendency for economic development but also the speed of economic 
development. Since the reform and opening-up
3
, marked changes have occurred within the 
Chinese housing market and the behaviour of the housing market in China has had a 
significant impact on the aggregate economy. Housing accounts for a significant proportion 
of the wealth of the personal sector
4
. Over the last 30 years in China, both the super-fast 
economic growth and the rapid increase of personal disposable income have stimulated the 
demand for owner-occupied dwellings, and thereby there has been a dramatic increase in 
house prices and house purchases. During the global financial crisis periods, most countries’ 
housing markets have been through an unprecedented rough time; while the Chinese housing 
market has sustained growth rather than a depression, and Chinese house prices have kept an 























(Data source: National Bureau of Statistics of China http://www.stats.gov.cn/) 
Figure 1.2: Chinese Housing Price Index: 1997-2010 
In order to control the excessive growth in house prices, Chinese governments have 
implemented many kinds of policies to control the housing market. But, the results are not as 
good as was perhaps expected. Therefore, there are some issues catching our attention and 
curiosity: Why can the Chinese housing market keep booming? What forces drive up Chinese 
house prices even during the global depression and despite the governments’ pressure? And, 
is there convergence between regional house prices in China? Furthermore, do the housing 
conditions affect individual’s subjective well-being and thus will the housing boom have 
contributed to that too? 
                                                 
3 The reform and opening-up policy was carried out by Chairman Deng in 1978, which marked that Chinese economy started 
to transform from central planning economy to market economy. 
4 A similar situation exists in the UK (Holly and Jones, 1997) and US (Poterba, 1991). 
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The existing studies about the Chinese housing market are mostly confined to a qualitative 
analysis, lacking the support of any theoretical basis and empirical research. With a 
comprehensive review of the literature on the Chinese housing market, this thesis aims to 
systematically investigate the fluctuations and determinants of Chinese house prices by 
qualitative investigation and quantitative examination. Furthermore, in order to detect how 
regional house prices interact with each other, this thesis is going to examine the varying 
patterns of regional house prices through the convergence and ripple effects between them. In 
addition, due to the importance of housing for Chinese people, it is also worth studying the 
relationship between housing conditions and subjective wellbeing in urban China.  
Based on the research findings of western developed countries, whist accounting for China’s 
practical situation, this thesis builds a Chinese house price model by using updated Chinese 
data. Figure 1.3 shows the regions of China (31 provinces in China excluding Hong Kong, 
Macao and Taiwan). More specifically, the panel data across 30 provinces over the period 
1999 to 2009 will be used to examine the factors determining real estate prices. The quarterly 
house price indices for 35 major cities over 1998Q1 to 2010Q4 will be used to detect the 
convergence and ripple effects of regional house prices. Finally, the 2006 Chinese General 
Social Survey data covering thousands of urban householders will be applied to study the 
individual subjective wellbeing. 
 
Figure 1.3: The Map of China 
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A number of innovative methodologies will be developed in this thesis. For instance, on the 
determinants of Chinese house prices, the previous research is limited to the standard 
estimation approaches, such as OLS or VAR. While this thesis constructs a GMM dynamic 
panel data model, targets the impact factors determining real estate prices, and finds out the 
way that these factors affect house prices. Meanwhile, the robustness checks will verify our 
findings by using different variables, or different estimation approaches. The study of 
convergence and ripple effects of regional house prices will comprehensively compare the 
results of several methods, such as unit root tests, σ-/β-convergence analysis, panel regression 
models, Engle-Granger/Johansen cointegration tests and Granger causality tests. While the 
commonly used method for the survey research, the ordered probit model, is employed to 
discover the interactive relationship between housing and people’s life satisfaction. 
Furthermore, this thesis will explore their distinctive effects within different groups as well, 
by setting up divisions based on age and income. 
Throughout this thesis, my findings suggest that Chinese house prices are mainly affected by 
government policies, such as monetary policy and land policy, rather than by market 
economy factors. That reflects the non-fully market-oriented nature of the Chinese housing 
market. Although the house prices have been rising all over the country, there is very limited 
evidence of convergence between regional house prices; however, to some extent, the real 
estate prices of several major cities, such as Beijing, Shanghai and Shenzhen, ‘ripple out’ to 
other regions. Meanwhile, my results show that the housing-related conditions play a 
significant role in the people’s life satisfaction, with different degrees of effects on different 
groups.   
My research also contributes to the literature by revealing the nature of the Chinese housing 
market and supplies prospective information for potential real estate investors which may 
help prevent a further housing market bubble forming and even a financial crisis. To some 
extent, my results also imply some policy recommendations for the administration 
particularly with respect to the regulation of the Chinese real estate market. In short, research 
on the Chinese housing market, of which this is a part, plays a significant role in stabilizing 
the national economy, promoting the healthy and steady development of the Chinese housing 
market, and improving citizens’ welfare. 
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1.2 Research Framework and Structure 
The overall framework of my research is shown in Figure 1.4. Firstly, this thesis will 
introduce the development of the Chinese housing market by focusing on the practical 
situation of Chinese real estate development in recent years, especially, summarising Chinese 
housing reform and the associated policies. This thesis includes three empirical chapters in 
total. The first empirical part is to construct the econometric models to quantitatively 
investigate the determinants of the Chinese housing market. Afterwards, the empirical 
analysis of house price models will focus on the convergence and ripple effects of regional 
house prices in China. Then, the empirical work will include the study between housing and 
life satisfaction in urban China as well. Finally, the thesis will conclude the empirical results, 
and give some policy implications and suggestions on the Chinese housing market. 
 
Figure 1.4: The Research Framework  
This thesis will adopt the integrated method of qualitative study and quantitative research to 
systematically analyse the Chinese housing market. Overall, my research can be divided into 
six chapters:  
Chapter 1 is an ‘Introduction’, including my movivations for doing this research and 
emphasising the original contributions, the research framework and also the structure. 
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Chapter 2 is ‘Background to the Chinese Housing Market’, which provides an essential 
overview of the major issues regarding the Chinese housing market. This chapter elaborates 
on the Chinese housing reform with a focus on relevant policies, such as housing policy, 
monetary policy, land policy and population policy. This chapter also concludes with the 
main achievements of the Chinese housing reform, and the major problems of the Chinese 
housing market. 
The three empirical chapters are ‘Chapter 3—Empirical Analysis of Determinants of China’s 
Housing Market’, ‘Chapter 4—Testing the Convergence and Ripple Effects of Regional 
House Prices in China’, and ‘Chapter 5—Housing and Life Satisfaction in Urban China’ 
respectively. Empricial chapters have a mostly identical structure with six sections, including 
‘Introduction’, ‘Literature Review’, ‘Methodology’, ‘Data Source and Description’, 
‘Empricial Results’ and ‘Conclusion’.    
Chapter 6 is the ‘Conclusion’, which summarises my research and the empirical findings, 
gives the practical policy implications and suggestions for the Chinese authorities, and also 
implies the possible research orientations in the future.        
To sum up, this thesis raises some new perspectives and different findings on the Chinese 
housing market in many areas, such as the research framework and the research methodology. 
My research summarises research achievements about the Chinese housing market, and 
combines the theoretical and empirical studies by adopting approaches previously used for 
the western developed countries. This thesis improves upon the existing mature models of 
house prices by considering China’s actual conditions, and uses updated Chinese data to run 
the empirical tests. Finally, my findings give conclusions and policy implications. The 
theories about the real estate market have been in a sustained development process; my study 
extends the research of the Chinese housing market, deepens the empirical research, and 




Chapter 2—Background to the Chinese Housing Market 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter describes the background of the Chinese housing market
5
. Firstly, we introduce 
the development stages of the Chinese housing market since 1978 and explore the different 
features of the housing market at different stages. This can be divided into four main steps: 
the gestation period from 1978 to 1988, the fledging stage from 1990 to 1995, the growth 
phase from 1998 to 2002, and the adjustment stage since 2002. This study will concentrate on 
the latest two stages since the implementation of a brand new housing system in 1998. 
Then, we summarise the relevant policy changes during this period of Chinese housing 
reform, including housing policy, land policy, land tax policy, housing monetary policy
6
 and 
population policy. These policies have had profound influences on the real estate market 
through the whole development process. As a result of the rapid development of the Chinese 
housing reform, a number of achievements have been made, such as the diversification of 
housing types, a higher home ownership ratio, more housing space per capita, and the quick 
growth in housing demand and housing supply. 
However, the remarkable achievements have been accompanied by prominent conflicts in the 
Chinese housing market as well. The major problems include the huge housing inequities for 
different householders, the lack of sufficient affordable housing supply, and a classical 
principal-agent problem. At the end of this chapter, we will summarise the Chinese housing 
market from a panoramic point of view. 
2.2 Overview of the Chinese Housing Market Development 
The housing market is a significant industry for the whole economic system in China and has 
always been a barometer of the economy. Before the reform and opening-up, the Chinese 
housing system was a component of social welfare and was provided mostly for free by 
government institutions and state-owned enterprises, also known as work units. Since the 
reform and opening-up, against the background of rapid economic development in China, the 
real estate market has developed quickly. Based on the summary of previous studies, as a 
whole, there are four stages to the housing market development in China over recent times 
                                                 
5 This chapter has been presented in the ‘6th Annual International Symposium on Economic Theory, Policy and Applications’. 
6 ‘Housing monetary policy’ in this thesis refers to monetary policy particularly on housing. 
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(Li and Yi, 2007; Deng, Shen and Wang, 2011).  
The first stage (1978-1988) is the gestation period. Some state owned enterprises built 
welfare rooms for their staff, and meanwhile the first real estate companies started up. In this 
period, the citizens basically lived in the workers’ dormitories; therefore, most people did not 
have their own houses and only small numbers of individuals had a demand for housing in 
relatively developed parts of China. In the meantime, housing reform experiments were 
conducted in several selected cities by means of selling public housing at cost price and the 
gradual raising of public housing rent. The experiments of this stage were to test the 
feasibility of public housing reforms and devolve the decision making from central 
government to the local government and enterprises; in particular, the State Council issued 
‘the Implementation Plan for Gradual Housing System Reform in Cities and Towns’ on a 
nationwide basis (Wang and Murie, 2000). 
In the second stage (1990-1995), the real estate industry started to grow, and there were 
some business activities related to land transactions. After the Chairman Deng’s speech about 
further reform and opening-up
7
, the Chinese economy entered upon a new sharply expanding 
phase. The first property boom appeared between 1992 and 1993. In 1994, the Chinese 
central authority promulgated ‘The Decision on Deepening the Urban Housing Reform’, 
which established a comprehensive framework for housing reform and further spelt out the 
details in the next stage (Huang 2004). During this stage, two distinct systems of housing 
provision were established: (i) ‘economic and suitable housing’ provided by local authorities 
and enterprises, and (ii) ‘ordinary commodity housing’ provided by the market. However, 
work units and enterprises proceeded to dominate the housing provision. As such, this stage 
can be termed the ‘double-track stage’ (Li and Yi, 2007).  
Against this background, housing investment increased rapidly and large quantities of real 
estate companies were set up, such as the Chinese first and largest real estate company, Vanke. 
But because of these companies’ overdevelopment and speculative operations, it led to some 
problems for the housing market in many areas, such as a real estate bubbles and numerous 
uncompleted edifices, especially in Hainan province (Han, 1998; Wu, 2003; Wu, Reed and 
Robinson, 2006). 
The third stage (1998-2002) was a quick development stage. According to the State Council 
                                                 





 in 1997, the welfare-room system changed radically. In 1998, another 
milestone of the housing reform occurred when the central government announced ‘A 
Notification of the Urban Housing System and Accelerating Housing Construction’, which 
means an end to the welfare allocation of urban housing. The role of work units was 
redefined in the housing system. The end of welfare housing allocation now not only means 
ending provision of rental public housing to state-owned enterprise workers but also to 
government and quasi-government authorities, the latter being known as ‘Shi Ye Dan Wei’ (Li 
and Yi, 2007).  
The housing market showed a demand for more space and the material standard of living has 
been raised to a great extent. Specifically, the bigger house size, more number of rooms, and 
having bathroom or living room will most likely increase subjective well-beings. Because it 
was the early stage of the housing market and the requirement for sustaining domestic 
demand, the housing policies were not strictly controlled and lowered the standards of 
housing quality. This new market-based housing system also has particularly Chinese 
characteristics (Deng, Shen and Wang, 2011). For instance, even though work units no longer 
built apartments directly for their workers, they still played an important part in their 
employees’ housing consumption, either through cash-based housing subsidies or through 
their contribution to the Housing Provident Fund (Zhu Fang Gong Ji Jin) program. Therefore, 
there were various problems with this situation, especially the ‘land rent-seeking’ problem. 
Even worse, a number of property developers speculated on land transactions and the land 
market was very disorderly. In order to limit these activities, the State Council announced 
some special measures to regulate and prevent problems occurring. 
The fourth stage (2002-now) is the housing industry adjustment period. In 2002, the 
Ministry of Land and Resources issued the competitive bidding, auction and listing-for-sale 
transfer policy for the right to use state-owned land as profit-oriented land. Since then, the 
development of the land market has become standardized. The implementation of the policy 
reduced the possibility of ‘rent-seeking’ and thereby those enterprises relying on land 
speculation lost their viability, while those real estate enterprises, with powerful financial 
support and rich experience in developing the housing market, started a large-scale expansion 
throughout the nation. The new real estate investment boom has been triggered by the 
vigorous expansion of real estate enterprises and the sustained market demand. Since 2002, 
                                                 
8 This announcement was carried out to speed up and reform further the construction of the housing system.(3rd July,1997 ) 
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there have been some debates about the housing market bubbles. As a consequence, the 
Central Bank issued ‘No. 121’ document, stipulating that the real estate projects without 
completed procedures and adequate capital shall not get grant loans, shall not use the 
endowment bank loans and real estate projects shall not get a mortgage until the completion 
of the main construction. This led to tremendous pressures for real estate companies, which 
depended on bank loan support. Nonetheless, the government has not stopped trying to 
control the housing market. More stringent policies created pressure and challenges for some 
companies, who started to withdraw from the housing industry. 
In this context, the State Council issued ‘No. 18’9 document on September 2003, which was 
the first time publicly that the real estate industry had been accepted as a pillar of the national 
economy and that it was recognised that the housing market required sustainable and 
controlled development. ‘No. 18’ document not only addressed the problems of the housing 
market to some extent, but also worked out some industrial polices, ‘supporting the real estate 
enterprises who had a good reputation and brand advantage to form lots of competitive and 
large enterprises and enterprise groups through mergers, takeovers and restructuring’ (‘No. 18’ 
document). Therefore, under the guidelines of these policies, a property boom has occurred in 
some areas of China since 2004 and the house prices of the Yangtze River Delta, including 
Shanghai and Hangzhou, grew by double-digit figures. In the second half of 2004, the fear of 
a real estate property bubble arose again. Since March 2005, the State Council, Ministry of 
Construction and other government departments not only implemented policies to stabilize 
house prices, but also issued policies to enhance the management of real estate taxation. The 
biggest difference in this adjustment was laying stress on the demand side of the housing 
market, especially to inhibit the demand for investment and speculative real estate. A series of 
policies for accessing housing led to a wait of more than six months or longer, but also made 
some companies better off because of the industrial regulation and integration. Meanwhile, 
some industry giants have taken shape, such as the Vanke and Shoukai
10
 enterprise groups. 
During the period of great prosperity, Chinese house prices have been rising very quickly, and 
have only dropped slightly after the 1997 Asian and 2007 Global Financial Crises. As a result, 
some latent issues have arisen in the Chinese housing market, that are typical and yet totally 
different from other countries’. We will discuss these problems later in this chapter. After 
                                                 
9 ‘An Announcement on Promoting Persistent and Healthy Development of the Real Estate Market’.  The State Council.  
[2003] No.18 
10 Shoukai Enterprise Groups is the biggest real estate company in Beijing, who participated the construction of the National 
Indoor Stadium and Olympic Village. 
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three decades of reform, the Chinese housing market has developed a complicated 
construction system. One key complication in the Chinese housing market is that it is not 
fully-marketized in the real sense. The central and local governments' macro regulation and 
control still plays an important role in the housing market. More specifically, the government 
is a monopolist in the ownership of land. Additionally, the government adjusts the house 
prices through political and monetary policies to affect the investors and consumers’ market 
behavior. Furthermore, based on different levels of development in different areas, the 
situation of the housing markets are widely different. 
In addition, a number of vague market manipulations occur, such as ‘Quanqian’ and ‘Quandi’, 
which have become very popular in the Chinese housing market since 2007. ‘Quanqian’ 
refers to the property developers using many different ways to get financing from the market, 
especially the stock market and bond financing. Just in the year of 2007, 38 real estate 
enterprises increased or announced an increase in their issues of stocks and bonds, involving 
102.43 billion yuan (13.47 billion US$
11
). After real estate developers captured enough funds, 
‘Quandi’, meaning the buying and holding of land as much as possible has become their next 
aim. To some extent, this behaviour explains the reasons for the Chinese stock market boom 
in 2007. Additionally, property developers not only have ‘Quanqian’ and ‘Quandi’ but also 
conduct ‘Wudi’ and ‘Wupan’. ‘Wudi’ is when enterprises hold the land without selling or 
constructing any buildings; ‘Wupan’, also known as property hoarding, means enterprises 
delay selling their dwellings in order to get more profits from house price increases. More 
specifically, Li Dong (2010) illustrated that real estate developers lie to consumers that the 
supply of their apartments fails to meet the demand, claiming unsold housing as sold ones. 
They drive up house prices through this strategy. 
The development of the economy and the increase in national income fundamentally 
contributes to promoting sustainable and rapid growth of Chinese house prices, but there are 
still other specific factors, different to other developed countries’ situation, which artificially 
increase house prices. The problem of population plays an important negative role in the 
housing market. There are 1.3 billion people in China and the land possession per capita is 
less than 1/3 of international average levels
12 . What’s worse, the population has been 
sustainably growing since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949. 
According to the China Statistical Yearbook, the population was only 0.54 billion in 1949 and 
                                                 
11 From the NBSC, the average exchange rate in 2007 is 7.6040 yuan/US$. 
12 Data source from China Statistical Yearbook. 
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grew to nearly 1.3 billion in 2004; while by 2009, the population reached 1.33474 billion. 
China’s total population has increased by 2.464 times during the last six decades. In face of 
the heavy demand for houses, the structural imbalance of supply and demand in the domestic 
housing market is more and more serious. More specifically, the supply is far from meeting 
the demand, which motivates the price increases. For ‘Rational-Economic Man’, the profits’ 
proportion of economically affordable houses is limited to within 3%, and real estate 
developers prefer to supply more high-grade apartments for the sake of much higher profits; 
thus, the economically affordable dwellings for middle and low income groups fall severely 
short of demand. 
According to Sohu Focus’s editorial13, the percentage profits in the Chinese housing market 
are as high as 30% to 50%, the profit ratios of some projects even reach up to 100%-200%; 
but for the developed countries, the profit ratio is lower than 10%. This situation stimulates 
domestic and foreign property speculation in the Chinese housing and stock markets. The 
data form NBSC demonstrates that foreign ‘hot money’ has been getting into the Chinese 
housing market and has reached two peaks in 1997-1998 and 2006-2007. This speculation 
contributes to the property bubble in the whole market, which is likely to lead to a series of 
contagion effects. On the other hand, the real estate industry, with its high profits, now has an 
important position in the whole national economy in China. The percentage of real estate 
investment in total fixed asset investment is as high as 70% to 80%, which indicates the 
importance of the real estate industry.  
Due to the importance of the real estate industry, the behaviour of the authorities plays a 
significant role in the development of the Chinese housing market. The Chinese housing 
market is not completely-marketized, as it is a policy based market, the government 
dominating the two most important inputs—the supply of land and funds. On one side, the 
real estate industry promotes local economic development and the swift growth of local GDP. 
On the other side, the high taxes fulfil the authorities’ need for fiscal revenue. Therefore, the 
central and local governments have been gradually revising interrelated policies, such as the 
land transfer policy and the real estate enterprises issuing of stock. Other than the authorities’ 
contracts, bank loans are another dominant factor in increasing house prices. 
To sum up, as a result of the imperfect market, there exist various problems in the Chinese 
housing market; and due to these characteristics and problems, it becomes an interesting issue 
                                                 
13 Sohu Focus: http://house.focus.cn/news/2009-09-15/757349.html [Accessed 9th July 2011] 
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and worthy of further research into the Chinese real estate market and house prices. 
2.3 Chinese Housing Reform  
Chinese housing reform has been a complex development process, including many reforms 
and changes of related policies, such as housing policy, land policy, land tax policy and 
housing monetary policy. The housing reform in China is also a profound social change, 
which in turn affects the relevant policymaking. Various policies impacting on the Chinese 
housing market have been changing and reforming over the last several decades since the 
founding of the New People’s Republic of China. Overall, there is a time line for the 
development of these policies. Figure 2.1 clearly expresses the different policies’ time lines. 
More detailed policy reforms will be discussed in the following parts. 
Figure 2.1: The Development Time Lines of Different Policies 
 
(a) Housing Policy (Source: Gao, 2010, Figure 1) 
 
(b) Land Policy  
 




(d) Housing Loans Policy 
2.3.1 The Development of Housing Policy 
Before the market reform and its opening-up, the Chinese housing market was a government-
funded and government-run welfare housing system, with no interest paid and no profit on 
land grants and land transfers. Regarding the ownership of buildings as separate from land, 
normally buildings could not be bought or sold privately. To put it differently, there was no 
normal real estate market in China, as all land and housing resources were entirely owned, 
built and delivered by the state or state agents, such as local public entities and work units. 
Public housing was divided into two types during the central planning era: directly managed 
housing implemented by the local government housing administration; and self-managed 
housing built, distributed, and managed by state-owned enterprises and institutions for their 
employees and families (Fan, 1999). The urban housing conditions and supply mostly relied 
on investments of, either the central and local governments, or the enterprises and work units 
whom individuals worked for.  
Under this socialistic housing policy, until the early 1990s, the rent for the house in most 
Chinese urban families only accounted for 1%-3% of their total income, with the average rent 
being only 6.5% of the full cost of rent. As a result, government investment in building 
houses was ultimately non-recoverable (Tang, 1989). In addition, the government has 
perennially been burdened with the maintenance and management cost of these buildings, 
which resulted in tension and insufficient construction and maintenance funding (Yok-shiu, 
1988; Fong, 1989). Over that era, the welfare housing system in China had experienced 
severe problems, including the shortages of home building (Fan, 1999); urban zoning issues 
(Wang and Murie, 2000); unfair distribution wherein privileged households manipulated the 
allocation system (Chiu, 1996); heavy burdens on government finance, and corruption in the 
process of distribution and allocation (Wang and Murie, 1996).  
Since the market reforms and opening-up, the socialistic welfare housing approach did not 
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appear to attain the expected goal of ‘housing for all’. To establish a new market-oriented 
housing system, the central government started to implement new regimes and regulations to 
marketize the transferring, leasing and mortgaging of real estate property, including housing. 
The target of Chinese housing reform was to gradually change the collectively-owned welfare 
housing system into the market-oriented housing regime while expanding private home 
ownership. Furthermore, it attempted to alleviate the financial pressure of governments at all 
levels, whilst resolving the housing shortage problem. Since 1978, the Chinese economic 
structure has been transformed from a planned economy, first to a socialist planned-
commodity economy, then eventually to a socialist market economy (Gao, 2010). 
Consequently, the housing regime in urban areas also suffered the transition from a centrally 
collective, welfare-based paradigm to a more decentralized, market-oriented system (Tang et 
al., 2006). Therefore, as an important part of the overall economic revolution, housing system 
changes capture transitional features as well as numerous trial-and-error patterns (Cao and 
Gao, 2002).  
In general, it can be seen from the Figure 2.1(a) that the Chinese urban housing revolution 
can fall into two overall stages: the pilot trial stage from 1978 to 1991 and the real estate 
market development stage from 1992 to the present (Gao, 2010).  
At the pilot trial stage, firstly, experimental housing reforms happened at the local levels and 
concentrated on increasing the rental and sales of public buildings. Then, the changes 
expanded to the allocation and usage of land system, in which land users rather than land 
owners took charge of land grade including locations and geological conditions of land (Cao 
and Gao, 2002). The commoditization of real estate property sector has been especially 
affected by deeper reform. In other words, the housing reform mainly focused on changing 
houses from a ‘free good’ to a ‘subsidized good’, and eventually to a ‘commodity’. The house 
price (rental or sale price) reflects fair value of housing measured by production costs and a 
market profit margin (Chiu, 1996). In 1988, one of the most meaningful land amendments 
was settled, stating ‘land use rights can be transferred in the light of law’, which means the 
abolition of the traditional restrictions on land transfers. The Land Administration Law was 
amended correspondingly, although the state-owned land use rights were established as the 
foundation for the Chinese real estate market. 
Deng Xiaoping’s speeches, about the demand and direction for urban housing reform, which 
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was an essential part of the market reform and opening-up in 1978, opened the first pilot 
housing reform experiment
14
. In 1979, the first wave of alterations occurred in two cities, 
Xi’an and Nanning, aiming at selling buildings at full production cost and market value. 
While before long, the amendment failed as a result of the shortage of affordable housing and 
the coexistence of a relatively low rental cost. Later on, during 1982 to 1985, another larger 
scale experiment occurred in Zhengzhou, Shashi, Siping, and Changzhou, which transferred 
housing to home owners at one-third of the market value, with the householders’ employers 
and local authorities undertaking the rest of the cost. To some extent, the affordability issue 
was alleviated by instalment payments. However, such reforms aggravated the financial 
burden on employers and enterprises. As a consequence, between 1986 and 1988, the 
Housing Reform Steering Group, which was newly established in the central government, 
developed a comprehensive reform strategy. This strategy initiated a third round of the 
housing revolution. This stage was to lessen the disparity between home rent and home 
purchase via increasing not only house rental but also housing allowance in salaries, while 
offering housing at production cost. The successful reform in Yantai took the first step of 
housing reform, which swept across the nation in 1988. There were several basic and 
essential characteristics of reform programs through different regions: raising rental at 
different times and increments, offering existing housing units either by the authority agents, 
or by the enterprises with a discount rate, introducing housing subsidies into the salary 
structure to allow wage earners to afford higher rental, and founding development companies 
to build housing units for sale to privately-owned-and-operated individuals and work units at 
market value (Chiu, 1996). Drawing on the experience of Singapore, in 1991, Shanghai set up 
the first public housing accumulation fund system, and this practice was approved nationwide 
later (Chua, 1997). 
                                                 




(Source: Author’s summary) 
Figure 2.2: The Map of Chinese Housing Reform Process 
A historic turning point was in 1992 in terms of the Chinese housing market development. In 
the true sense, the nationwide real estate market had not been established until 1992. Under a 
favourable economic and political environment, the real estate industry developed rapidly 
afterwards. Meanwhile, many problems in the property market sector were caused by an 
excessive expansion. For instance, the out-of-control expansion of the housing market, the 
imbalanced structure of the real estate industry, the insufficiency of appropriate market 
regulations, and the prevalence of irregular market activities (Cao and Gao, 2002). Since 
1992, the central authority has gradually changed the welfare housing distribution system into 
a distribution mechanism with the pecuniary allowance as part of the wage. Following the 
maturation and development of the Chinese housing market, an accumulation housing fund 
system was formally established, as well as a housing finance and insurance system.  
In 1994, in order to match housing services with householder income levels, the central 
government carried out more changes to legislation. In accordance with the ‘Decision on the 
Deepening of Urban Housing System Reform’, the housing supply system can be diversified 
into three parts (Figure 2.3): (1) for high-income families, commodity houses were sold at 
market value; (2) mid-to-low income families were qualified to buy affordable housing at 
‘standard price’ or ‘full-cost price’, defined as ‘the summation of three times the average 
annual income of double-earner families and the estimated total housing superannuation 
contribution made by the work unit to the household’ (Chiu, 1996); (3) while low-income 
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families can pay off rent with further increasing 15% of average household income in 2000. 
In 1998, the termination of the housing allocation system was announced by the State 
Council. In 1999, furthermore, the Ministry of Construction clarified that current qualified 
residents who are willing to buy can purchase the existing public housing. In 2006, the 
General Office of the State Council also passed the Opinions of nine ministries and 
departments including the Ministry of Construction. The opinions indicated the demand to 
construct middle-and-small sized commodity houses for sale to low or intermediate income 
families. The government promulgated a series of policies and measures in response to the 
widening disparity between household incomes and housing demands across the urban 
residents. While the actual effect might be not as expected, as there is no evidence to indicate 
the gap has been narrowed. 
 
(Source: Yiu, 2010) 
Figure 2.3: Three-Tier Housing Policy of China 
After nearly three decades of the urban housing regime reform, the Chinese housing market 
appears to have a general pattern: the high-income population purchase commodity houses, 
middle-and-low income individuals purchase affordable houses, and the demand of the 
lowest-income household is satisfied by low-rent houses. Even so, the Chinese housing 
market and regulatory system have still been going through a sustained and rapid 
transformation. 
Top Tier: Private Commodity 
Housing Market -- provides 
housing at the market price or 
rent to the high income residents. 
Middle Tier: Economically 
Affordable Housing -- purchased 
by the mid-to-low income 
householders. 
Lowest Tier: Low-rent Housing -- 
provides rental housing to the 
lowest earning citizens. 
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2.3.2 The Development of Other Relevant Policies 
2.3.2.1 The Development of Land Policy 
Land is not only a property asset but also a significant factor input or means of production. Its 
ownership and use is one major issue relating to the national economy and the peoples’ 
livelihood. Figure 2.1(b) demonstrates the time line of the land policy development since the 
Founding of New China. In essence, after the establishment of the People’s Republic of 
China in 1949, and before the market reforms in 1978, the land ownership and use rights 
were controlled by the state. This land regime was mainly based on two important 
commitments of the Constitution: ‘the eventual elimination of private ownership of property 
and the means of production, as well as the establishment of a centrally planned economy 
monopolized by the state sector’ (Anderson, 2010).  
Since 1978, alongside transforming the centrally planned economy into a market-based 
economy, the ownership and user rights of land went through a gradual transition into the 
private sector. Table 2.1 indicates some key milestones in land system reforms after 1978. All 
of the key milestones play an essential role in the developing story of the Chinese land and 
housing market, especially the new ‘Bidding Auction Listing Transferring State-owned Land 
Use Rights Provision’ in 2002. 
As Lichtenberg and Ding (2009) describe, under the current system, all land in China is 
owned by the state, but market forces are increasingly giving rise to a private sector. This 
consequence was caused by a dual system of land allocation, including some land use rights 
allocated via market mechanisms and other land use rights allocated via non-market 
approaches. The institutional reforms make it possible for the long-term lease mechanism for 
transferable land use rights in the land market. Particularly, urban land is owned by the nation 
while its use is administrated by local government authorities. These local officials lease out 
land use rights to the private sector with long-run leases. Historically, the rental fees of land 
were negotiated between the government and the private entities. Recently, however, under 
the pressure of market forces, the competitive auctions or tenders have become a channel for 
land leases. 
Table 2.1: Key Milestones of Chinese Land Reforms Effecting Housing Market 
Date Reforms  
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1978 The ‘household responsibility system’: the cooperatives contracted land use rights to 
individual tenant peasant households, with the ownership retained by the commune 
1983 Rural commune regime ended 
1987 Land leasing system was initially introduced in Shenzhen 
1988 The transfer of development rights was legitimized by the PRC’s constitution 
1990 The central government formally approved a ground lease system 
1992 Public land leasing system spread nationwide 
1994 Basic farmland protection implementation amended 
Tax assignment changes adopted 
1995 Rules for the Implementation of the Interim Regulations of the People's Republic of China on 
Land Value-added Tax (Decree 6)  
Applying VAT to rental value of land 
1996 No net loss of farmland as a result of substantial balance of agricultural land policy 
1997 Circular of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the General Office of 
the State Council on Further Strengthening Land Management and Practically Protecting 
Cultivated Land (Decree 11) 
1998 Land Administration Law of 1998 reaffirms substantial balance policy and retrenches 
regulations on farmland conversion 
New restriction on residential housing land promulgated 
1999 Circular of the General Office of the State Council on Strengthening Management of Transfer 
of Land and Strictly Banning Speculative Land Dealing (Decree 39) 
2002 ‘Bidding Auction Listing Transferring State-owned Land Use Rights Provision’ implemented 
by the Ministry of Land and Resources since 1
st
 July 2002 
2004 Circular of the Ministry of Land and Resources on Enforcement and Inspection of Carrying 
on the Tender to Sell the Operating Land Auction (Decree 71) 
The remarkable boundary of land policy, 31
st
 August 2004, so called ‘8.31 major limit of land 
granting’. The last deadline of ending land agreement transferring. Since then, new bidding 
auction listing land transferring system built up 
2006 ‘the Central Committee of Communist Party of China develops the eleventh about making the 
national economy and society the proposal that plans 5 years’, points out the cultivated land 
must remain 1.8 billion acres until the end of 2010, so called ‘1.8 billion red line’ 
2009 Central authority recommends regulation of LUTRG-linkage between urban land taking and 
rural land giving policy, which preserves the interest of land use transfers 
Since 
2007 
In allusion to the real estate enterprises, governments unveil fresh policies, such as the levy of 
land value increment tax, the supply of limited price land, and land granting via invitation to 
tender instead of listing & auction. 
Source: Anderson, 2010, Table 1. 
Under China’s national land market conditions, the excessive high land leasing fees become 
the breeding ground for some speculation and profiteering behaviour, such as ‘Quandi’ and 
‘Wudi’. These behaviours refer to buying and holding land as much as possible, without 
developing land or constructing buildings. The developers attempt to pursue more profits 
waiting for the further increase of land price and house prices; meanwhile the highest records 
of land transfer fees, so called ‘Diwang’, have been continuously broken in recent years. 
Table 2.2 demonstrates the ‘Diwang’ of different cities across China in 2009. Furthermore, on 
the 15
th
 March 2010, Beijing has three pieces of land with ‘Diwang’ prices in the same single 
day (see Table 2.3). 
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Table 2.2: The ‘Diwang’ of different cities in 2009 
City Bid-winning Enterprise 
Total Price of the Land 
(billion yuan) 
Land Value in Terms of Per 
Unit Floor Age (1,000 yuan) 
Beijing Big Dragon Real Estate 5.05 29.859 
Shanghai Greentown Group 7.245 27.231 
Tianjin CITIC Group 3.6 1.434 
Shenzhen ZhaoShang HuaQiao Cheng 0.53 18.875 
Guangzhou 
Guangzhou Urban Construction 
Group 
0.345 15.324 
Hangzhou Zhejiang West Real Estate Group 0.77 24.295 
Ningbo JinIie Property 0.77 8.170 
Nanjing Poly Real Estate 1.592 7.553 
Suzhou Greentown Group 3.6 28.057 
Wuxi Greentown Group 2.9 7.097 
Jinan Sinopec 0.086 17.8 
Xiamen Hengxiang Ownership 1.047 30.94 
Chongqing 
Cnooc Group Kowloon 
Storehouse 
4.1 2.741 
Dongguan LongGuang Real Estate 0.703 13.088 
Foshan China Overseas Property 3.82 6.495 
Hainan China Sonangol 0.905 6.141 
Data source: Sohu Focus  http://house.focus.cn/ztdir/2009diwang/  
 
Table 2.3: Three ‘Diwang’ in Beijing on 15th March 2010 
Bid-winning Enterprise 
Total Price of the Land 
(billion yuan) 
Land Value in Terms of Per 
Unit Floor Age (1,000 yuan) 
Big Dragon Real Estate 5.05 29.859 
Greentown Group 7.245 27.231 
CITIC Group 3.6 1.434 
Data source: Daily Economic News http://www.nbd.com.cn/ 
2.3.2.2 The Development of Land Tax Policy 
China’s real estate taxation was built up in the early 1950s. According to the development of 
real estate taxes, it can be classified into four stages since 1949. According to the time line of 
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Figure 2.1(c), Figure 2.4 shows the historical development stages of China’s real estate tax 
system. 
 
(Source: Du ,2009, Figure 3.4) 
Figure 2.4: The development of Chinese real estate tax categories 
The first stage: the infant stage (1950-1972) 
At 30
th
 January 1950, the central government announced ‘Guidelines for the Implementation 
of National Taxes ’, which started the levy of land tax, housing tax and inheritance tax; in 
May 1950, the Ministry of Finance promulgated ‘Land Tax Provisional Regulations’ and 
‘Housing Tax Provisional Regulations’. On 8th August 1951, the Government Administration 
Council published ‘Provisional Regulations of Urban Real Estate Tax’ to begin to collect 
urban real estate tax. Due to the postponement of inheritance tax, land tax and housing tax 
were amalgamated with real estate taxes; thus, the housing and land tax system during the 
initial stage of new China comprises three tax categories: real estate tax, stamp tax and deed 
tax. 
The second stage: the recession stage (1973-1983) 
During the reformation of the tax system in 1973, the central authority adjusted the incidence 
of real estate tax, and only collected real estate tax on the real estate management ministry, 
individuals, and foreign-owned enterprises. Under the background of free urban land usage, 
state-owned houses and tax simplification, the importance of real estate tax and deed tax 
declined substantially in China’s tax system. 
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After reform and opening-up, in October 1984, the government reactivated the collection of 
real estate tax on state-owned enterprises, and also separated real estate tax into housing tax 
and land tax. Over 1986 to 1988, the State Council implemented three remarkable tax 
regulations-‘Provisional Regulations of Housing Tax’, ‘Provisional Regulations of Farm 
Land Occupation Tax’ and ‘Provisional Regulations of Urban Land Use Tax’-which meant 
the recovery of the real estate tax system. 
The fourth stage: the improving state (from 1994) 
The Chinese socialist market economy system was initially established during this stage. The 
reform of the tax system in 1994 recomposed the tax base and tax range. Furthermore, it 
added a new real estate tax category of land value increment tax; in October 1997 the new 
deed tax regulations were implemented; and moreover, on 12
th
 December 1999, three related 
tax departments of the central government announced a joint intention to start collecting 
property transfer tax. In 2006 and 2007, governments re-modified ‘Provisional Regulations of 
Farm Land Occupation Tax’ and ‘Provisional Regulations of Urban Land Use Tax’ to raise 
the amount of tax credits. 
The current Chinese real estate tax system is based on the foundation of the 1994 tax reform. 
There are a total of 12 tax categories relating to land, property and real estate enterprises, 
including urban land use tax, real estate tax, farmland occupation tax, land value increment 
tax, urban maintenance & construction tax, deed tax, business tax or sales tax, stamp tax, 
enterprise income tax, individual income tax, education surtax, and resources tax (Chang, 
2007). The first six categories are straightforwardly targeted on real estate property (An and 
Wang, 2004; Xie, 2005). The present tax system has been designed of tax collection on three 
branches—holding, flowing and earning of housing property. The real estate taxes have 
played an impressively positive role in the comprehensive use of land resources, the rational 
distribution of real estate resource and the abundance of local financial income (Du, 2009).  
In order to dampen down the increase of housing prices during recent years, the State Council 
of China has been discussing the regulation details of housing property taxes. Some large 
urban areas have been listed as experimental cities, such as Shanghai and Chongqing. More 
specifically, since 28
th
 January 2011, housing property tax has started to be collected in these 
two pioneering cities. The tentative tax rate in Shanghai is 0.6%. It is between 0.5%-1.2% in 
Chongqing. As a new instrument to control real estate price, the housing property tax will be 
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implemented gradually in further urban and rural areas. The levying of housing property tax 
has become another key milestone in the Chinese housing market. This means that the 
Chinese housing market takes one more step towards becoming a fully market-oriented 
market in the socialist market economy. 
2.3.2.3 The Development of Housing Monetary Policy 
The real estate industry, as a typical capital-intensive industry, is highly dependent on the 
financial sector. There is a close mutual relationship between the housing market and the 
banking industry. Any changes of one industry may significantly influence the other sector 
particularly in China as both industries are deeply under national macro control. Within 
China’s current real estate market, commercial banks have participated in nearly all the 
processes of housing development. According to an estimate of the People's Bank Research 
Council, approximately 80% of the land acquisition and real estate development funds, 
directly or indirectly, come from commercial bank credit. The scale of the fund-raising for 
real estate agencies is very limited; therefore the real estate business has to rely on the 
commercial banks, either debt financing for development project loan, or capital raising via 
pre-sale auction and collecting money from contractors (Ma, 2007). Not only for the 
suppliers, but also the consumers, they also need mortgage loans for purchasing houses from 
commercial banks.      
So the commercial banks, directly or indirectly, take market risks and credit risks during each 
stage of the housing market operation, through various forms of credit funds-housing 
consumption lending, real estate development loans, construction firms’ liquidity loans, and 
land reserve loans, etc. On the basis of existing studies, the rapid development of housing 
market profits originates from loose monetary policy. Although the central bank has 
implemented many moderate and even tight monetary policies in the recent years, under the 
stimulation of rising property prices, bank credit expansion is still ‘unstoppable’. The 
expansion of the money supply has strongly supported the huge release of property 
development and individual housing consumption (Kong, 2010). For instance, He (2007) 
shows that, by the end of 2005, real estate loans had reached 3070 billion yuan (374.77 
billion US$
15
), accounting for 14.84% of total loans from financial institutions and 16.75% of 
GDP. According to some financial institutions’ estimations, the percentage of bank lending in 
                                                 
15 From the NBSC, the average exchange rate in 2005 is 8.1917 yuan/US$. 
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real estate development was over 55% by 2005, and mortgage loans on housing was 63% in 
the first quarter of 2005. Furthermore, the growth rate of real estate loans has been 
continuously higher than the increase in total financial institution lending, even up to the peak 
value—34.5% in the first quarter of 2005. 
On the other side, the support of monetary policy for housing industry has also contributed to 
the fast growth of individual housing mortgage loans. The report by the Central Bank points 
out, that since 1998, the encouragement of monetary policy on the real estate market has been 
changed from the one side motivation on property enterprises to promoting both sides of 
investment and consumption. Individual housing loans have become today’s most important 
part of China’s individual consumption lending (Kong, 2010). According to the statistical 
data, by the end of October 2007, national commercial real estate loans have risen to 4690 
billion yuan (616.78 billion US$) with a 30.75% growth rate, accounting for 28.9% of total 
net new commercial bank loans at the same period. Therein, individual housing lending is 
2600 billion yuan (341.925 billion US$) with a 35.57% growth rate; housing provident fund 
loans is 450.22 billion yuan (59.21 billion US$) with a 34.87% growth rate. Under the 
expansion of the money supply, the sold floor space of commercial buildings has been 
increasing by an average 20% a year, with the highest recorded level of 45.1% in 2005.
16
 
Monetary policy has impacted on the real estate market through two channels: money supply 
and interest rate (Ahearne et al. 2005, Lv et al. 2010). From the perspective of the money 
supply, the data from NBSC shows that the growth rate of money supply (M2: money and 
quasi-money) has remained above 20% from 1991 to 1996; although slightly dropping 
afterwards, it still remained around 17%. After the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997 and the 
Global Financial Crisis of 2007-2008, the growth rate has firmed up to 27.7% again in 2009. 
With regard to the interest rate policy, the record of the People’s Bank of China indicates that 
the overall trend of the statutory reserve ratios
17
 for both large and small financial institutions 
has steadily risen up since 2004, although the ratios slightly fell down in 2008 due to the 
2007 global financial crisis. Meanwhile, the benchmark deposit and lending rates have also 
kept increasing during the same period, apart from in 2008.  
The increases in the interest rate not only corresponds to market prosperity and development 
needs, but they also reflect the determination of the central government to limit the housing 
                                                 
16 From the NBSC, the average exchange rate in 2007 is 7.6040 yuan/US$. 
17 ‘Statutory Reserve Ratio’ refers to a minimum portion (expressed as a percent) of total customer deposits and notes, that 
each commercial bank must pay as reserves to the central bank. 
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market, as well as control the extremely high inflation rates. Especially in 2010, against the 
background of rapidly increasing house prices and excessive inflation, the People’s Bank of 
China raised interest rates as many as ten times, the benchmark deposit and lending rates 
twice, and the statutory reserve ratio eight times. To some extent, these monetary measures 
have controlled the growth rate of house prices. 
In addition to the interest rate adjustments, the central authority has introduced abundant 
implementary provisions, which specifically aim at controlling the phenomenon of house 
price increases to further relieve stess in the Chinese housing market. The housing loan 
policy has started since 1985, and has been through a dramatic development stage from 1996 
to 1999. After 2002, the houisng loan policy has rationally returned to the normal track of 
development. Since 2010, the China’s central government has frequently implemented new 
housing policies to cool down the overheated real estate market. Particularly, in April 2010, 
‘New Four Housing Policies’ and ‘New Ten Housing Policies’ have the strongest impact and 
play a significant role in the Chinese housing market. Figure 2.1(d) illustrates the time line of 
its development process. Table 2.4 elaborates a series of adjustments for housing loans 
policies. Overall, according to the status of the Chinese housing market development, the 
adjustments combine loose and tight policies together in order to guide changes in the 
housing price trend. For example, the loose monetary policy refers to the discount for housing 
loan interest rate, and the tight policy includes raising the percentage of down payments for 
the second apartment. These adjustments have contributed to making a better policy 
environment for China’s housing market. 
Table 2.4: The Adjustment of Housing Loans’ Policies 
Date Reforms 
2003.06 The central bank: the down payment % for the first housing purchase is at least 20%, 
decreasing interest rate by 10%; while for the purchase of high-grade commercial 
buildings, villas or the second house, commercial banks can properly increase the 
percentage of down payment. 
2005.03 There is no restriction on interest rate cap, and the down payment % for individual 
housing loan can ascend from 20% to 30%. 
2006.05 A notice on adjusting individual housing credit policy: the down payment % of home 
loans must not be under 30%; while for the apartments less than 90 m
2
, the percentage 
remained at 20%. 
2006.08 The central bank: interest rate floor for housing mortgage loan expanded from 90% to 
85%, the interest rate of individual housing fund stayed at the same level. 
2007.09.27 The central bank and CBRC
18
: the down payment proportions were no less than 20% for 
apartments less than 90 m
2
, and no less than 30% for apartments more than 90 m
2
; for 
second housing purchase, the ratio must be above 40%, and the interest rate must not be 
                                                 
18 CBRC: China Banking Regulatory Commission 
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under 110% of benchmark deposit rate; also, the down payment % and interest rate should 
significantly go up with the increase number of housing purchase. 
2007.10 The central bank failed to make a exact definition of ‘the second apartment’, and banks 
declared different standards for ‘the second apartment’. Therefore, the new policy for ‘the 
second apartment’ fell into an awkward dilemma.  
2007.12.05 The central bank and CBRC: for individual home loans of the second apartment, if per 
capita housing area is still lower than the local average level, the consumer can apply for 
the discount of home loan interest rate as well as the first apartment. 
2008.10.22 The notice was declared by the central bank: since 2008, commercial banks can supply a 
70% discount for housing loan interest rate to clients on the basis of the standards for the 
first time purchasing houses. 
2008.10.27 The central bank clearly pointed out that the interest rate floor of individual home loans 





 claimed that ‘the second apartment buyers, who are fit for the policy 
requirements, can apply the discount for housing loan interest rate ’. 
2008.12.20 General Office of the State Council: for individual housing loans of the second apartment, 
the consumer can also enjoy the discount of home loan interest rate if per capita housing 
area is still lower than the local average level. 
2009.01 In Beijing, the second apartment policy was released by Beijing Municipal Construction 
Committee, Beijing Development and Reform Commission, Beijing Finance Bureau and 
Beijing Local Tax Bureau; the proportion of down payment was adjusted as the same as 
the first apartment. 
2009.06.22 CBRC: commercial banks cannot neither define the standards for ‘the second apartment’ 
by themselves, nor lower the down payment percentage by any means. 
2010.01.07 A notice on promoting the healthy development of real estate market is announced by the 
State Council: reasonable guide housing consumption, reining in the speculative housing 
purchase, increasing the percentage of down payment for second home loan to 40%, and 
continuously practising housing tax policies with differentiation. 
2010.04.12 Five largest state-owned commercial banks
21
 tighten home loan interest rate. ICBC 
increases the discount rate of housing loan interest rate from 70% to 85%; ABC and CCB 
call of the discount for second housing loan interest rate; BOC sets up the home loan 
interest rate as 110% of benchmark deposit rate; BC means to conduct new policy for 
housing mortgage loan. 
2010.04.15 The State Council announced four concrete measures in order to slow down the excessive 
growth of house prices (‘New Four Housing Policies’): the down payment % must be 
over 30% for the first purchase of over 90 m
2
 housing; the ratio must be above 50% for 
the second housing home loans, and the loan interest rate must not be under 110% of the 
benchmark deposit rate; the down payment % and loan interest rate have to significantly 
increase for families with consumption on the third housing. 
2010.04.17 Only two days after the announcement of ‘New Four Housing Policy’, the State Council 
took another ten concrete steps to press down increasing housing price (‘New Ten 
Housing Policies’). 
2011.01.26 The State Council announces that the down payment percentage of second housing home 
loan is raised up to 60%.  
Source: Sohu Focus ‘The Review of Policy Adjustment in Recent Years’ http://house.focus.cn/news/2011-01-
27/1180107.html  
2.3.2.4 The Development of Population Policy 
China, as a fast growing economy, has been experiencing one of the most rapid urbanization 
processes in the world. As mentioned before, China’s urbanization rate was only 19% in 1980, 
                                                 
19 the National People's Congress 
20 Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference 
21 Five largest state-owned commercial banks in China: Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC), Agricultural 
Bank of China (ABC), Bank of China (BOC), China Construction Bank (CCB), and Bank of Communication (BC) 
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and grew to 45.66% in 2008; while it is expected to reach 52.28%, 57.62% and 67.81% in 
2015, 2020 and 2030 respectively
22
.  
On the basis of China’s special Household Registration System (Hukou), the annual urban 
population growth can be distributed into two components: one is the natural growth of the 
existing urban residents, and the other is the net urban migrants with urban household 
registration transformation.
23
 According to Chen et al. (2010, Table 1), over 1991 to 2005, the 
natural increase of urban citizens remained stable and only accounted for a small part of the 
total growth of new city population. Comparatively, the main source of city dwellers growth 
contributed to the net official rural-to-urban migrants. Especially, after 1995, the disparity has 
been increasingly aggravated between the natural growth of urban citizens and the net 
migration to cities.  
It comes to a further conclusion that the net migration with official household registration 
transfer is the primary source of urbanization in China and takes up to 90% of new urban 
immigrations. Not only have the new official migrants from rural areas added to the demand 
for housing in cities, but the floating population without household registration transfer 
theoretically may also cause a thriving housing demand in urban areas. Since unlike the 
official urban residents, the floating population could not enjoy the equal treatment to 
purchase the affordable houses. Instead, either the floating migrants with higher economic 
capability have to purchase commodity buildings in the primary housing market to meet their 
housing needs, which further causes house price inflation; or the lower-income floating 
population have to live in the shanty town-the substitutes of affordable houses in the 
secondary housing market. 
2.4 Achievements of Chinese Housing Reform 
Through three decades of Reform & Opening and the rapid expansion of the Chinese Real 
Estate Industry, the Chinese housing market has achieved significant improvements in many 
fields, such as the diversification of housing types, high home ownership, and the rapid 
growth of housing built/sold, residential investments and per capita housing space. 
                                                 
22 The data is from the ‘Macro-Economy Blue Book’ published by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences on 15th April 
2010. 
23  Migrants without the official transformation of household registration (Hukou) are defined as floating population and 
usually excluded from urban population in the official statistical survey and census in China. 
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2.4.1 The Diversification of Chinese Housing Types and Home Ownership 
Ratio24 
After housing reforms, commercial houses have been produced in many formats instead of 
the single welfare housing modality, in order to meet customers’ needs at different levels. 
Figure 2.5 shows the classification of buildings in China. The houses in the market can be 
divided into many groups: the welfare housing assigned to employees, the commercialized 
buildings etc. For instance, the commercial buildings include economically affordable 
housing, which is very cheap as with the welfare houses but different from welfare houses. 
The welfare houses are used by employees because they have paid a certain proportion of 
their wage into a house funding, while the economically affordable housing is also 
determined by the market, but under the authorities’ control and administration. Thereby the 
prices can greatly differ between different houses. 
 
(Source: China Statistical Yearbook, National Bureau of Statistics of China http://www.stats.gov.cn/) 
Figure 2.5: The classifications of Chinese commercial houses 
Generally speaking, home ownership has risen dramatically during this period. Gao (2010) 
demonstrates there are two major sources for housing ownership: either purchasing existing 
public housing or acquiring newly constructed commercial buildings. In 2005, MOC (2006) 
illustrates the percentage of homeowners in urban residents with ‘Hukou’ holders as 81.62%. 
While in accordance with ‘Report on the Status of the Cities in China 2010/2011’25 published 
on 4
th
 October 2010, this number has reached to 87.8%. Furthermore, the conditions of urban 
residences have been improved substantially. By the end of 2008, the proportions of urban 
                                                 
24 Home ownership ratio means privately-owned housing-houses inventory of all society ratio. 
25 ‘Report on the Status of the Cities in China 2010/2011—City, Make Your Life Better’. Published jointly by the China 

















home holders, living in single buildings and apartment units, are 4.5% and 83% respectively. 
In contrast, only 12.5% of householders live in tube-shaped apartments
26
 or bungalows. 
2.4.2 Demand and Supply Sides of Housing Market 
With massive urbanization and rural-to-urban migration, the demand for housing is expected 
to continuously rise in urban areas. On 25
th
 March 2010, a report produced by the UN, points 
out China’s urbanization rate was only 19% in 1980, but it will be as high as 47% and 59% in 
2010 and 2025 respectively. ‘The Macro-Economy Blue Book’, published by CASS27 on 15th 
April 2010, also predicts vigorous growth of the urbanization rate in China. As the Blue Book 
said, this rate was 45.66% in 2008, while it will substantially grow by up to 52.28%, 57.62% 
and 67.81% in 2015, 2020 and 2030. The high expected urbanization rate reflects the 
expected increase in urban residences, and further is a reflection of the demand for urban 
dwellings.  
In the meantime, the supply of urban residential buildings has grown increasingly to match 
the demand side in the housing market. The statistics data from NBSC illustrates that the 
residential building completion (the supply side) in 2009 has grown approximately by three 
times compared to 2000, while the floor space sold of residential buildings (the demand side) 
has increased more sharply from 165.7 million m
2
 to 861.85 million m
2
 over the same period. 
Moreover, between 2000 to 2009, the completed floor space always exceeded the amout sold 
in the initial years. However, since 2005, the level sold has been higher than the amout 
completed. Clearly, the persistent imbalance between market demand and supply might 
become one of the essential reasons driving the house price growth. 
2.4.3 Residential Investments 
Among the three key macro variables--investment, consumption and export—of China’s 
economy, investment has always played a profound influence on China’s macro-economy. 
More specifically, real estate investment has been widely regarded as a significant indicator 
of a healthy economy. Since 1979, responding to the call to enhance people’s living standards 
and more liberal economic development policies, the state has invested in the real estate 
                                                 
26 ‘Tube-shaped Apartment’ is a typical housing style with Chinese characteristics, which is a product of Chinese state-
owned enterprises welfare housing system in 1970s and 1980s. These buildings are dormitories with the long corridor, 
shared toilets & kitchens, and the same size individual rooms, usually less than 20 m2 for each room. 
27 the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) 
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sector to a remarkable effect. Based on the statistics of the NBSC, in 2009, the investment in 
new residential building construction has increased nearly ten-fold from 380.64 billion yuan 
(55.722 billion US$) to 3642.8 billion yuan (533.275 billion US$)
28
. Also, at provincial level, 
the real estate investment has gone through a dramatic expansion. Taking the three most fast 
developing provinces—Beijing, Shanghai and Guangdong--as examples, in 2001, the gross 
fixed asset investments were 151.33 billion yuan (18.283 billion US$), 200.46 billion yuan 
(24.219 billion US$) and 348.44 billion yuan (42.097 billion US$) respectively
29
. By 2009, 
this climbed up to 461.69 billion yuan (67.587 billion US$), 504.38 billion yuan (73.837 
billion US$) and 1293.31 billion yuan (189.33 billion US$) respectively with the rate of 
increase as 205% for Beijing, 152% for Shanghai and 271% for Guangdong
30
.  
2.4.4 Per Capita Housing Space  
Although under the pressure of migration to urban cities and constant imbalance between 
market demand and supply, the housing reform has promoted the increase in the available 
housing. ‘At the very beginning of the reform in 1980, the average housing space standard 
was only 7.18 m2 per capita, then slightly raised to 10.02 m2 per capita in 1985, despite that 
26.5% of urban residents was still either homeless or suffered from overcrowding’ (Tang, 
1989). The urban population was only 172.45 million accounting for 17.92% of the total 
population in 1978, but had a huge leap forward to 606.67 million, 45.68% of the total 
population by 2008 (NBSC 2009 Year Book). Meanwhile, the average living space for urban 
individuals has risen steadily since the Reforms. In addition, the vice minister of MOHURD
31
 
has pronounced that the housing space per capita would reach up to a historical new high—
28 m2 per capita—in 2007, representing a dramatic improvement in the Chinese housing 
reform. However, the actual number would drop downward to 22 m2 if migrant urban 
residents without official registration (Hukou) are also included in the urban populations. 
Even so, we should believe that such an achievement is difficult, since China has been 
experiencing contemporaneously high-speed urbanization process over the same period.  
                                                 
28 From the NBSC, the average exchange rate in 2009 is 6.8310 yuan/US$. 
29 From the NBSC, the average exchange rate in 2001 is 8.2770 yuan/US$. 
30 From the NBSC, the average exchange rate in 2009 is 6.8310 yuan/US$. 
31 The Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural Development (MOHURD) 
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2.5 The Major Problems of the Chinese Housing Market 
2.5.1 Housing Inequities for Householders with Different Income 
Housing reform has effectively increased people’s living space and relieved the heavy 
housing financial burden of governments. During the progress of privatization across the 
country, although the disposable income of urban residents has sharply risen and the problem 
of housing shortage has been partially resolved, the income disparity between the rich and the 
poor has increased among urban areas on a national scale (Zhao and Bourassa, 2003). 
According to the statistics of NBSC, the highest-grade disposable incomes per capita of 6 
provinces are all above 20000 yuan (2927.829 US$) in 2009.
32
 Also the first and second 
highest income is 28838 yuan (4221.637 US$) in Shanghai and 26738 yuan (3920.802 US$) 
in Beijing, which is approximately 2.4 times the lowest income province Gansu with only 
11930 yuan (1746.45 US$) per capita. Not only in crosswise comparison, but also in 
longitudinal form, there also exists a huge gap between the top 3 provinces and the last 3 
provinces. Figure 2.6 shows the disposable income gap between the top 3 and the last 3 
provinces over the last few years. The developmental level of the richest regions has been 
nearly 10 years ahead of the poorest regions. More specifically, the income level of Shanghai 
in 1996 was equal to Gansu’s income level in 2005, while the per capital disposable income 
of Gansu in 2009 was similar to Shanghai in 2000.  
 
Figure 2.6: The Disposable Income Gap between the Top 3 and the Last 3 Provinces over 
Few Years 
Not only that, according to the National Statistics Yearbooks (NBSC, 2007), the house price 
to income ratios in China’s biggest cities have remained at around 20 (Ma, 2005), which are 
                                                 
32 From the NBSC, the average exchange rate in 2009 is 6.8310 yuan/US$. 
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significantly higher than the recommended standard of 3-6 by the World Bank. ‘Even in 
developed countries such as the United States, the median housing price-household annual 
income ratio is rarely over 8 in most regions’ (Gao, 2010). Particularly, in most major cities in 
China, the ratios of average housing price to the middle-to-lower income families are much 
higher than those in developed countries. What’s worse, the gap in these ratios between 
mid/low- and high- income families has been enlarged in recent years (Jin, 2006). For 
instance, in 2005, the house price to annual income ratio was 22.69 for the urban lowest 
income residents (the bottom 20% income households), while it was only 2.45 in highest 
earning families (the top 20% income households). Compared to the global average levels, 
these two ratios for mid-to-low and high income householders are 9.7 and 5.6 respectively. 
The rapidly rising house prices probably worsened social and political stability in China, 
without appropriate housing policies to satisfy the demand for affordable and low-rent houses. 
Therefore, housing inequities have become one of the major sides of social injustices causing 
social unrest in many regions in China.  In recent nationwide urban development programmes, 
such as large-scale removal and rebuilding, even with the sizeable compensations from the 
governments, many householders or units relocated due to building demolition were still 
reluctant to move out of their old and subpar buildings, for fear of not being able to afford 
new dwellings. In some extreme cases, in order to expropriate the land, the authorities take 
some compulsory means, such as cutting off maintenance services; but the residents 
resolutely refuse to move out of their old houses even without the supply of water and 
electricity (Chen, Wei and Xiang, 2006). Either the developers have to increase compensation 
for householders, or there might be a violent conflict between householders or units and 
developers or local authorities (Xiao and Yang, 2008).  
On the basis of the three-tier housing regime after the housing reforms (Yiu, 2010), the 
housing demand of mid-to-low and low income householders should be satisfied by the 
affordable housing and low-rent dwellings system. However, since the prime commodity 
housing market for high earning families appears much more profitable, most of the newly 
built constructions have been targeted at top grade private apartments, while the government 
could not provide a sufficient supply of affordable public welfare houses for mid and low 
income individuals. Thus it can be seen, the current housing system design does not correlate 
very well with Chinese income distribution. On the one side, rich people possess much more 
housing units than they need; on the other hand, the majority of the population cannot afford 
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the dwellings available in the housing market and have to rely on the public welfare housing 
system, which comprises only a small portion of the whole housing supply (Gao, 2010). 
2.5.2 Lack of Sufficient Affordable House or Low-Rent Housing Supply 
Another evident problem of Chinese housing market is the lack of sufficient affordable house 
or low-rent housing supply for middle-to-low income populations. Although one of the 
primary objectives of Chinese housing reform is to guarantee mid-to-low families  affordable 
housing or low-rent housing; as a matter of fact, the actual demand for housing has far 
exceeded the annual completion supply of affordable house. Since the most important target 
of the real estate developers is to maximize the returns on their capital investment, while 
doing such projects for middle-to-low income householders is not as profitable as doing 
commodity buildings for middle-to-high income homeowners; therefore, they lack incentives 
to develop affordable house or low-rent housing. 
Over the past decade, China’s central authority has budgeted at vast expenses to support the 
affordable/low-rent housing projects, the largest project known as ‘An Ju Gong Cheng’. ‘In 
1998, the government spent a total of 80.6 billion yuan (9.735 billion US$
33
), which was 
about 0.99% of GDP, to build affordable housing. In 2003, the government expenditure on 
affordable housing construction increased to 157.8 billion yuan (19.065 billion US$
34
), which 
was 1.35% of annual GDP’ (Jin, 2006). In addition, the real estate developers are encouraged 
to construct such projects by purchasing land at a much lower cost than market value, ‘on 
condition that a certain percentage of the acquired land was to be developed for price-limited 
housing projects’ (Gao, 2010), which term of transaction is called ‘land-for-housing 
approach’.  
However, the effectiveness of these arrangements has not been satisfactory. The reality is that 
the government-funded affordable/low-rent houses are far behind in fulfilling the 
requirements of middle-to-low income families. As a result of the profit maximization, with 
the ‘land-for-housing approach’ of acquiring land, the real estate developers have always 
constructed other projects, such as ‘luxurious apartments and mansions for the elite’ (Gao, 
2010), to replace the affordable/low-rent housing project. Worse than that, the local 
authorities usually motivate such behaviours, because selling the high-priced commodity 
                                                 
33 From the NBSC, the average exchange rate in 1998 is 8.2791 yuan/US$. 
34 From the NBSC, the average exchange rate in 2003 is 8.2770 yuan/US$. 
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housing can dramatically contribute to the growth of GDP and financial revenue for local 
economy. Based on the data from NBSC, the total constructed floor space of affordable/low-
rent houses has been persistently increasing over 2000 to 2009, but the proportion of 
affordable housing to total constructed floor space has been decreasing. Similarly, not only 
the completed floor space of affordable houses but also the percentage of affordable houses to 
total completed floor space has presented a decreasing trend during the last decade. 
In order to reveal how greatly different revenue can be made between building 
villas/individual apartments and affordable/low-rent houses, there is a specific case of Vanke 
Real Estate Group, the largest real estate developer in China.  As we can see from Table 2.5, 
there are three examples of their housing projects in Shanghai: ‘Lan Qiao (Orchid Woods), 
which hosts single family houses of around 280-480 m
2
 in lot size; Hong Du (Red Capital) 
center, which is home to townhouses and multifamily houses; and Hong Qiao (Rainbow 
Bridge), an affordable housing project. Considering the space occupancy rate for each project, 
the Lan Qiao project has the highest land waste rate, while the affordable housing Hong Qiao 
project has the lowest. However, considering the huge difference in selling price per square 
meter lot size, and in building costs per square meter lot size, in 2006, Vanke actually made 
the highest profit from the most land-wasting Lan Qiao project, and the least profit from the 
affordable housing Hong Qiao project’(Gao, 2010). In light of this case, it is easy to 
understand why there is lack of sufficient affordable/low-rent house supply in China’s real 
estate market, even with the central government provision. 
Table 2.5: Cost and Profit Comparison across Different Housing Projects of Vanke 
Project Lan Qiao Hong Du Hong Qiao 
Type 






Space Occupancy Rate (%) 30 86 92 
Sales Price (yuan/m2) 40000 20000 4200 
Construction Cost 
(yuan/m2) 
2000-3000 3000 4000 
Profit (yuan/m2) 37000-38000 17000 200 
Source: Gao (2010) Box 1 
In response to the incentives of real estate developers to replace the affordable housing 
projects, China’s central authority has implemented more detailed and compulsive regulations, 
such as the ’90-70’ policy. In 2006, the central government issued a declaration that real 
estate developers are obliged to allocate 70% of the total area in each of their new housing 
projects to ‘affordable housing’, i.e., smaller than 90 m2 per unit (thus the nickname ‘90-70’ 
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units). The intention of ’90-70’ policy is to satisfy the housing demand of middle-to-low 
income householders; however, according to an anonymous official source, in the first five 
months of 2007, ‘90-70’ projects only accounted for 17.2% of all invested housing projects 
all over China (Gao, 2010). 
Based on Gao’s research (2010), due to the huge profit difference between affordable houses 
and luxury apartments, real estate developers have a strong motivation to seek ways around 
the ‘90-70’ policy minimizing the negative influence of such policy. Their strategies include: 
(1) building walls surrounding their acquired low-cost land to wait for opportunities to switch 
land usage in the near future; (2) altering construction plans to allow combining multiple 
neighboring ‘90-70’ small units into luxurious spacious larger units for home buyers not 
falling within the low-income group; (3) enlarging the space of the balcony, which is only 
counted as half of the living area by China’s national construction standard; hence, the final 
products can still be sold as luxury units with sizeable living area and spacious balconies.  
On the other hand, since the local governments are eager to generate higher government 
financial revenue and to stimulate local economic development by pushing the upscale 
housing market instead of fulfilling the housing needs of the lower-income group, the local 
political leaders were behind real estate developers. This helped deflect the intention of 
the ’90-70’ policy by building more affordable/low-rent housing for the lower-income 
families. More specifically, many local authorities promoted real estate developers to 
accumulate vacant land intended for the affordable housing, but not to develop it and wait 
until the policy changes in the near future. For example, as Shanghai municipal government 
required, developers have to maintain 70% of the under-construction projects to be affordable 
housing projects (in compliance with the 90 m
2
 rule). However, developers are allowed to 
maintain 100% of the projects to be large-unit apartments in regions with expensive housing 
prices (therefore higher profits) such as the downtown area. In this way, the excess profits 
from the lage-unit projects in high-price regions offset the ‘losses’ of the affordable housing 
projects. Other local authorities adapted the ‘90-70’ policy but to minimize its impacts as well. 
In addition, the strict ‘90-70’ policy even led to housing prices to rise further. When the few 
new housing projects according to such strict ‘90-70’ rules were brought into the market 
starting from early 2007, surprisingly, these intentionally designed small apartments even 
caused a new round of price increases. One specific case is the ‘Shanghai Olympic Garden’ in 
Songjiang (a suburban town close to Shanghai). The previously existing apartments in the 
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 in early 2007. With its third 
phase construction completed, about 266 newly constructed ‘90-70’ units were released in 







. Meanwhile, because of the fact that only 30% of newly-
completed units were bigger than 90 m
2
, the price for such bigger apartments sharply grew up 
in different cities.  
In short, the new regulation is pushing housing prices higher rather than providing an 
increase in low-price housing supply. Thus, it can be seen that the good intent by the central 
government to implement the strict ‘90-70’ policy to real estate industry did not result in 
more convenient and affordable housing units which suit people’s housing demand. The 
failure of the ‘90-70’ policy clearly demonstrates the ineffectiveness and insufficiency of 
simply using administrative tools from the central government in the Chinese housing market. 
2.5.3 Principal-Agent Problem 
In light of the housing reform since 1998, the land transfer policy has been through a variable 
revolution over time. In 2002, the implementation of a new bidding auction listing land 
transfer system has marked the marketization of China’s land use right transaction. Naturally, 
land transfer fees have now become one of the major sources of financial revenue for local 
authorities. As mentioned above, the discretionary self-interest among different levels of 
governments have generated the inconsistency of regulations and policies on controlling 
Chinese house prices. 
One of the most apparent problems is the ‘Principal-Agent’ problem between central 
government and local governments. As the ‘principal’ part, the central government has two 
primary goals: the long-term objective is to sustain a high growth rate of economic 
development; meanwhile, in order to ensure a stable social and political environment for 
sustainable economic growth, it is necessary to meet the demand of a majority of citizens for 
daily necessities, such as housing demand. The central government needs to achieve 
governing goals through sub-level authorities, which are local governments. In this case, 
local authorities have played a part of ‘agent’, who fulfils the objectives proposed by their 
principal, the central government (Gao 2010).  
                                                 
35 From the NBSC, the average exchange rate in 2007 is 7.6040 yuan/US$. 
36 From the NBSC, the average exchange rate in 2007 is 7.6040 yuan/US$. 
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In the Chinese real estate market, the interests of local governments, real estate developers, 
and commercial banks have become entangled with each other. Figure 2.7 demonstrates the 
mutual relationships among every party of the housing market: the central government, local 
authorities, real estate developers and commercial banks. In order to achieve the central 
government’s goal of high GDP growth and financial revenue, the local governments have 
transferred land use rights to real estate developers by even expropriating farm land; 
meanwhile, real estate developers have paid high land transfer fees and various taxes to the 
local authorities.  
 
(Source: Author’s summary) 
Figure 2.7: The Mutual Relationships of Each Party in the Chinese Housing Market 
As the ‘Cash Box’ of local governments, the land transfer fees have reached up to 2700 
billion yuan (398.848 billion US$)
37
 in 2010. It can be found from Figure 2.8 that the high 
speed of land transfer fee growth over 2001 to 2010. In 2001, the percentage of land transfer 
fees was only 16.6% of total financial revenue, while the percentage has accounted for 76.6% 
of local financial revenue with an increase rate of 70.4%. China’s land market has presented a 
trend with the growths of both the quantity and the price of land supply. More specifically, 
three cities, Beijing, Shanghai and Dalian, have moved into ‘Hundred Billion Club’, with 
total land transaction fees 160 billion yuan (23.635 billion US$), 150 billion yuan (22.158 
billion US$) and 110 billion yuan (16.249 billion US$) respectively. The price element has an 
outstanding contribution on the growth of urban land transfer fees. For instance, according to 
                                                 
37 From the NBSC, the average exchange rate in 2010 is 6.7695 yuan/US$.  
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a record, the land transaction area of Wuhan and Nanjing has grown by no more than 20%, 
but the land transfer fee has increased more than 125%.  
 
(Data Source: Southern Weekend Newspaper, 13th January 2011. Available from: http://www.infzm.com/content/54644) 
Figure 2.8: The Growth Rate and Percentage of Land Transfer Fees 2001-2010 
In recent years, the real estate market has largely contributed to the local economic output; 
meanwhile, GDP growth has become the most important evaluation element for local 
authorities. As a consequence, more and more local governments over depended on the land 
transaction and real estate development projects to fulfil the local financial advantage and 
GDP growth. The local authorities have relied on ‘real estate development as an important 
political tool to enhance their own political power and reputation within the governing system’ 
(Gao, 2010). As Gao (2010, Table 3) stated, in 2006 the highest percentage of land transfer 
fee in terms of local GDP was nearly 7% in Chongqing, and the percentage of land transfer 
fee in terms of local revenue was as high as 96.05% in Fujian. Even for the average level, this 
index in local revenue was 40.96%. Another overall trend was that, the less developed the 
region, the higher the percentage is. This phenomenon has raised much concern for a series of 
social problems, such as violent/forced demolition and rapidly rising house prices.  
As the principal party, the central government has implement a series of policies to control 
and regulate the land market and real estate market; while, as the agent party, the local 
governments, who fell into a financial dilemma, have racked their thoughts to expand the 
sources of land finance. The ‘common tricks’ include bidding to host various conferences and 
festivals, expropriating farmland in the name of ‘new rural community construction’, the 
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construction of affordable housing projects, the urban renewal of old cities, and so on. The 
local authorities expropriate land and remove the rural/urban residents into the concentrated 
residence area; afterwards, they transfer land use rights to real estate developers by bidding-
auction-listing channels, and finally get a huge amount of land transaction fees. In addition, 
hosting festivals and constructing new cities, not only raises financial income for local GDP 
growth, but also promotes the city image manifesting the political achievements. 
2.6 Summary of the Chinese Housing Market 
As our review shows, since reform and opening-up in 1978, the Chinese housing reform has 
experienced thirty years development with two overall stages: the pilot trial stage from 1978 
to 1991 and the real estate market development stage from 1992 to the present. More 
specifically, these two big stages can fall into four sub-steps: the gestation period (1978-
1988), the start of the real estate industry (1990-1995), the quick development stage (1998-
2002), and the housing industry adjustment period (2002-now).  
Before 1978, the old housing system was the socialist welfare housing system and the houses 
were provided almost free by government organizations and state-owned enterprises/work 
units. In the first stage, the housing reform trials were carried out in selected areas only by 
selling public housing at cost price and rising public housing rent. All the land rights for 
housing were state-owned, and state-owned enterprises did not need to pay for any fees for 
land using. Meanwhile, the real estate market has started to appear and the housing loan 
policy has started in 1985; while most people still lived in work units’ dormitories and only a 
small number of individuals had their own apartments. 
Moving to the second stage, the central government formally approved a ground land lease 
system in 1990, and then the first property boom appeared between 1992 and 1993 on a 
national scale. In 1994, the Chinese central authority promulgated ‘The Decision on 
Deepening the Urban Housing Reform’, which founded a comprehensive framework for 
housing reform and further listed the details in the next stage. In 1995, the ‘Decree 6--Rules 
for the Implementation of the Interim Regulations of the People's Republic of China on Land 
Value-added Tax’ was promulgated and applied Value Added Tax (VAT) to rental value of 
land. However, the housing loan development was still in the exploratory stage. Under the 
promotion of the implementation of these policies, some large real estate companies set up, 
such as the Chinese first and largest real estate company, Vanke.  
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During the third period, against the fast urbanization background, more positive policies have 
been approved covering for many sectors: housing reform policy, land policy and housing 
loan policy. According to the State Council announcement
38
 in 1997, the welfare-room 
system changed radically. In 1998, another milestone of the housing reform came up when 
the central government announced ‘A Notification of the Urban Housing System and 
Accelerating Housing Construction’, which means an end to the welfare allocation of urban 
housing. In the meantime, Land Administration Law of 1998 reaffirmed substantial balance 
policy and retrenches regulations on farmland conversion, which indicated the new 
restrictions on residential housing land were promulgated; furthermore, in 1999, the Decree 
39,  ‘Circular on Strengthening Management of Transfer of Land and Strictly Banning 
Speculative Land Dealing’, was also issued by the General Office of the State Council. This 
period also saw a dramatic development stage of housing loan policy. With the support of 
housing home loan, a number of urban citizens have bought their own apartments by 
borrowing the housing mortgage.  
Finally in the present stage, in order to control the overheated development, the Chinese 
housing market has stridden forward into an adjustment period. In 2002, the Ministry of Land 
and Resources issued the competitive bidding, auction and listing-for-sale transfer policy for 
the right to use state-owned land as profit-oriented land. ‘The Bidding Auction Listing 
Transferring State-owned Land Use Rights Provision’ has largely accelerated the 
marketization process of the Chinese housing market. Following this, the State Council 
issued ‘No. 18’39 document in September 2003, which was the first time publicly that the real 
estate industry has been accepted as a pillar of the national economy and that the housing 
market required sustainable and controlled development. In 2004, the remarkable boundary 
of land policy, 31
st
 August 2004, so called ‘8.31 major limit of land granting’, implied the last 
deadline of ending land agreement transfer. Since then, a new bidding auction listing land 
transferring system was finally built up.  
Moreover, since March 2005, the State Council, Ministry of Construction and other 
government departments not only made policies to stabilize house prices, but also issued 
policies to enhance the management of real estate taxation. In 2006, the General Office of the 
State Council also passed the Opinions of nine ministries and departments including the 
Ministry of Construction. The opinions indicated the demand to construct middle-and-small 
                                                 
38 This announcement was carried out to speed up and reform further the construction of the housing system.(3rd July,1997 ) 
39 See Footnote 9. 
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sized commodity houses for sale to low or intermediate income families. Meanwhile, in order 
to regulate the housing mortgage behaviours, the central bank of China has constantly 
escalated the ratio of down payment of home loans. This ratio has risen from 20% initially in 
2003 to 60% for the second apartment purchase in 2011. Especially in recent years, there 
have been growing calls for the regulation and restriction of the Chinese housing market.  
After three decades of housing reform, the real industry has become a major contributor to 
the nation’s economic growth. Under the current housing system, there are three tiers: (1) top 
tier—private commodity housing for high income families; (2) middle tier—economically 
affordable housing for mid-to-low income families; (3) lowest tier—low-rent housing for the 
lowest earning families. As we can see, the Chinese housing market has achieved great 
success in many aspects, such as the diversification of housing supply channels, the increase 
of residential investment, the improvement of floor space per capita and living standards.  
However, the Chinese housing market also faces some significant challenges and problems. 
For example, there exist severe housing inequities for householders with different income 
levels, and the house price-to-income ratio is much higher than the international standard 
level. Moreover, although the living standards have been improved on the overall level, there 
is still a lack of sufficient affordable housing/low-rent housing for low income citizens. Thus, 
a huge amount of slums and shanty towns have risen in response to the lack of housing 
supply. In addition, a principle-agent problem for land transfer fee persistently exists between 
the central government and local authorities in the long run.  
Based on above, the following chapters will penetrate deep into the impact factors of the 
Chinese housing market to analysis how these factors affect the Chinese house prices. 
Through the empirical research, the next part of this thesis will focus on the answers to what 
decides the Chinese house prices, whether there is convergence between regional house 
prices and how the housing conditions affect people’s subjective well-being. After the 
theoretical and empirical research, this thesis aims to give some policy recommendations and 
suggestions to resolve the existing challenges of the Chinese housing market.  
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Chapter 3—Empirical Analysis of Determinants of China’s Housing 
Market 
3.1 Introduction 
Following a discussion of the Chinese housing market background, this chapter is going to 
examine the fundamental determinants of Chinese house prices. That is crucial to determine 
the true reasons for the consecutive growth of real estate prices, and how dynamic forces 
affect house prices.  
The existing literature has proposed that, the major factors determining Chinese house prices 
fall into two aspects—the demand side and the supply side. Wherein, the demand-side 
elements may include GDP, income, demographic factors, housing consumption, monetary 
factors and so on; while the supply-side factors may contain land factors, investment, housing 
units completed, construction costs and so on. In addition to the determinants, we also 
summarise the common methodologies and models adopted in modelling Chinese house 
prices, which include the OLS model, VECM model, VAR models and GMM estimations. 
Broadly speaking, different researchers have reached distinctive conclusions about the Chines 
housing market, where possible reasons for these inconsistent positions could be due to the 
differences between data, methodologies and models. 
Based on the existing studies, this chapter will use the panel data from 1999 to 2009 across 
30 provinces/cities in China. And the explanatory variables are developed to explain the 
house prices, including disposable income, urban population proportion, unemployment rate, 
statutory reserve ratio, housing consumption, excessive housing demand, construction cost, 
urban land use tax, and investment completed.  
Although the most popular panel data models applied by Chinese scholars are VAR models, 
there are still some pitfalls of using the VAR. But the more advanced GMM estimations have 
not as yet been popularized in modelling Chinese real estate prices. Thus, this chapter will 
develop the dynamic panel data model with GMM estimation, by starting with basic OLS 
models, then to fixed effects or random effects, further to instrumental variables models and 
eventually to GMM estimators. Meanwhile, the long-run equilibrium of the dynamic models 
has also been studied. In addition, the Sargen/Hansen test for Overidentification, the 
Arellano-Bond test for autocorrelation, and the robustness checks, all indicate the efficiency 
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of our GMM regressions.  
Through the empirical studies, we can conclude that Chinese house prices are more 
significantly affected by policy shocks, such as monetary policy and land policy, rather than 
market factors, such as population growth and construction cost. That gives a signal of a non-
fully market-oriented housing market in China, and suggests the government could use the 
policy instruments to regulate and control China’s house prices. 
Generally, there are six sections in this chapter. Firstly is the ‘Introduction’; the second 
section is the ‘Literature review’; next is the section on the ‘Methodology’, followed by ‘Data 
sources and description’; then the fifth part is ‘Empirical results’; the last part is of course the 
‘Conclusion’. 
3.2 Literature Review 
There are some fundamental questions about the housing market and the macroeconomy 
(Leung 2004), such as: ‘How are the housing market and the macroeconomy interconnected? 
Is it important to include the housing market in macroeconomic analysis, and vice versa? 
What is, and should be the scope of macro-housing research?’ The common view is that 
housing constitutes a significant share of the overall macroeconomy, with some stylized facts 
illustrating the significance of the housing market in the macroeconomy. There is a 
productive literature reviewing the intricate interactions between the housing market and 
macroeconomy, for instance it acts as a wealth effect in the consumption function. Here, we 
concentrate on the related work of investigating the determinants of China’s housing market 
and how these factors affect Chinese house prices. As summarised in the last chapter, there 
are many factors that have been tried by many other researchers, such as the growth of GDP 
and income, rapid urbanization with large population immigration, insufficient housing 
supply, land shortages, ineffectiveness of regulations, cultural preferences and investment 
speculation. The following sections are going to discuss the most critical influences and 
models used in the Chinese housing market. 
3.2.1 The Impact Factors of Chinese House Prices 
3.2.1.1 Macro-economy Factors: GDP and Disposable Income 
The two strongest impetuses on house prices are the rapid development of China’s economy 
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and the remarkable improvement of people’s living standards, which have arguably done 
most to promote the rise in Chinese house prices. Since the reform and opening-up, the 
growth rate of China’s GDP has been maintained at an impressive speed. Especially after the 
1990s, this rate has been kept as high as around 10%. During 1992-1996 and 2003-2007, the 
growth rates were above 10%. Even over the period of 1997 Asian Financial Crisis and 2007 
Global Financial Crisis, the growth of China’s economy has always been sustained at no 
lower than 7.6%. 
As a result, the people’s living standards have caught up with the increase in GDP. More 
specifically, per capita GDP and disposable income are both increasing sharply. Table 3.1 
illustrates the strong growth of the nationwide GDP and average per capita disposable income 
in the past 10 years. It can be seen that the increases of GDP and disposable income are much 
stronger than of house prices and rental indices. However, the accretion of the housing rental 
index has lagged behind, not only GDP and disposable income but also the house price index, 
which indicates some unusual and interesting phenomena in the Chinese housing market. 
Table 3.1: Nationwide GDP Index, Average Disposable Income Index, Average House Price 
and Rental Indices, China 2000-2009 (2000=100) 








2000 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
2001 110.29 109.23 100.49 108.10 
2002 121.03 122.66 105.98 110.26 
2003 136.61 134.91 112.02 118.53 
2004 160.81 150.03 122.55 121.14 
2005 184.28 167.09 132.84 121.75 
2006 213.16 187.25 141.34 123.45 
2007 258.80 219.52 152.93 126.66 
2008 302.42 251.29 163.79 129.45 
2009 342.49 273.49 176.57 128.41 
Data source: National Bureau of Statistics of China http://www.stats.gov.cn/ 
Empirical research by Chow et al. (2008) has confirmed the positive relationship between the 
housing market and GDP & disposable income. Also, a series of models adopted Peng, Tam 
and Yiu (2008) detect a two-way linkage between GDP and house price growth. Additionally, 
Li and Zhang (2010) show there is a positive relationship, using OLS regressions, between 
real house prices and inflation (consumer price index), and a reciprocal causation using the 
Granger Causality test between them as well. 
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3.2.1.2 Land Policy and Land Price 
3.2.1.2.1 Land Policy 
In the onrush of the whole market reforms and opening, the land policy has gone through a 
substantial revolution for the last 30 years. Land price, is an important determinant of house 
prices, and has continued to rise along with the booming of the housing market. Of course, 
the two are interrelated. The boom in house prices has been a factor on the price of land, 
which has fed into house prices and so on. 
In recent years, despite land owned by the state, the innovations on the transfer of land use 
rights as well as development rights have led to the housing market flourishing. Deng (2005) 
elaborates on the development of land use rights in the last few years in China.
40
 Liu (1998) 
describes the development of the real estate sector of the Chinese economy during the 1980s 
and 1990s. Chan (2003) exposes the compensation scandals in land acquisition in China. 
Furthermore, Wang (2010) discusses the process of taking cultivated farmland for city 
development and various formats for challenges on the land use rights transfer mechanism.  
In order to provide food security for the country, the preservation of cultivated farmland is 
one of the major policy concerns in China. Therefore, the central government implements a 
series of standards and indicators to assure the percentage of farmland. For instance, ‘The 
proposal of the eleventh 5-year plan stated by the Central Committee of the Communist Party 
of China’ points out the cultivated land must remain at 1.8 billion acres until the end of 2010, 
so called ‘1.8 billion red line’. Tan and Beckman (2010) enumerate the three quotas in the 
land use provisions penetrating all five administrative levels (central, provincial, prefecture, 
municipal and township). ‘The three limitations are: the maximum amount of land for 
construction during the planning period, the minimum amount of farmland within the 
planning period, and the maximum amount of converted farmland for construction over the 
planning period.’41  
With the birth of Decree 11
42
 (1997) and Decree 39
43
 (1999), the State Council requests all 
levels of authorities (nation, province, city, county and township levels) to reinforce the 
                                                 
40 For more details, see Table 2.1. 
41 Anderson, J. E., 2010. ‘Housing, Taxation and Urban Development in China.’ 
42 Circular of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the General Office of the State Council on 
Further Strengthening Land Management and Practically Protecting Cultivated Land 
43 Circular of the General Office of the State Council on Strengthening Management of Transfer of Land and Strictly 
Banning Speculative Land Dealing 
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administration of farmland, as well as to severely punish illegal speculation in land purchase. 
The statements also require the government officials to redress the illegal land granting trade 
and return the construction land to farmland. In order to encourage the land market 
competition and make the land use rights more transparent, some new forms of granting land 
have emerged as the times require. Since 1st July 2002, ‘Bidding Auction Listing 
Transferring State-owned Land Use Rights Provision’ has been implemented by the Ministry 
of Land and Resources, which means land use rights are transferred via three new methods-
invitations to tender, auction and listings (Deng et al., 2009). Over 2002 to 2004, the two 
systems, land agreement transferring and bidding auction listing transferring, coexisted 
simultaneously. According to Decree 71
44
 (2004), by 31
st
 August 2004, the marked boundary 
of land policy called ‘8.31 major limit of land granting’, the old land agreement transferring 
has terminated and the new land transferring system was formally built up nationwide.  
Thus far, land transferring has been entirely controlled by the state monopoly. Therefore, to a 
very great extent, these regulations drive the land price. It stands to reason that it is a 
simultaneous relationship between house prices and land price, both influence each other. 
3.2.1.2.2 Land Price  
As one of the principal determinants of high house prices in China, high land leasing fees to 
acquire land use rights account for the greatest proportion of residential housing construction 
costs for real estate developers. However, the high land granting fees apparently can be 
overcome by an even higher profit of the housing market afterwards. In the initial stage of the 
termination of the work unit-owned and state-owned housing allocation system and the 
initiation of the market-oriented housing market, property developers signed up for land use 
by granting contracts with local government officials with low nominal land use fees. 
Consequently, in order to acquire the privilege of land use and development rights, property 
developers tend to bribe the local authorities. The developers make every effort to build up a 
good relationship with local governments, and furthermore, to bribe the local officials (Gao, 
2010). In fact, the black market operations eventually drove the land use cost to an extremely 
high level. The central government also realized there were such severe drawbacks, hence the 
new land regulation
45
 for residential, industrial, or business uses was implemented in 2002, 
which requires the purchase of land use rights by invitations to tender, auction and listings. 
                                                 
44 Circular of the Ministry of Land and Resources on Enforcement and Inspection of Carrying on the Tender to Sell the 
Operating Land Auction 
45 Bidding Auction Listing Transferring State-owned Land Use Rights Provision (1st July 2002) 
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For the purpose of ‘complementary instructions’, the new system contained fatal loopholes 
during the executive process by local administrative departments. In a quick response to the 
defects of the new system, by 2003-2004, the central administration reformulated more 
rigorous and transparent regulations to crack down the illegal transactions. To a great extent, 
these subsequent movements contributed to behind-the-scene land-versus-rights exchange 
trades in land use right transactions.  
Even though, the accumulated research has indicated that the largest piece of housing 




 of 2009, a 
conference speech of the All-China Federation of Industry & Commerce proclaimed the land 
cost takes up to 58.2% of the total building cost. Moreover, the report also appointed the 
biggest benefit taken by the local governments through transferring land use rights. Other 
similar studies have also shown that nearly half of housing construction fees is attributable to 
land leasing expenditure (Shao, 2005; Sun et al., 2006; Zhang and Peng, 2007). Based on a 
survey of 620 real estate projects nationwide in 2009, the Ministry of Land and Resources has 
issued another report, showing that the proportion of land leasing expenditure in total 
building costs was 23.2%. Taking 21 projects in Beijing as an example, land-cost/building-
cost ratios ranged between 14.33% and 48.38%.  
To empirically investigate the impact of land prices on Chinese house prices, Ding (2008), 
Deng, Ma and Chiang (2009), Fu (2007), and Yuan (2009) employed both land prices and 
rental prices into their regressions. And they all concluded that land prices have significantly 
affected real estate prices to different degrees. Particularly, Deng, Ma and Chiang (2009) 
added the land price using a dummy variable in their model, and found that the land price is 
an extremely crucial effect on house prices, especially after the new land policy implemented 
in July 2002. To briefly summarise, the land cost has become the biggest component of total 
real estate development costs. 
3.2.1.3 Housing Monetary Policy 
3.2.1.3.1 The Changes in Monetary Policy 
Generally speaking, the monetary policy has impacted on the real estate market by two 
channels: money supply and interest rate (Ahearne et al., 2005; Lv et al., 2010). In comparing 
                                                 
46 the National People's Congress 
47 Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference 
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the two tools, the interest rate has played a more significant role in the adjustment of housing 
market (Elbourne, 2008; Vargas-Silva, 2008; Del Negro & Otrok, 2005). The expansion of 
the money supply on both the investment sector and the consumption sector has promoted the 
booms of housing supply and housing consumption demand, and then exacerbated the 
constant increase of housing prices. To some extent, the easing of monetary policy can be one 
of the explanations for the house price increase. The soaring house prices far exceeds what is 
reasonable, when judged in international terms by the level of house price to income ratio, 
which most likely means a highly risky real estate bubble. As the pillar industry of the 
national economy, the collapse of the real estate industry could trigger the depression of the 
entire national economy through the bankruptcy of other relative industries, a large number of 
bad loans of the commercial banks, and the contraction of consumption. As we saw in the 
previous chapter, in order to restrain the excessive growth of property prices, a series of tight 
monetary policies have been implemented by the central government and the central bank, 
including continually upward adjustment of the statutory reserve ratio and benchmark deposit 
and lending interest rates, the cancellation of preferential interest rates for housing loans, the 
increase in minimal down payment for individual housing loans and the interest rate increase 
of individual housing fund loans (Yu and Yu, 2007). 
3.2.1.3.2 The Effects of Monetary Policy on China’s Housing Market 
There exists a strange phenomenon in the Chinese housing market: the vacancy rate of 
commodity buildings is extremely high (Xie, 2010; Tang, 2006; and Jia, 2004); meanwhile, 
the house prices have stayed at a high level as well. One of the reasons has been the lower 
interest rate for real estate developers, which means the cost of credit for real estate 
developers is so small that suppliers hold the buildings without a sale in order to acquire more 
profit when house prices rise further. Furthermore, the speculators also drive up housew 
prices, such as ‘Wenzhou Real Estate Corporation’48. A series of rising interest rate policies 
have had a comprehensive effect on both the demand and supply sides of the housing market. 
In light of the study of Xie (2010), the effects of rising interest rates can be summarised as 
Box 3.1. 
 
                                                 
48 ‘Wenzhou Real Estate Corporation’: speculators from Wenzhou, a rich and developed area in Zhejiang province, build up 
groups to acquire buildings for speculation in big cities, such as Beijing and Shanghai. 
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Box 3.1: The Effects of Rasing Interest Rate on China’s Housing Market 
I  The Effects of Raising Interest Rates on the Demand Side 
(1) Purchase as an owner-occupier 
Purchase as an owner-occupier can also fall into two types: one is the demand for living, and the other one is for 
the improvement of living standards. The demand for living can be satisfied through either home purchase or 
rent of apartments. If the rental is comparatively lower than home purchase, individuals often choose to rent 
apartments instead of buying houses; and vice versa. The increase of interest rate has aggravated the interest 
burden of home purchasers. Potential home purchasers will rent houses instead of buying houses. The demand 
for the improvement of living conditions is for population with the affordability of home purchase, as long as 
the increase of interest rate is still within their expectation. If the house prices are stable during a period, the 
changes of interest rate will influence their disposal decision on their old small apartments. If the interest rate is 
still lower than the rental income, they will keep ownership and rent houses; by contrast, they will sell their old 
apartments in order to decrease holding cost of the existing apartments. The increase of interest rate, not only 
makes the burden of home loans heavier, but also implicates government’s expectation of adjustment on real 
estate industry. In fact, the rational residents are willing to sell their old apartments, which increase the supply of 
housing and play a positive role on steady house prices. 
(2) Hedgers for a store of money’s value 
There exists such a group of home purchasers, with middle-level incomes, lack of much professional knowledge 
on investment and without strong motivation to buying houses. They acquire apartments for two main reasons: 
on one hand, due to the sharp increase of house prices, people make sizable profit by home purchase; on the 
other hand, due to the higher inflation expectation and lower interest rate, they desire to store the value of their 
money by home purchase. These individuals are often lack of rational judgments on investment and the national 
macro-economy situation and not equipped with the powerful capacity of resisting risk. Thus they are always 
the major victims when the housing bubble breaks down. In a word, the increase of interest rate can adjust the 
inflation expectation as well as the house price increase expectation; also can enrich interest income of savings; 
in order to decrease housing demand of this group. 
(3) Investors and speculators 
The adjustment of real estate market is aim to strike the speculators, who gain exorbitant profit through 
frequently buying-selling houses. Increasing interest rate can increase the costs to speculators, and then push 
them out of the real estate market automatically. For general investors purchasing houses with their own capital, 
even if the interest rate rises, if no better investment opportunities emerge, they will maintain their house 
investment with an impressive rental income. While for speculators, their purpose is not to long-term hold 
apartments or to lease their houses; instead, they desire to gain extra profit by frequent buying-selling tricks. 
They trade on housing market by financial credit leverage of banks and concentrate their own capital on huge 
storage of buildings. Raising interest rate increases both purchase cost and opportunity cost of housing storage. 
Therefore, the appropriate interest rate level can reduce the demand of speculators, as well as encourage 
speculators to sell their vacancy apartments. The decrease of speculation demand and the increase of (second) 
housing supply should induce a significant jump down of real estate prices. 
II  The Effects of Raising Interest Rate on the Supply Side 
It contributes to so-called ‘exuberant demand’ for houses that speculators hold large sources of apartments 
without sale; meanwhile, property developers create so-called ‘short supply’ via storing land and holding 
buildings. Developers get the instruction and development loans from banks with very low interest rate, which 
makes the opportunity cost quite low to store land and buildings. Raising interest rate can push up their 
opportunity cost, especially for housing industry with excessively high debt ratio and financial leverage. The 
interest rate adjustments have deteriorated the financial burden of real estate enterprise, and increase the 
construction and development costs as well.  
To conclude, there are three aspects of impact of interest rate changes on real estate industry in the short run: 
firstly, it implicates a macro-control signal from the central government, thereby cool down the consumption 
expectation of house prices; secondly, it can increase the money income of depositors, while cause heaver 
interest rate burden of creditors, thus to restrain housing demand of investors and speculators; thirdly, it can 
increase the opportunity cost of storing land and buildings for investors and speculators. The interest rate 
adjustments make a dynamic equilibrium between demand and supply sides by market-oriented ‘invisible hand’ 
to change cost-yield curves of home purchasers and sellers. 
 
Zeng (2008) tested the transmission procedure of monetary policy on house price dynamics 
and concluded that the money supply had a negative impact on the house prices but the 
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interest rate had a positive shock on house prices, which reflected that monetary policy has a 
positive influence on house prices. Generally, the interest rate, as the major monetary 
instrument, played a more important role than the money supply in the Chinese housing 
market. In addition, Zhao (2010) improved upon Zeng (2008)’s research and illustrated the 
dynamic influences of both demand shocks, supply shocks and monetary shocks on China’s 
real estate price fluctuations. Another Chinese scholar Duan (2008) found that, the 
contractionary monetary policies have negative effects on real estate prices, while the 
expansionary monetary policies drive up real estate prices. Additionally, compared with 
interest rate policies, house prices exhibit a higher sensitivity to credit based monetary 
policies. 
However, the effect of monetary policy on Chinese house prices is not a consensus issue. 
Some researchers fail to detect a significant impact of interest rates on real estate prices, such 
as Fu (2007), Deng, Ma and Chiang (2009). Specifically, Dong, Duan and Ming (2010) who 
claimed that the effect of the nominal interest rate was not significant, while the effect of the 
real interest rate was. 
3.2.1.4 Urbanization and Immigration (Household Registration System-‘Hukou’) 
Many scholars have explored the possible effects of demographic factors on the housing 
market. More specifically, demographic variables can influence house prices via both the 
demand and supply sides of the housing market. Some house price models are estimated 
including demographic factors, such as immigration, urbanization and the population’s ageing 
structure. 
China’s rapid urbanization process, generated by history’s largest flow of rural-to-urban 
migration in the world, has led to the rapid increase in the urban population (Chan and Zhang, 
1999). Since housing is an essential requirement for each household, the demand for housing 
is usually not elastic, but inelastic, in the Chinese social environment (Shaw, 1997); which 
implies that the expansion of the urban population would induce a heavy demand for 
dwellings without any substitutes. Compared with other countries, China differs, to a certain 
extent, in migration and urbanization patterns as a result of its unique Household Registration 
System (Hukou system) and huge population base. Most rural migrant workers in cities are 
unofficial city dwellers without a change of Hukou, who have not been included in 
calculation of urban population.  
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What impact do these immigration waves with official and unofficial workers have on the 
Chinese housing market and housing price dynamics? Do the massive rural-urban migrants 
drive up the price of commodity buildings in urban areas? Some existing studies have 
answered the above questions mainly from a macro-aspect viewpoint of the Chinese housing 
system, such as the housing polices (Wang and Murie, 1999a&1999b), housing consumption 
(Li, 2007), or an assessment of Chinese housing reform (Tong and Hays, 1996). Some 
scholars have also analysed the institutional factors-as the unique determinants-affecting the 
Chinese housing consumption and residential crowding (Huang and Clark, 2002; Huang, 
2004).  
But there has not been a great deal of empirical analysis on the impact of urbanization and 
migration factors on Chinese urban housing market growth. Further studies have contributed 
to the role of urbanization and rural-urban migration in affecting housing price dynamics in 
China (Chen et al., 2010; Zeng, 2010). Chen et al. (2010, pp. 1) analyse ‘the changes over 
time in house prices in each Chinese province and examine empirically the determinants of 
urban house prices at national and regional levels using time-series and cross-sectional data’. 
Their analysis suggested the urban household income and the urbanization level were 
significant factors driving up Chinese house prices, whilst the impact of floating workers and 
the supply side of urban houses were insignificant. Zeng (2010) constructed a straightforward 
linear equation to estimate the effects of urbanization on Chinese house prices.  His model 
only included three variables: house prices, the urbanization level and inflation rate. His 
estimation suggested that, under the condition of inflation effects, urbanization played a 
significant role in determining the real estate price, which suggests that the urbanization 
dynamic should be considerable in my study. In addition, some recent quantitative analysis 
on the Chinese urban housing market has focused on exploring housing consumption and 
residential mobility in the big cities of China (Li, 2000&2003; Lau and Li, 2006).  
3.2.1.5 Cultural Effects and Investment Requirements (speculation) 
‘As in many other East Asian countries, demographic changes, rising income and in 
particular housing aspirations, all contributed to inflation of housing prices in China’ (Renaud 
et al., 1997). Real estate property is enormously important in China due to people’s belief in 
the traditional idea of ‘land is wealth’ (Chien, 2010). The cultural impact can be another 
reasonable explanation of this preference for household ownership. Chinese people, 
especially the young, tend to regard owning real estate property as a precondition for creating 
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a family. In contrast, it is not a popular wish to rent a house for individuals with a stable job. 
Chinese parents are always willing to dedicate all their savings to acquire real estate property 
for the marriages of their sons or daughters. As a consequence, ‘income and saving from two 
generations and three families (bride’s parents, groom’s parents, and the young couple 
themselves) all combine to purchase a single apartment, which drives the already high house 
price to an even higher level’ (Gao, 2010).  
In addition to the cultural impact, other factors also contribute to the high house prices and 
high house price to income ratios, such as the demand for long-run investment, limited 
investment channels, and even speculation. Notoriously, Chinese people are so conservative 
and old-fashioned that China has become a country with the highest savings ratio in the world. 
It was reported that the domestic savings rate of 2005 was as high as 51% in China, compared 
with 19.7%-the global average level (Sina Finance)
49
.  
One of the major reasons for the highest savings ratio is that there is a lack of good channels 
and opportunities for Chinese citizens to allow their money to appreciate (Qi, 2000; Yu, 2003; 
Shi and Zhu, 2004; He and Cao, 2005; Kuijs, 2005). Unlike the financial markets in 
developed countries, the Chinese financial market is far from a fully complete competitive 
market. Therefore, the classes of financial products and financial derivatives are too few to 
meet people’s needs. Also, due to market imperfections on regulations, it is not easy for 
people to invest in most financial instruments (Kuijs, 2005). The severe turbulence of the 
stock market has triggered large losses for many civilians. Take the security market as an 
example, it has always been suffering large fluctuations since it was established in the early 
1990s (SSE
50
 in 1991 and SZSE
51
 in 1992). The Shanghai Composite Index remained at 
under 2000 points before 2000. While it reached up to around 2100 points in 2001, then 
dropped down to between 1300 and 1700 points. In 2005, the market continuously fell to 
under 1100 points. After the lowest part, the stock market has increased to the historical 
highest level of 6057 points on the 17
th
 October 2007, which was the beginning of the global 
financial crisis. Following the boom, the Index sharply dropped down to about 1800 points in 
2008, and stayed at 2700-3300 points in recent years.  
Furthermore, people know little about other advanced financial products or derivatives either. 
                                                 
49 Sina Finance, 14th March 2006, Available from: http://finance.sina.com.cn/xiaofei/consume/20060314/11512415695.shtml 
[Accessed 11th July 2011] 
50 Shanghai Stock Exchange 
51 Shenzhen Stock Exchange 
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By contrast, it is a good choice for individuals to invest savings in the Chinese housing 
market (Gao and Leng, 2010). Since for the last three decades, house prices in China have 
kept a sustainable increase, which means investing in real estate is a more desired and 
insurable approach to making profits. Moreover, investment in property not only maintains 
capital value, but allows speculation in the property market (Gao, 2010). Many high income 
families attempted to acquire excess profits by purchase of a second or even more properties. 
Conversely, property market speculation and manipulation significantly drove the house 
prices up. 
3.2.1.6 Other Relative Determinants of House Prices 
Except for the determinants mentioned above, such as economic factors (GDP and disposable 
income), policy factors (land policy and monetary policy), demographic factors (immigration, 
Hukou system and population age structure), cultural factors and investment requirements, 
there are many other factors which affect China’s real estate market and house prices: 
unemployment, housing tax policy and stock market, etc.  
3.2.1.6.1 Unemployment 
Some specialists have interpreted the relationship between unemployment and house prices. 
In reality, the impacts of unemployment on the housing market are different in different areas. 
Deng, Ma and Chiang (2009) have included unemployment as an explanatory variable in 
models estimating house prices. They interpreted a lagged significant negative influence of 
the unemployment rate on Chinese real estate prices through a Panel VAR model. However, 
Liu and Shen (2005) have claimed that the fluctuation of house prices in China is not well 
explained by the unemployment rate. Their explanation is covering the study period between 
1986 and 2002 when the government and state-owned enterprises (SOE) provided most 
residential housing, regardless of people’s actual purchasing power. Therefore, there are 
different conclusions between these two research groups.  
The different findings are probably due to the different study periods or different estimation 
models. While from the Figure 3.1, it can be seen that the nationwide unemployment rate has 
been going through a consistent increase in China from 1990 to 2009. But as mentioned 
before, Chinese house prices have also been increasing over recent years. In the following 
chapters, my empirical work will construct the equations including the unemployment 
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variable, and we will see how the unemployment rate fluctuation impacts on the house prices. 
 
(Data Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China http://www.stats.gov.cn/)   
Figure 3.1: The Nationwide Unemployment Rate in China, 1990-2009 
3.2.1.6.2 Housing and Land Tax Policy 
Taxation is one of the essential instruments which governments use to regulate and control 
the real estate market. Meen (1998, 2001) analyses the effects of housing and land taxes on 
house prices. Many theoretical studies indicate that real estate tax policy can induce the 
changes of frequency of housing transaction, transaction volume and bargain prices. Most 
developed countries and areas in the world have levied housing and land taxation with a 
mature tax policy system, which makes real estate tax not only to be an effective source of 
local government finance but also a tool to adjust real the estate market effectively (Du, 
2009). Housing and land taxes have contributed to reducing the real estate speculation by 
increasing the cost of holding real estate, and thus controlling the growth of house prices 
efficiently. Noord (2005), Lopez-Garcia (2004), and Lang & Jian (2004) summarise similar 
conclusion through a number of empirical researches on the relationship between real estate 
taxes and house prices. For the Chinese housing market, many scholars have approached 
some discussion on this topic. Yang and Xu (2007) suggest that, due to the less demand 
elasticity of home purchasers, real estate taxes can control house prices from the view of cost-
benefit analysis. Wang (2004), Chen and Zong (2004) all demonstrate the influence of real 
estate taxes on the housing market with reducing expectations and the revenue of real estate 
speculators. In addition, Yi (2006) believes the adjustment of housing and land taxes is the 
most convenient, straightforward and efficient instrument to regulate the real estate market; 
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since with high real estate taxes, speculators with many dwellings have to sell their vacant 
apartments to reduce the holding costs. 
3.2.1.6.3 Stock Market 
The determinants that affect the house price dynamics are of interest to governments, 
policymakers, urban planners, real estate developers, housing scholars and financial 
institutions as well as most householders. In most countries and areas around the world, many 
researchers recognise that there is a mutual relationship between the stock market and real 
estate market (Quan and Titman, 1999; Tse, 2001; Chen, 2001; Green, 2002; Kapopoulos and 
Siokis, 2005); therefore, the equity price has become another essential factor in determining 
house price changes.  
In China, there is evidence that there exists a simultaneous relationship between the real 
estate market and the capital markets within the entire macro-economy. Dong (2009) 
proclaims that house price dynamics must co-move with the changes of equity prices. He 
shows that if stock market returns increase, real estate prices must increase; conversely, if 
stock prices slump sharply, house prices must be more resistant in a bear market. Kuang and 
Zhao (2010) draw some more specific conclusions about the relationship of the two asset 
prices by theoretical analysis and empirical verification:  
(1) Their theoretical model indicates the current stock price has a positive relationship with 
the current house price but a negative relationship with real estate prices in the next time 
period. Additionally, the empirical results also verify this proposition.  
(2) The empirical results show a strong interaction between the two asset prices, but the 
mutual response is asymmetric. The effect of the real estate market on the stock market seems 
to be more significant than the impact of stock market on housing market. Their interaction 
has been manifested in four general perspectives: firstly, the current house prices move 
together with stock prices in the same direction, but the changes of house prices in the next 
time period moves in the opposite direction to the current stock prices. Secondly the 
fluctuations of house rental prices have no significant influence on either stock prices or real 
estate prices. Thirdly, compared with the Western area of china, the growth rates of both asset 
prices are more excessive in the Eastern part and Middle part, which implies that geographic 
factors also have an impact on the two asset prices. Finally the house prices show a 
significant serial correlation, but stock prices exhibit stochastic changes. 
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(3) The regression results of the stock price equations indicate that there is a co-movement in 
the same direction of the stock risk premium, stock turnover rate, stock equity, capital growth 
and stock prices. The regression results of house price functions indicate that the increase of 
the lagged development cost can drive up real estate prices, and the increased rate of house 
prices is more significant in urban areas with higher economic growth.  
To sum up, even though China’s stock market has a mutual interaction with China’s housing 
market, looking at the whole picture, we can see that huge fluctuations in the stock market 
over the last two decades in China would not substantially stop the sustained house price 
increase during these years. Figure 3.2 demonstrates the nationwide average commercial 
house prices over 1997-2008 and the highest & lowest point of Shanghai Composite Index in 
SSE market during the same period. This figure cannot tell the significant effects of the stock 
market on the house prices 
 
(Data Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China http://www.stats.gov.cn/) 
Figure 3.2: Shanghai Composite Index and Average Housing Price, 1997-2008 
3.2.1.7 Summary of the Impact Factors on Chinese House Prices 
Taken together, Figure 3.3 shows the correlation linkages between Chinese house prices and 
these factors. Chinese house prices have been affected by various determinants.  Generally, 





From the demand side, the rapid growth of GDP and household income has become the major 
driver of house price increase (Yiu, 2010; Stephens, 2010). Furthermore, the dramatic 
urbanization process and population immigration from rural to urban areas have also 
contributed to the rise in house prices (Hao, Sliuzas and Geertman, 2011; Zhao, 2011). In 
addition, due to the Chinese traditional culture, the preference of purchase housing is a 
common perspective for most Chinese people, since they believe ‘land and housing is wealth’. 
Therefore, the cultural preference has become another special reason to the house price 
growth in China (Chien, 2010; Gao, 2010). 
From the supply side, many studies shed light on the issue that the land cost has become the 
biggest part of the total real estate development cost since the implementation of the new 
‘Bidding Auction Listing Transferring State-owned Land Use Rights Provision’ with the 
Chinese housing reform (Leung and Chen, 2006; Wu, Gyourko, and Deng, 2010; Leung, 
Chow, Yiu and Tam; 2010; Zhao, 2011). As a result of the new land policy, the land transfer 
prices have been steered by the interest conflict between the central authority and local 
governments; therefore, the insider trading and black market operation has further driven up 
the Chinese house prices (Zhu, 2000; Li, Chiang and Choy, 2011). Meanwhile, another chief 
factor of the house prices has been attributed to the insufficiency of affordable housing 
supply (Gao 2010; Deng, Shen and Wang, 2011).  
Figure 3.3: The Correlation Framework of Chinese House Prices and Other Factors 
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Apart from these fundamental variables which determine Chinese house prices, the financial 
market also has played an important role in the Chinese housing market, mainly through the 
interest rate and the housing mortgage loan (Deng et al., 2005; Zhu, 2006; Stephens, 2010; 
Deng, Shen and Wang, 2011). Consequently, the investment speculations and the Chinese 
house prices have mutually combined to jointly increase (Huang and Clark, 2002; Lau and Li, 
2006; Mak, Choy and Ho, 2007; Gao, 2010).  
In summary, these determinants from different sectors have played a profound role in the 
development process of the Chinese housing market. They have contributed to the rapid 
growth of Chinese house prices with varying degrees. Vice versa, the house price increases 
have also provoked the further development of some variables. In the existing research, a 
number of scholars have done plenty of good theoretical and empirical studies on the Chinese 
housing market. The next part of this chapter will conclude previous researcher’s models and 
focus on their empirical analysis of Chinese house prices.  
3.2.2 Methodologies and Models of Chinese House Prices 
In a general view of the existing literature, several representative models have been employed 
in modelling Chinese house prices, for example, basic Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) Model, 
Vector Error Correction Model (VECM), and (Structural) Vector Autoregression Model 
(VAR/SVAR). Although the VAR is the most common regression form among the above 
models, a prevalent advanced method, Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) estimation, 
has been implemented most recently, especially in the panel data case. We will discuss each 
method or model individually and explore their typical traits. 
3.2.2.1 Basic OLS Model 
Starting with the most basic linear model on Chinese house prices, a number of scholars use 
the OLS model to study the driving factors of real estate prices (Cheng, Guo and Wu, 2011; 
Gao and Leng, 2010; Leung et al., 2010; Li and Zhang, 2010; Zeng, 2010). An example of an 
OLS model using time-series data is in Zeng (2010) in studying the impact of urbanization on 
house prices. His model only included three variables: house prices (HP), the urbanization 
level (CSH) and inflation rate (CPI): tttt CPICSHHP   210 . While Leung et al. 
(2010) set a panel OLS model with quarterly data (over 2000Q3 to 2007Q4) across four 
major cities (Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin, and Chongqing):
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1321 )1(][  itiriririt GPDUGWAGEGRGP  , where GP is the growth rate of the 
overall property price index, GR is the growth rate of the real rental, GWAGE is the growth 
rate of household real disposal income, and DU is the annual difference of the real lending 
rate for housing loans as a measure of user cost of homeownership. The lag of GP indicates 
the dynamic nature of their model. 
Furthermore, others (Dong, Guan and Ming, 2010; Wu and Zeng, 2010) adopt the logarithm 
OLS model to eliminate the heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation, by taking the logarithmic 
format of variables. For instance, Dong, Guan and Ming (2010) used 1999-2006 province-
level panel data to analyse the dynamic determinants in the Chinese housing market. Their 












Their empirical evidence implied that the main driver of the house price (priceRE) came from 
the demand side (popden and pcgdp) of the Chinese housing market, and that local 
governments (revenue) also played an important role in determining real estate prices. By 
contrast, the effects of supply side (priceLand) and monetary policies (IR and REER) had less 
significant impacts on real estate prices. 
Also, with the province-level panel data over the period 1999 to 2008, Wu and Zeng (2010) 
suggested that the drivers of the house prices in China fell into two groups: supply side and 












Interestingly, they concluded Chinese real estate prices (PRE) have a positive correlation with 
the demand side factor of urban investment (TI) and the supply side factor of six-month to 
one-year loan interest rate (IR); while there is no significant influence of either the demand 
factors of the supply of commodity houses (SRE), land price index (LPI), building material 
price index (AMPI), nor the demand factors of urban population (TP), and the GDP growth 
rate (GGDP), urban householder disposable income (RI), the liquidity index (M2).  
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3.2.2.2 VECM Model 
Taking the primary OLS model, researchers usually test for cointegration among dependent 
variables and explanatory variables, to explore a latent long-run relationship between two 
series (Wooldridge, 2012, Chapter 18, pp. 651-652). Hence, for the existance of cointegration 
between house prices and other independent variables, Ding (2008), Fu (2007), Li (2010) and 
Yuan (2009) developed the VECM model to study the Chinese real estate prices. Fu (2007) 
and Yuan (2009) employed a VECM model. Specifically, Fu (2007) and Yuan (2009) 
specified their VECM models as following respectively, 
















where HP is house price, S is householder savings, Pop is population factor, R is rental price, 
C is construction cost, I is interest rate, DGDP is disposable income, LP is resident land 
purchased price, Sloan is real estate development loans for housing supplier, Dloan is 
housing consumption loans for housing consumers, and ecm is the error correction term. Fu 
(2007)’s study suggested that the demand factors, population and savings, had a significant 
effect on real estate price changes in both the short and long run; while the effects of 
monetary policy, through interest rate adjustment, failed to efficiently affect house prices as 
expected. Yuan (2009)’s main conclusions can be represented as: to a great extent, the rapid 
growth of China’s real estate price was a bubble phenomenon under the pressure of excessive 
financial support, land price increase and speculative investment activities. 
Li (2010) used the VECM model in the panel data estimation as well, for Chinese cities that 















Her studies mainly discuss the effects of the previous house prices (p) and interest rates (i) on 
the current house prices, by including the lag 1, 2, and 3 of two variables. She advocated that, 
in the short run, the effects of the interest rate is significant in the eastern region but not in the 
western region. In the middle region of China, the interest rate has a more significant 
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relationship with house prices in the long run.  
3.2.2.3 VAR/SVAR Model 
When considering the endogeneity problem of the house price models, the VAR model can be 
implied as a large-scale simultaneous equations structural model (Brooks, 2008, Chapter 6). 
The VAR model is popular in modelling the housing market with current researchers in China 
(Deng, Ma and Chiang, 2009; Duan, 2008; Liu, 2010; Zeng, 2008; Zhou, 2010). For example, 
Liu (2010) explored the mutual reactions between household savings and house prices with 
the VAR, and Zhou (2010) adopted the VAR to investigate the relationship between the total 
retail sales of consumer goods and house prices with 3 lags of duration. 
A panel VAR model was developed by Deng, Ma and Chiang (2009) to examine the dynamic 












They suggested that, the main fundamental explanatory factors explaining house price 
variation are household disposable income (Yit), land prices (Lit), construction cost (Cit), new-
building supply (NBit), housing units sold (HSit), unemployment (URit) and stock market 
return (SRit). Sometimes lagged values are significant. But the effects of the rent (Rit), interest 
rates (INTit) and population growth (POPit) are not significant. 
In order to specifically test the importance of land prices, they included a dummy variable for 











d1= 1 if the land is granted after 2002, that is, when the land use rights are granted through 
the new land policy; otherwise, d1= 0. Their findings strongly supported the significance of 
the dummy variable, which indicated the new land policy has played a profound role in the 
housing market.  
Further, Zeng (2008) built a 7-variable Structural VAR (SVAR) model to detect the 
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transmission procedure of monetary policy via house prices, embodying a house price index 
(HP), GDP (GDP), CPI (CPI), total retail sales of consumer goods (CON), total fixed asset 






















































































































where e measured the structural impacts and u were error terms. In order to keep the 
independence of random shocks and calculate the dynamic response of system to the shocks, 
the SVAR model needs to add certain constraints to the VAR model based on the economic 
theories. Hence, he made a few hypotheses on the short-run shocks: 
(1) except for the price level, other shocks have no instant impact on consumption, thus a12 = 
a13 = a14 = a15 = a17 = 0;  
(2) since the interest rate is an exogenous variable controlled by the central bank, the interest 
rate has no response to other shocks, which means a21 = a23 = a24 = a25 = a26 = a27 =0;  
(3) except for GDP, other shocks can affect the supply of money immediately, so a37 =0;  
(4) consumption, money supply and GDP have no effect on investment instantly, therefore a41 
= a43 = a47 = 0;  
(5) except for the interest rate and money supply, other shocks have no instant influence on 
house prices, thus a51 = a54 = a56 = a57 =0;  
(6) the price level has no effect on interest rate and GDP immediately, so a62 = a67 = 0;  
(7) except for consumption and investment, GDP has no response to other shocks, which 
means a72 = a73 = a75 = a76 =0. 
His assumptions would in themselves help us understand the Chinese housing market. He 
concluded that the money supply had a negative shock on the house prices but the interest 
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rate had a positive shock, which reflected that the monetary policy changes result in a 
positive adjustment to house prices. Also, the housing market had a profound influence on the 
macro-economy. More specifically, there was a significant wealth effect of the real estate 
prices on social consumption as well as on investment. In addition, the real estate prices 
impacted upon GDP directly by industry driving effects; meanwhile, it is also one of the 
major forces on inflation (price level). Overall, he suggested that the interest rate, as the 
major monetary instrument, played a more important role than the money supply in the 
Chinese housing market.  
The VAR model could be further extended to the case of the VECM where the model 
includes first difference terms and cointegrating relationships; meanwhile, it is usually 
followed by impulse response and variance decomposition analysis (Brooks, 2008).  
3.2.2.4 GMM Estimation 
In the case of panel data, another broadly adopted method in modelling Chinese house prices 
is GMM estimation. Peng, Tam and Yiu (2008) induced the GMM estimator to obtain 










where Y denotes property price growth; X denotes the independent variable matrix (GDP, 
fixed asset investment, real estate investment, retail sales and bank credit). Moreover, they 
introduced an additional explanatory variable as the dummy variable into the estimation: 
taking a value of one for coastal provinces and cities, and zero for the rest of the sample. Cui 
(2009)’s function has been estimated by the GMM method as well: 
ittitititititit rcompcpiincpopulppriceprice   6543211 )(  
where (–p) is the lagged indicator of real estate price (price), popul is population, inc is per 
capital disposable income, cpi is price level, comp is house space completed, and r is interest 
rate.  
Both the above contributions have used the difference GMM estimators. However, they have 
neither clearly explained the necessity of GMM estimation nor systematically illustrated the 
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procedures generating the GMM estimator. Moreover, due to the sensitivity of GMM 
regression, the existing studies have not applied the robustness checks either. 
3.2.3 Summary of Literature Review 
Comparing to the rest of the world literature with that on China, despite the relative young 
age of the Chinese housing market and the greater degree of government control, there are 
substantial similarities in the impacts of the different variables, such as in the importance of 
the housing market as a source of taxation revenue and even in government controls. But one 
problem affecting the studies on China has been a lack of data. 
To sum up, many scholars have contributed to the studies of the Chinese housing market. 
Their research has mostly covered the major fundamental aspects of explanatory variables 
affecting China’s real estate prices, which can be divided into two sectors—demand sector 
and supply sector. From the demand side, previous research provides sufficient evidences that 
the growth of some fundamental variables, such as GDP, income, population immigration 
with the rapid urbanization, housing consumption and housing units sold, have become the 
dominative factors of the upswing. Besides, the culture preference of ‘land and housing is 
wealth’ also played an important role in China’s housing market. From the supply side, 
because of the rise of land cost, land supply has most likely become one of the most powerful 
forces to push up the China’s housing market. Investment and rent prices might play an 
important role as well. Apart from these fundamental dynamics, government intervention has 
a profound influence on the Chinese housing market through the policy decision-making 
channels, such as housing policy, land policy and monetary policy. However the conclusions 
in analysing the Chinese real estate prices are still controversial. There are many reasons for 
these inconsistent positions, such as differences in the data, methodologies and models. 
Some common methods and models have been employed in analysing the Chinese housing 
market, that include basic linear regressions, such as OLS and log-linear OLS models, and 
more advanced estimations, such as VECM model, VAR or SVAR models and GMM 
estimation. VAR models are most broadly preferred by Chinese scholars in modelling panel-
data house prices. As Brooks (2008) claimed, users do not need to specify which variables are 
endogenous or exogenous, as all are treated as endogenous. In practice, this restriction leaves 
the researchers with a great deal of discretion concerning how to classify the variables. But 
the researchers also have the option of using the SVAR, in order to impose some structure on 
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a VAR. Also, VAR models are more flexible by allowing the value of a variable to depend on 
more than just its own lags or combinations of white noise terms. Furthermore, VARs are 
acknowledged as a powerful device for forecasting (Brooks, 2008, Chapter 6, pp. 292; 
Wooldridge, 2012, Chapter 18, pp. 657).  
Nonetheless, Brooks (2008) also enumerated the drawbacks and limitations of VAR models: 
(1) the lack of theoretical information about the relationships between the variables, that 
makes VARs  less amenable to theoretical analysis and therefore to policy prescriptions; (2) 
the difficulty of determining the appropriate lag lengths; (3) too many parameters, especially 
when there are a number of variables; (4) the requirement of all components to be stationary, 
that is why most VAR users apply the first difference format of variables. Specifically, the 
degrees of freedom will decline a lot in panel data models of Chinese house prices. Since 
many fundamental determinants are involved; and the time dimension is quite limited 
(accurate data is only available from 1999 after the new housing system), compared with the 
cross-section dimension (at the province level—31 province). Consequently, this allows us to 
explore more applicable estimations for the Chinese housing market. 
It is also worth mentioning that, the Exponential Generalized Autoregressive Conditional 
Heteroscedasticity-in-Mean (EGARCH-M) model (Morley and Thomas, 2011) and 
Conditionally Heteroskedastistic-in-mean (CGARCH–M) model (Karoglou, Morley and 
Thomas, 2013) are also used to examine whether house prices exhibit some properties 
associated with assets such as equities. Since these studies focus more on the financial 
features of house prices rather than the macroeconomic determinants, we will leave this issue 
out of our research. 
This literature review will inform the rest of this chapter. This literature, focused on China, is 
a young literature partly because the Chinese housing market with a market focus this is a 
relatively new phenomenon. But this newness has meant that there has been relatively little 
data to work with and crucially that data excludes the period since the 2008 crash. We have 
more data which covers the period since the crash. In a word, the empirical analysis is based 
on the previous studies of predecessors in this literature, but with more innovative approaches 
and of course more up to date and extensive data. One of the key questions we will be asking 
is whether the conclusions of the previous literature are still applicable and secondly whether 





3.3.1 Basic Model 
One of the difficulties for house price models is that a single equation is unlikely to capture 
the full determinants of house prices. The most basic theory on the dynamics of house prices 
is a supply-demand approach (Cameron, Muellbauer and Murphy, 2006; Deng, Ma and 
Chiang, 2009; Fu, 2007; Jud and Winkler, 2002). In the Chinese housing market, we will 
estimate the dynamics of real house prices over 30 provinces/cities across China from 1999 to 
2009 by construction of an equilibrium equation for the demand-supply model
52
. In line with 
the panel data literature, i denotes the area dimension and t denotes the time dimension. The 
demand equation for house prices is given by: 
),,,,,,,( ,,,,,,,,, titititititititi
D
ti uDHCIURPYHPDQ                                                                       (3.1) 
where HPi,t = real house price; Yi,t = real disposable income; Pi,t = urban population proportion; 
URi,t = unemployment rate in urban areas; Ii,t = statutory reserve ratio; HCi,t = real housing 
consumption;  Di,t = housing demand, which is indicated by floor space sold; and ui,t = 
random error term. 
The supply equation for house prices can be expressed as: 
),,,,,( ,,,,,,, titititititi
S
ti eSINVTCHPSQ                                                                                      (3.2) 
where HPi,t = real house price; Ci,t = real construction cost; Ti,t = real urban land use tax; INVi,t 
= real investment completed; Si,t = housing supply, which is denoted by floor space of 
building completed; and ei,t = random error term. 
Except for the urban population proportion, unemployment rate and statutory reserve ratio, all 





tiQ , , we get the house price model as following: 
                                                 
52 The parts of this chapter have been presented in the ‘2nd International Institute of Social and Economic Sciences (IISES) 
International Academic Conference’, the ‘Finance and Economics Conference 2012’, and the ‘2012 Shanghai International 
Conference on Social Science (SICSS)’. 
This chapter is also a working paper. 
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),,,,,,,,,( ,,,,,,,,,,, tititititititititititi INVTCDSHCIURPYfHP                                                    (3.3) 
where DSi,t = excessive housing demand, which indicates the gap between housing demand 
and housing supply this year; and ti , = random error term. 
In macroeconomics, house prices in the previous time periods certainly have an effect on the 
house price in the next time period, which means there is a dynamic relationship within house 
prices over time. As Brooks (2008) explained, lagged values of the dependent variable may 
capture important dynamic structural aspects of the dependent variable. Thus, in order to 
investigate the dynamic effect, we will use the dynamic panel data (DPD) model from 
Equation 3.3, which includes the lagged dependent variable on the right-hand side of 
Equation 3.3 (Greene 2005, Chapter 19, pp. 558-560; Brooks 2008, Chapter 4, pp. 154-155):  
),,,,,,,,,,( ,,,,,,,,,,1,, titititititititititititi INVTCDSHCIURPYHPfHP                                         (3.4) 
The Equation 3.4 can be simplified as follows: 
titititi Xyy ,,1,,                                                                                                      (3.5) 
where tiX , = [ tititititititititi INVTCDSHCIURPY ,,,,,,,,, ,,,,,,,, ] are the explanatory variables. 
The simple OLS regression yields plausible parameter estimates of house prices, but in fact, 
two major sources of bias exist in the OLS regression, unobserved heterogeneity and 
simultaneity, which have tended to generate less satisfactory parameter estimates. As Mileva 
(2007) suggested, several econometric pitfalls can arise from estimating Equation 3.5: 
1. Some variables are most likely to be endogenous, which means these parameters or 
variables might have a correlation with the error term. Thus causality may exist in bi-
direction—from house prices to housing supply and vice versa. According to Wooldridge 
(2010, Chapter 4, pp. 54-55) and Wooldridge (2012, Chapter 3, pp. 86-87), there are usually 
three possible forms of endogeneity in applied econometrics: omitted variables, measurement 
error and simultaneity. Omitted variables arise when some important factors should be 
controlled for and they are correlated with one or more of the independent variables, but 
usually because of data unavailability, they could not be included in a regression model. 
Measurement error is an issue when we would like to measure the (partial) effect of a 
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variable, but we can observe only an imperfect measure of it. In the case of simultaneity, at 
least one of the explanatory variables is determined simultaneously along with the dependent 
variable. The difference among the three sources of endogeneity is not always apparent, as an 
equation can have more than one source of endogeneity.        
2. Time-invariant regional characteristics (fixed effects) of the panel data, such as geography 
and demographics, may be correlated with the explanatory variables as well.  The fixed 
effects are embodied in the error term ti , of Equation 3.5, which consists of the unobserved 
region-specific effects ( i ), and the observed specific error ( ti , ): tiiti ,,   . Our 
Equation 3.5 then can be rewritten as: 
tiitititi Xyy ,,1,,                                                                                             (3.6) 
3. As Wooldridge (2012, Chapter 3-4, pp. 83-119) defined, for cross-sectional regression 
applications, there are six general assumptions, called ‘classical linear model (CLM) 
assumptions’ including linearity in the parameters, no perfect collinearity, the zero 
conditional mean, homoscedasticity, no serial correlation, and normality of the errors: 
Assumption I: Linear in Parameters 
The model in the population can be written as 
  kk xxxy 22110  
where β0, β1, …, βk are the unknown parameters (constants) of interest and ε is an unobserved 
random error or disturbance term. 
Assumption II: Random Sampling 
The random sample of n observations, {(xi1, xi2, ..., xik, yi): i=1, 2, ..., n}, following the 
population mode in Assumption I. 
Assumption III: No Perfect Collinearity 
In the sample (and therefore in the population), none of the independent variables is constant, 
and there are no exact linear relationships among the independent variables. 
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Assumption IV: Zero Conditional Mean 
The error ε has an expected value of zero given any value of the independent variables. In 
other words, 0),,|( ,21 kxxxE  . 
Assumption V: Homoskedasticity 
The error ε has the same variance given any values of the explanatory variables. In other 
words, 
2
,21 ),,|(  kxxxVar  . 
Assumption VI: No Serial Correlation and Normality 
The population error ε is independent of the explanatory variables x1, x2, ..., xk and is 
normally distributed with zero mean and variance σ2: ε ~ Normal (0, σ2). 
Wooldridge (2012) summarises the population assumption of the CLM in a succinct way as:  
y|x ~ Normal (
2
22110 , kk xxx   ) 
where x is the matrix of (x1, x2, ..., xk). Thus, conditional on x, y has a normal distribution 
with mean linear in x1, x2, ..., xk and a constant variance. 
In our model, the possibility of autocorrelation is raised by the presence of the lagged 
dependent variable 1, tiy , which violates strict/strong exogeneity, CLM Assumption VI; since 
1, tiy  is correlated with the past value of idiosyncratic error term 2, ti at time t: 
0),...1,|( 1,,2,  TtyxE tiiiti                                                                                           (3.7) 
Furthermore, the composite error ( ti , ) exhibits serial correlation due to the time-invariant, 
panel-specific unobserved effect—one of the repressors is a lagged dependent variable 
( 1, tiy )—which apparently violates the weaker condition of zero contemporaneous correlation 
of the repressors with the composite error term tii ,  . 
‘If the time dimension T of a sample is small, the inconsistency can be particularly severe. A 
larger cross-section dimension N cannot help, since the number of unobserved effects 
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increases one-for-one with N. It is sometimes known as Nickell bias (1981).’ (Bluedorn 2009) 
4. The panel dataset has a short time dimension (T=11) and a relatively large area dimension 
(N=30).  
3.3.2 Fixed Effects and Random Effects 
Because of the above limitations of the OLS pooled regression, as Greene (2012, Chapter 11, 
pp. 386-387) suggested, alternative model structures for panel data also include Fixed Effects 




Recall our basic OLS model, tiitititi Xyy ,,1,,    , 
where μi embodies all the observable effects and specifies an estimable conditional mean. If 
μi is unobservable but uncorrelated with the explanatory variables xit, then the least squares 
estimator β is biased and inconsistent as a consequence of an omitted variable. The FE 
approach takes μi to be a group-specific constant term in the regression. FE explores the 
relationship between predictor and outcome variables within an entity. Each entity has its 
own individual characteristics that may or may not influence the predictor variables.  
When using FE we assume that something within the individual may impact or bias the 
predictor or outcome variables and we need to control for this. This is the rationale behind the 
assumption of the correlation between the entity’s error term and predictor variables. FE 
removes the effect of those time-invariant characteristics from the predictor variables so we 
can assess the predictors’ net effect. Another important assumption of the FE model is that 
those time-invariant characteristics are unique to the individual and should not be correlated 
with other individual characteristics. Each entity is different therefore the entity’s error term 
and the constant (which captures individual characteristics) should not be correlated with the 
others. FEs estimator ‘removes the effect of time-invariant characteristics’ (see above), hence 
panel data models can easily correct for time-invariant unobservable effects, correlated with 
the observable regressors. 
If the unobserved individual heterogeneity μi, however formulated, can be assumed to be 
uncorrelated with xit, the model might be modified as tiitititi Xyy ,,1,,    , that 
is a linear regression model with a compound disturbance estimated by lease squares, which 
is consistent but inefficient. The random effects (RE) approach specifies that μi is a group-
                                                 
53 Assumptions for FE and RE, see Wooldridge, 2010, Chapter 14, Appendix 14A, pp. 509-511.  
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specific random element, similar to υi,t except that for each group, there is but a single draw 
that enters the regression identically in each period. An advantage of RE is that time-invariant 
variables can be included. In the FEs models, there are ways to recover the time-invariant 
parts of the model, either through the LSDV approach or, upon model estimation, by 
extracting the time-invariant part of the error term and regressing it on the time-invariant 
variables and a constant term. RE approach also needs to specify those individual 
characteristics that may or may not affect the predictor variables. The problem with this is 
that some variables may not be available therefore leading to omitted variable bias in the 
model. RE allows to generalise the inferences beyond the sample used in the model.       
Again, the key distinction between FE and RE is whether μi and xit are correlated, not whether 
these effects are stochastic or not (Greene, 2012, Chapter 11. pp. 387; Wooldridge, 2010, 
Chapter 10, pp. 328). The Hausman test can be used to determine the preferred model 
between FE and RE (Clark and Linzer, 2012; Greene, 2012, Chapter 11. Pp. 419-420; 
Wooldridge, 2010, Chapter 10, pp. 329-333). If there is no correlation between the 
independent variables and the unit effects, then estimators of β in FE ( FEˆ ) should be similar 
to β in RE ( REˆ ). Thereby, the Hausman test statistic H measures the difference between FEˆ  
and REˆ :  






                                                              (3.8) 
Under the null hypothesis H0 of ‘difference in coefficients not systematic’, H is distributed as 
Chi-square with degree of freedom equal to the number of repressors in the model. Rejecting 
the null suggests the FE approach is preferred. In our case, after determining between FE or 
RE by the Hausman test, we can use the chosen approach to compare with the results of other 
models, as a robustness check.  
3.3.3 2SLS or Instrumental Variables Estimator 
The correlations between endogenous explanatory variables and the error term violate an 
assumption of the regression framework, which means OLS estimation will be biased. Even 
as the sample size approaches infinity, the estimates of the parameters on average will not 
equal the population estimates (Oczkowski, 2003). To remedy this bias, we would usually 
implement 2SLS (Two-Stage Least Squares), also called the instrumental variables (IV) 
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estimator, to identify instruments for the endogenous variables. The 2SLS can overcome the 
drawbacks of the fixed-effects OLS panel estimator. Specifically, the major limitations of FE 
approach are failing to estimate effects of variables which vary across individuals but not 
over time, breaking all cross-section variation in the dependent and independent variables by 
controlling for omitted variables, failing to predict effects in levels outside of the sample, 
inefficiency if unobserved effects μi is uncorrelated with xit, and exacerbating biases from 
other types of specification problems, especially measurement error (Greene, 2005, Chapter 
13; Wooldridge, 2010, Chapter 10; Bollen and Brand, 2010).   
The instruments of 2SLS must satisfy two conditions: (1) instruments must be uncorrelated 
with the error term; (2) instruments must be correlated with the replaced endogenous 
variables. As the 2SLS name suggests, there are two steps to get the parameter estimates by 
running two OLS regressions. The first step is to regress the endogenous variable on all the 
predetermined (exogenous) variables in the system to get predictions for the endogenous 
variables, and then obtain the fitted values, as the instrumental variables that are uncorrelated 
with the residual. The second step is to regress the initial equation by using the fitted values 
as instruments to replace the original endogenous variables.  
A natural assumption which can locate valid instruments is sequential exogeneity (Greene 
2005, Chapter 5, pp. 74-76): 
0),...,,,...,,|( 1,1,,1,1,,,  ititiititiiti yyyxxxE                                                                           (3.9) 
The only requirement of the sequential exogeneity assumption is that the idiosyncratic error 
( ti , ) term has zero mean conditional upon the unobserved effect and the current set of 
information (the predetermined and exogenous variables). Even under this assumption, the 
correlation still occurs between the unobserved effect and the lagged dependent variable. In 
this case the usual transformation to adopt is the first-difference (FD), which can eliminate 
the unobserved effect (Greene 2005, Chapter 13, pp.307-308): 
titititi Xyy ,,1,,                                                                                                 (3.10) 
where 1,,,  tititi yyy , 1,,,  tititi XXX , and 1,,,  tititi  . Of course, just like FD 
estimation, FE estimators can eliminate the unobserved effect as well. For large N and small 
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T, the choice between FE and FD hinges on the relative efficiency of the estimators and this 
is determined by the serial correlation in the idiosyncratic errors υi,t, which is usually difficult 
to test (Wooldridge 2012, Chapter 14, pp. 490). However, Greene (2005) states this model is 
still complicated by correlation between the lagged dependent variable and the disturbance 
(the first order moving average disturbance). As Bluedorn (2009) explains, the first 
differencing generates a negative correlation between the differenced lagged dependent 
variable ( 1,  tiy ) and the differenced idiosyncratic error term ( ti, ), which implies we still 
need to use an alternative IV estimation strategy. 
3.3.4 Difference GMM and System GMM Method 
In response to the endogeneity problems, we could use the GMM (Generalized Method of 
Moments) estimator, which originates with Hansen (1982). The increasingly popular dynamic 
panel instrument estimators were proposed by Arellano-Bond (1991), and Arellano-Bover 
(1995)/Blundell-Bond (1998). These are the two most common estimation strategies for 
dynamic panel models of the form of Equation 3.4. The application of the Arellano and Bond 
(1991) GMM estimator uses first differences to eliminate unobserved area-specific effects 
(fixed effects) and taking lagged instruments to correct for simultaneity in the first-
differenced equations, and so is known as ‘difference GMM’. Subsequently, Arellano and 
Bover (1995) generated the forward orthogonal deviations transformation instead of 
differencing. The Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond estimator expands upon the Arellano-Bond 
estimator via adding an additional assumption that the fixed effects are uncorrelated with the 
first differences of the instrument variables. The latter estimator builds up a two-equation 
system, the original equation and the transformed equation, and is typically called ‘system 
GMM’. The considerations of Roodman (2009) explain well the appropriateness and 
efficiency of GMM estimators for our model: 
‘Both are general estimators designed for situations with 1) ‘small T, large N’ panels, 
meaning few time periods and many individuals; 2) a linear functional relationship; 3) a 
single left-hand-side variable that is dynamic, depending on its own past realizations; 4) 
independent variables that are not strictly exogneous, meaning correlated with past and 
possibly current realizations of the error; 5) fixed individual effects; and 6) 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation within individuals, but not across them.’ 
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The following assumptions about the data-generating process are embodied by the difference 
and system GMM estimators: 
The following is based on (Roodman, 2009). 
‘1. The process may be dynamic, with current realizations of the dependent variable 
influenced by past ones. 
2. There may be arbitrarily distributed fixed individual effects in the dynamic, so that the 
dependent variable consistently changes faster for some observational units than others. This 
argues against cross-section regressions, which must essentially assume fixed effects away, 
and in favor of a panel set-up, where variation over time can be used to identify parameters. 
3. Some regressors may be endogenous. 
4. The idiosyncratic disturbances (those apart from the fixed effects) may have individual-
specific patterns of heteroskedasticity and serial correlation. 
5. The idiosyncratic disturbances are uncorrelated across individuals. 
In addition, some secondary worries shape the design: 
6. Some regressors may be predetermined but not strictly exogenous: even if independent of 
current disturbances, still influenced by past ones. The lagged dependent variable is an 
example. 
7. The number of time periods of available data, T, may be small. (The panel is ‘small T, 
large N.’) 
Finally, since the estimators are designed for general use, they do not assume that good 
instruments are available outside the immediate data set. In effect, it is assumed that: 
8. The only available instruments are “internal”—based on lags of the instrumented 
variables. 
However, the estimators do allow inclusion of external instruments.’ 
More specifically, the GMM estimator in a first-differenced dynamic panel regression, 
proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991), employs valid instruments for the lagged endogenous 
variables where the following moment conditions hold: 
1,...,20)( ,,  tsyE tisti                                                                                              (3.11) 
Equation 3.11, also known as the ‘standard moment condition’, and is widely applied in 
empirical estimation. The resulting instrument matrix for past values of the endogenous 







































                                                                   (3.12) 
Analogously, the matrix of strictly exogenous/predetermined explanatory variables ( 1, tiX ) 










































                                               (3.13) 
Thus, the full IV set for the first differenced transformed model (








                                                                                                           (3.14) 
One common disadvantage of first-differenced dynamic model estimators is their weak 
empirical performance (Alecke, Mitze, and Untiedt; 2010): as Bond et al. (2010) debate, 
first-differenced IV/GMM estimators would be poorly behaved because lagged levels of the 
time series only provide ‘weak instruments’ for subsequent first differences. In order to 
remedy this critique, a second generation dynamic panel data (DPD) model has been 
developed, which also introduces appropriate orthogonality conditions for the equation in 
levels (Blundell and Bond, 1998) as: 
TtyE tiiti ,...,30])[( ,1,                                                                                           (3.15) 
Rather than adopting lagged levels of variables for first-differenced equations involving the 
first difference estimators, an orthogonality condition can be obtained for the model in levels 
that uses first difference instruments. Equation 3.15 is also referred to as the ‘stationarity 
moment condition’. Blundell and Bond (1998) suggest a GMM estimator that jointly includes 
both the standard and stationarity moment conditions. This approach is typically called 
‘system GMM’ incorporating ‘level’ and ‘difference’ GMM estimators. System GMM applies 
the data system as a single-equation problem since the same linear functional relationship 












































                                                                                      (3.16) 




 , where 
L
iZ  is the 
instrument set for the equation in levels on the valid orthogonality conditions for both 1. tiy  
and 1, tiX . 
Unlike difference GMM, where the effects of time-invariant regressors get differenced out, 
regressors with the time-invariant effects can be estimated as well in system GMM by adding 
the level version of the dynamic panel model to the differenced version. Consequently, 
although system GMM requires more assumptions than difference GMM, it can achieve a 
greater efficiency as long as the assumptions hold. 
3.3.5 Tests for Overidentification and Autocorrelation 
3.3.5.1 The Sargan/Hansen Test for Overidentification 
The standard test of overidentifying restrictions is the Sargan (1958)/Hansen (1982) test (the 
Sargan or J-test), which is used for joint validity of the instruments. A critical assumption, for 
the validity of GMM estimators, is certainly that the instruments are exogenous. More 
specifically, the residuals should be uncorrelated with the set of exogenous variables if the 
instruments are truly valid. The statistic of the Sargan/Hansen test follows an asymptotically 
Chi-squared (
2 ) distribution, with the degrees of freedom equal to the number of 
overidentifying restrictions. The null hypothesis of the Sargan/Hansen test is that ‘all the 
instruments are valid’ (Bluedorn, 2009), or ‘the instruments as a group are exogenous’ 
(Mileva, 2007); in other words, the disturbance term is uncorrelated with the instruments. 
Thus, the high p-value is our favorable result: the higher p-value, the better the 
Sargan/Hansen statistic is. 
Generally, the classic Sargan test is more favourable if errors are homoskedastic; while 
Hansen’s J-test, based on the weighting matrix, is more favourable if errors are 
heteroskedastic. Although the Sargan test is more reliable, as the sample size is distorted with 
the growth of instrument number within Hansen test; it is not appropriate if homoskedasticity 
fails. Broadly speaking, the Hansen test is more robust than the Sargan test. 
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3.3.5.2 The Arellano-Bond Test for Autocorrelation 
The Sargan/Hansen test is used for testing the joint validity of the instrument set; in addition, 
Arellano and Bond (1991) propose a test for a scenario that some lags of the endogenous 
variables would be invalid as instruments, namely, there is autocorrelation in the idiosyncratic 
error term ( ti , ). Apparently, the full error term ( tiiti ,,   ) is supposedly autocorrelated 
because it contains fixed effects, thus the estimators are applied to eliminate this problem. 
The Arellano-Bond test is employed to the differences of residuals to test for autocorrelation 
apart from the fixed effects. The Arellano-Bond statistic also follows an asymptotically Chi-
squared (
2 ) distribution with the null hypothesis of no autocorrelation. 
As Roodman (2009) explained, ti, is mathematically correlated to 1,  ti  by sharing the 
term of 1, ti , there is an uninformative evidence of the negative first-order serial correlation. 
Therefore, in order to investigate first-order serial correlation in levels, second-order 
correlation in differences is quoted by estimating correlation between 1, ti in ti,  and 2, ti  
in 2,  ti . In other words, the test for AR(1) in first differences usually rejects the null 
hypothesis; while the test for AR(2) in first differences is more important, as autocorrelation 
will be detected in levels. Generally speaking, the serial correlation of order m in levels is 
tested by checking for correlation of order m+1 in differences. 
However, such an approach would not work for orthogonal deviations since all error terms in 
deviations are mathematically inter-correlated with many forward lags. As long as none of 
the regressors is ‘post-determined’—based on future disturbances, the Arellano-Bond 
autocorrelation test is actually valid for any GMM regression on panel data, including OLS 
and 2SLS. Moreover, another assumption is that errors are not correlated across individuals. 
3.3.6 The Long-run Equilibrium of DPD Model  
Our DPD model with GMM estimator may contain many differenced and lagged terms 
(Roodman, 2009) that make it difficult to interpret from a theoretical perspective, and the 
coefficients β just illustrate the short-run effects of our variables. One interesting property of 
a dynamic model that can be calculated is its long-run or static equilibrium solution (Brooks, 
2008; Greene, 2012). In order to investigate the long run effects, we need to induce the lag 
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structure analysis of the dynamic regression model. Recall the DPD model is shown as 
Equation 3.5: 
titititi Xyy ,,1,,                                                                                                    (3.17) 
With the lag structure, we can get: 
titititi Xyy ,1,2,1,                                                                                                (3.18) 

















                                                              (3.19) 
And by this analogy, with the backward recursion of time period t to time period t-p, 








































                                                             (3.20) 
From the lag structure form of our model, we can see that the effect of the lagged dependent 
variables on the current house price has been trailing off with the lags of house price further 
in the past. Namely, Equation 3.20 indicates the coefficient of t-p lags of house price is p . 
The parameters of  and  in Equation 3.17 solely demonstrate the short run effects of the 
explanatory variables on China’s house price. While, in the long run, the dynamic model can 
calculate the static equilibrium solution. The long run equilibrium is defined as when the 
variables have attained some steady state values and are no longer changing (Brooks 2008, 
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In the long run equilibrium, it can be seen from Equation 3.21 that the coefficients of 




 rather than  in the short run.   
3.4 Data Source and Description 
China’s welfare allocation housing system was finally terminated by 1998, and then a new 
market-oriented housing system was established. Thus a valid dataset of the housing market 
can be obtained from 1999. The data used in my thesis include 30 provinces/cities (excluding 
Tibet, Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan) in China Mainland from 1999 to 2009, that are 11 
East China provinces (Beijing, Tianjin, Hebei, Liaoning, Shanghai, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian, 
Shandong, Guangdong, Hainan), 8 Middle China provinces (Jilin, Heilongjiang, Shanxi, 
Anhui, Jiangxi, Henan, Hubei, Hunan), and 11 West China provinces (Inner Mongolia, 
Guangxi, Chongqing, Sichuan, Guizhou, Yunnan, Shaanxi, Gansu, Qinghai, Ningxia, and 
Xinjiang). 
The dependent variable is the real house price (HP). The explanatory variables include 
demand-side factors, such as disposable income of urban households (Y), the proportion of 
urban population (P), the unemployment rate in urban area (UR), statutory reserve ratio (I), 
housing consumption of urban households (HC), and floor space  sold this year (D); and 
supply-side factors, such as construction cost of building completed (C), taxation on the use 
of urban land (T), completed investment by enterprises for real estate development this year 
(INV), floor space of building completed this year (S). CPI is another force of Chinese house 
price growth (Zeng, 2008); thus, CPI for urban areas is used to eliminate the effect of the 
inflation rate in my estimation, which can get the real level of variables (HP, Y, HC, C, T and 
INV) by taking the nominal level of variables dividing by local CPI for urban areas.  
Real house price: The dependent variable, it is the real average selling price of 
commercialized buildings by area, where the commercialized buildings include residential 
buildings, office buildings, houses for business use and others. 
The lag of real house price: In order to investigate the dynamic effect of house price in the 
previous time period on the current house prices, the lag of house prices is adopted as one of 
our independent variables. The involvement of a lagged dependent variable is denoted as the 
major idiosyncrasy of the dynamic panel data (DPD) model. 
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Disposable income: A majority of the literature indicates that the disposable income is one of 
the significant variables impacting on both foreign housing markets (Cameron, Muellbauer & 
Murphy, 2006; Jud & Winkler, 2002) and China’s housing market (Cui, 2009; Li & Zhang, 
2010; Chen, Guo & Wu, 2011; and Deng, Ma & Chiang, 2009). Therefore, the real per capita 
disposable income of urban households is an indispensable estimator. 
Urban population proportion: From the view of demographic factors, Cui (2009), Deng, Ma 
& Chiang (2009), Fu (2007), Wu and Zeng (2010) use the absolute number of the urban 
population as an explanatory variable. But we will employ a new device of the population 
factor developed by Chen, Guo and Wu (2011)—the urban population proportion (urban 
population-to-total population), denoted as ‘the urbanization level’. However, in order to 
check the robustness of our estimation, we could use the different variable—the urban 
population.    
Unemployment rate in urban areas: Liu & Shen (2005) and Deng, Ma & Chiang (2009) 
both involve the unemployment rate as their independent variable to explain Chinese house 
price; However, they come to different conclusions: Liu & Shen (2005) find the effect of 
unemployment rate has no significant effects on house prices in China but Deng, Ma & 
Chiang (2009)’s evidence shows a significant effect. We will estimate the equation with 
unemployment rate in urban areas to find how actually it influences China’s house price. 
Statutory reserve ratio: In existing models, the most researchers (Fu, 2007; Deng, Ma & 
Chiang, 2009; and Dong, Guan & Ming, 2010) use the ‘nominal six-month to one-year 
benchmark lending rate’ denoting ‘the interest rate’ as an explanatory variable; while Duan 
(2008) adopted ‘three-year loan interest rate’. However, the statutory reserve ratio for large 
financial institution, enacted by the central bank, is the most important monetary instrument 
to adjust and regulate the macroeconomy in China. In addition, the adjustment of the 
statutory reserve ratio is much more frequent in response to the market dynamic changes. The 
Table 3.2 displays that how frequent of these two variables have been adjusted, also the 
adjustment of statutory reserve ratio has shifted more smoothly than benchmark lending rate 
with approximate 0.5% interval. In order to improve the veracity of the monetary variable, 
we capture the statutory reserve ratio for the large financial institution firstly; then, since 
there might be several adjustments of the statutory reserve ratio in the same year, we use the 
highest ratio of each year. The statutory reserve ratio is just a minimum percent of total 
customer deposits and notes, and it does not need to eliminate the inflation as there is no 
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difference between ‘nominal’ term and ‘real’ term. Again, we could use the most common 
factor of the benchmark lending rate to do a robustness check.  
Table 3.2: The Adjustment of Statutory Reserve Ratio for Large Financial Institution and 
































21/03/1998 8.00% -5.00%   22/08/2007   7.02% 0.18% 
01/07/1998   6.93% -0.99% 15/09/2007   7.29% 0.27% 
07/12/1998   6.39% -0.54% 25/09/2007 12.50% 0.50%   
10/06/1999   5.85% -0.54% 25/10/2007 13.00% 0.50%   
21/11/1999 6.00% -2.00%   26/11/2007 13.50% 0.50%   
21/02/2002   5.31% -0.54% 21/12/2007   7.47% 0.18% 
21/09/2003 7.00% 1.00%   25/12/2007 14.50% 1.00%   
25/04/2004 7.50% 0.50%   25/01/2008 15.00% 0.50%   
29/10/2004   5.58% 0.27% 25/03/2008 15.50% 0.50%   
28/04/2006   5.85% 0.27% 25/04/2008 16.00% 0.50%   
05/07/2006 8.00% 0.50%   20/05/2008 16.50% 0.50%   
15/08/2006 8.50% 0.50%   25/06/2008 17.50% 1.00%   
19/08/2006   6.12% 0.27% 16/09/2008   7.20% -0.27% 
15/11/2006 9.50% 0.50%   25/09/2008 17.50% 0.00%   
15/01/2007 9.50% 0.50%   09/10/2008   6.93% -0.27% 
25/02/2007 10.00% 0.50%   15/10/2008 17.00% -0.50%   
18/03/2007   6.39% 0.27% 30/10/2008   6.66% -0.27% 
16/04/2007 10.50% 0.50%   27/11/2008   5.58% -1.08% 
15/05/2007 11.00% 0.50%   05/12/2008 16.00% -1.00%   
19/05/2007   6.57% 0.18% 23/12/2008   5.31% -0.27% 
05/06/2007 11.50% 0.50%   25/12/2008 15.50% -0.50%   
21/07/2007   6.84% 0.27% 18/01/2010 16.00% 0.50%   
15/08/2007 12.00% 0.50%   20/10/2010   5.56% 0.25% 
Data source: The People’s Bank of China http://www.pbc.gov.cn/publish/zhengcehuobisi/610/index.html 
Excessive housing demand: The previous studies of Chinese house prices treat the demand 
side and supply side separately, either using housing units sold as the demand side (Fu, 2007; 
Deng, Ma & Chiang, 2009; and Dong, Guan & Ming, 2010) or building completed as the 
supply side (Gao & Leng, 2010). Here, we introduce a new variable, denoted as ‘excessive 
housing demand’, to overlap the effects of both housing demand and housing supply. The 
excessive housing demand is generated by the log of housing demand (housing units sold this 
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year) deducting the log of housing supply (building completed this year). Thus it is the log of 
the ratio of these two variables. In the robustness check, we could replace the excessive 
housing demand by two original demand-supply variables, housing units sold this year and 
buildings completed this year. 
Construction cost and housing consumption: From the suppliers in the Chinese housing 
market, the effects of construction costs greatly differ for the various regions (Leung et al., 
2010). From the purchaser of housing, Zhou (2010) and Zeng (2008) illustrate a significant 
relationship between property prices and aggregate consumption. While the housing 
consumption more likely impacts on the house price rather than the aggregate consumption. 
Thus, we introduce a consuming expenditure factor, ‘housing consumption’, as one of the 
explanatory variables. 
Investment completed on real estate development: Another new explanatory variable, 
‘investment actually completed by enterprises for real estate development this year’ as a 
supply-side variable, is included in our model. 
Urban land use tax: After the implementation of the new land transfer policy in July 2002, 
the land transfer fee and urban land tax have become other major determinants of Chinese 
house prices. Ding (2008), Yuan (2009) and Deng, Ma & Chiang (2009) elaborate the rapid 
increase of land prices has contributed to house price growth. Since the ‘land price’ means the 
land using right transfer fee paid by real estate developers to governments; the land transfer 
revenue has become one of the most important sources of total revenue for local authorities, 
known as the ‘cash box’ of local governments. The new variable—urban land use tax—is 
adopted as one of our explanatory variables. As mentioned before, there are many categories 
of taxes on urban land, therefore the alternative tax form of ‘urban land value added tax’ 
might be used to detect the efficiency of our explanatory variable in the robustness check.    
Table 3.3 introduces the data source and generation of my variables. In my estimation, apart 
from urban population proportion (P), unemployment rate (UR) and statutory reserve ratio (I), 
all the other variables are in logarithms  (log of HP, Y, HC, D, C, T,  INV and S, denoting as 
‘LHP, LY, LHC, LD, LC, LT, LINV and LS’ respectively). 
Table 3.4 describes the summary statistics of dependent variables and explanatory variables, 
which include their number of observations, mean standard deviation, minimal value and 
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maximum value. From the table, we can see that the fluctuations for all the variables are 
drastic, which can be reflected by the big gap between their minimal values and maximal 
values. The disparity is still apparent even with the logarithmic values. The reasons of 
varying changes within variables could be raised by the differences of both the time and area 
dimensions. More specifically, on one side, the fundamental factors have largely ameliorated 
with the rapid economic growth over time; on the other side, due to the relatively large 
differences in development level across China, various kinds of macroeconomic indicators 
differ greatly between 30 provinces/cities. 













the average selling price of commercialized buildings by area/local 
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construction cost of buildings completed by area/local CPI for urban 
areas 
T 
Urban Land Use 
Tax (10,000 yuan) 
taxation level on the use of urban land by area 
INV 
Real Investment 
(100 million yuan) 
investment actually completed by enterprises for real estate 






floor space of building completed this year by area 
Notes: 
1) All the statistic data, except for statutory reserve ratio, come from the ‘China Statistical Yearbook’ on the official webpage 
of ‘National Bureau of Statistics of China’ (NBSC) http://www.stats.gov.cn/ 
2) Local CPI for urban areas in each provinces/cities is also from the ‘China Statistical Yearbook’ on the official webpage of 
NBSC. 
3) The statistic data of unemployment rates in urban area of Shanghai in 2001 and 2005 come from the ‘Shanghai Statistical 
Yearbook’ rather than the ‘China Statistical Yearbook’. 
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Table 3.4: Statistics Summary 
Variable Observations Mean Standard Deviation Min Max 
Initial 
format 
 house price (HP) 330 2550.656 1749.468 827.3662 14014.8 
disposable income (Y) 330 9847.686 4368.643 4325.309 28955.89 
housing consumption (HC) 330 258.0656 138.0645 56.27649 995.1392 
housing demand (D) 330 1543.823 1494.559 30.74 10248.2 
construction cost (C) 330 1290.471 508.1163 616.9128 3366.733 
urban land use tax (T) 330 86168.6 164475.6 673.7864 1209514 
investment completed (INV)  330 518.8621 607.9096 6.26 3352.23 
housing supply (S) 330 1527.575 1319.057 28.6489 8442.8 
urban population proportion (P) 300 45.2209 15.41895 23.2 89.09 
unemployment rate (UR) 330 3.658364 0.7471114 0.6 6.5 
statutory reserve ratio (I) 330  9.363636  4.140894  6.0  17.5 
Logarithm 
format 
log(HP)—LHP 330 7.699049 0.4953977 6.718247 9.54787 
log(Y)—LY 330 9.109843 0.4042798 8.372239 10.27353 
log(HC)—LHC  330 5.425281 0.5051711 4.030277 6.902883 
log(D)—LD 330 6.846706 1.10964 3.425565 9.234858 
log(C)—LC  330 7.096819 0.3529258 6.424727 8.121698 
log(T)—LT 330 10.41218 1.37157 6.512913 14.00573 
log(INV)—LINV 330 5.556684 1.286543 1.83418 8.117381 
log(S)—LS 330 6.933172 0.9894436 3.355115 9.041069 
log(DS)—LDS 330 -0.0864659 0.2956824 -1.147045 0.8223372 
Notes: 
1) The summary of statistics is provided based on a time period from 1999 to 2009 for 30 provinces/cities. Thus, except for urban population proportion (p), 
number of observation is 330 (=30*11). 
2) Since the statistic data of urban population started from 2000 in the ‘China Statistical Yearbook’, there are 30 missing values of urban population for each 
provinces/cities in 1999. 





Table 3.5 demonstrates straightforward contemporaneous correlations between house prices 
and other variables respectively: the positive correlations suggest disposable income, urban 
population proportion, statutory reserve ratio, housing consumption, construction cost, urban 
land use tax, completed investment and excessive housing demand have a positive effect on 
house prices; while the negative correlation between house prices and unemployment rate 
suggests that the house prices will rise with the decline of the unemployment rate. But the 
table indicates that the house price has a positive high correlation with other explanatory 
variables (all correlation coefficients are more than 50%), except for the unemployment rate 
and excessive housing demand (the absolute values of correlation coefficient are less than 20% 
and 35% respectively), which means the other explanatory variables excluding 
unemployment rate and excessive housing demand have strong correlation with house prices. 
But of course correlation is not causation and to explore further we need to employ regression 
analysis. 
Table 3.5: Correlation between house price and other explanatory variables 
 lhp ly p ur i lhc lc lt linv lds 
lhp 1.0000 - - - - - - - - - 
ly 0.8975 1.0000 - - - - - - - - 
p 0.7850 0.6383 1.0000 - - - - - - - 
ur -0.1888 -0.0775 -0.1304 1.0000 - - - - - - 
i 0.5343 0.7186 0.1825  0.0423 1.0000 - - - - - 
lhc 0.6860 0.7118 0.5955 -0.1367  0.3346 1.0000 - - - - 
lc 0.8836 0.8315 0.7174 -0.1442  0.5332 0.6151 1.0000 - - - 
lt 0.5051 0.6424 0.2541 0.0139  0.6468 0.3658 0.4420 1.0000 - - 
linv 0.7084 0.8062 0.5258 -0.0038  0.5092 0.5747 0.6062 0.8117 1.0000 - 
lds 0.3345 0.5096 -0.0066 0.1848  0.5766 0.1859 0.3902 0.4817 0.4388 1.0000 
Note: 
lhp, ly, p, ur, i, lhc, lc, lt, linv and lds represent log of house price, log of disposable income, urban population proportion, 
unemployment rate, statutory reserve ratio, log of housing consumption, log of construction cost, log of urban land use tax, 
log of investment completed and log of excessive housing demand respectively. 
 
From Table 3.5, we can also see that some correlations between explanatory variables are 
relatively high, for instance, the lagged house price has correlation more than 50% with other 
explanatory variables except for unemployment rate. Thus there seems to be high collinearity 
between explanatory variables, which might cause problems of multicollinearity. The term 
multicollinearity refers to high (but not perfect) correlation between two or more independent 
variables, and it arises for estimating βj when Rj
2
 is ‘close’ to one. Here Rj
2
 is the R-squared 





multicollinearity violates none of the CLM assumptions, there is no absolute number that we 
can cite to conclude that multicollinearity is a problem. The Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) 
can be used to detect the muiltcollinearity. The VIF for slope coefficient j is simply 
 21/1 jj RVIF  , precisely the term in  jVar ˆ  that is determined by correlation between xj and 
the other explanatory variables. We desire lower levels of VIF with all other things equal. 
(Wooldridge 2012, Chapter 3, pp. 95-98) 
Although the problem of multicollinearity cannot be clearly defined, perhaps most commonly, 
a cut-off value of VIF is recommended as 10 (Wooldridge, 2012; Hair et al., 1995; Kennedy, 
1992; Neter, Wasserman and Kutner, 1989; Marquardt, 1970). Only if VIF is above 10, the 
multicollinearity is concluded as a ‘problem’. In our dataset, we use the VIF to test the 
multicollinearity, and get the following results (Table 3.6): 
Table 3.6: The Values of VIF 
Explanatory Variable VIF 1/VIF 
ly 15.78 0.063374 
L.lhp 8.79 0.113764 
linv 7.53 0.132853 
lc 5.15 0.194289 
lt 4.77 0.209785 
i 4.40 0.227465 
p 4.27 0.234114 
lhc 2.43 0.410930 
lds 2.16 0.463701 
ur 1.22 0.821443 
Mean VIF 5.65 
As we can see, only the income VIF is larger than 10 (15.78), and the average VIF is 5.65, 
much less than 10. Therefore in our case, the multicollinearity will not to be a substantial 
‘problem’. 
3.5 Empirical Results 
3.5.1 System GMM Estimations 
Based on the reasons explained in the methodology, we will use the dynamic panel data 
(DPD) model with both one-step and two-step system GMM methods. In our model, the 
lagged house price, housing vacancy, investment on real estate, urban land use tax, housing 





per capita disposable income of urban householder, urban population proportion, 
unemployment rate in urban areas, and statutory reserve ratio—are treated as exogenous 
variables. 
Next, the degree of freedom of the system-GMM DPD model will decline with the increase 
of instruments; therefore, in order to avoid weakening the estimation by too many 
instruments, we could ‘collapse’ the instruments, which means that the instrument matrix of 





































































                                             (3.22) 
Then, we run the regression and get the estimation results of in Table 3.7. In the general sense, 
the results are coincident in both one-step system GMM regression and two-step system 
GMM regression. The coefficients of the explanatory variables—the first lag of house prices, 
disposable income, statutory reserve ratios, excessive housing demand, real estate investment 
and urban land use tax—are mostly significant at the 1% or 5% significance level; while, the 
other explanatory variables—urban population proportion, unemployment rate of urban areas, 
housing consumption and construction cost—have insignificant coefficients.  
Table 3.7: Estimation Results of System GMM Regressions 
The Determinants of Chinese House Price 
Dependent Variable real house price 
No. of Observation 300 
Explanatory Variable 
One-step System GMM Two-step System GMM 
Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value 
log of the lagged house price (L.lhp) 0.690 (5.35) 0.000*** 0.719 (3.82) 0.001*** 
log of disposable income (ly) 0.370 (2.12) 0.044** 0.438 (2.03) 0.052* 
urban population proportion (p) 0.002 (1.21) 0.236 0.003 (0.97) 0.342 
unemployment rate in urban areas (ur) -0.008 (-0.63) 0.533 0.0004 (0.03) 0.977 
statutory reserve ratio (i) -0.022 (-4.22) 0.000*** -0.024 (-5.56) 0.000*** 
excessive housing demand (lds) 0.155 (2.53) 0.017** 0.184 (2.94) 0.006*** 





log of urban land use taxation (lt) 0.089 (2.52) 0.017** 0.088 (2.61) 0.014** 
log of housing consumption (lhc) -0.014 (-0.32) 0.753 -0.016 (-0.36) 0.718 
log of construction cost (lc) 0.200 (1.59) 0.122 0.142 (1.26) 0.216 





(H0=all instruments are valid) 
0.352 0.352 




1). ( ) denotes the t statistics of the respective coefficients. *** indicates significance at 1% level, ** indicates 
significance at 5% level. * indicates significance at 10% level.  
2). p-values are reported for the AR(2) test, Hansen test and Difference in Hansen test. 
3). The standard instruments for exogenous variables are (ly, p, i, ur); the GMM-style instruments for endogenous 
variables are the lag 3 to lag 5 of (L.lhp, lds, lt, linv, lhc, lc).  
4) lhp, ly, p, ur, i, lhc, lc, lt, linv and lds represent log of house price, log of disposable income, urban population 
proportion, unemployment rate, statutory reserve ratio, log of housing consumption, log of construction cost, log of 
urban land use tax, log of investment completed and log of excessive housing demand respectively. 
 
The empirical results demonstrate that the lagged house prices in the previous period 
significantly affect the current house prices in a positive direction. More specifically, the 
coefficients of lagged house prices are 0.690 and 0.719 in one-step and two-step models 
respectively. The rationale behind the homogenous movement between house prices and 
lagged house prices is that, the increasing positive push on fundamentals can result in the 
rising of prices and expectations, and then the rising expectations lead to further over-
valuation of house prices. Similarly with house price falls, the expectations of further 
decrease can exaggerate the price falls when prices eventually drop down.  
According to the literature (Cameron, Muellbauer & Murphy, 2006; Jud & Winkler, 2002), 
income is one of the most important fundamental factors in the housing market. It can be seen 
that, the coefficient of disposable income of urban households is positively significant, which 
is consistent with other studies on the Chinese housing market (Cui, 2009; Li & Zhang, 2010; 
Chen, Guo & Wu, 2011; and Deng, Ma & Chiang, 2009). More specifically, in the short run, 
a 1% change of disposable income will induce a 0.370% and 0.438% change of house prices 
with the same direction in one-step and two-step system GMM estimations respectively. 
Recall the long-run effects of independent variable X in DPD model is )1(    rather than β, 
disposable income will drive up 1.194 (=0.370/(1-0.690)) per cent and 1.559 (=0.438/(1-
0.719)) per cent of the house price in the long term. This does suggest that as China becomes 





We obtain the same conclusion as Deng, Ma & Chiang (2009) and Wu & Zeng (2010) about 
the demographic factors, although they use the absolute number of urban population as an 
explanatory variable. In our estimation, the coefficients of the urban population proportion 
are not significant in both estimations, even at the 10% significance level, which indicates the 
fluctuation of the urban population proportion has not a significant effect on the house price 
change. By contrast, Chen, Guo and Wu (2011) adopted the same variable (urbanization level) 
as ours (the percentage of urban population) but found a significant influence on house prices. 
Table 3.7 demonstrates the p-values of the t-test for unemployment rate in urban areas are 
0.532 and 0.986 respectively, which thus fail to reject the null hypothesis. In other words, the 
unemployment rate in urban areas is an insignificant explanatory variable. This conclusion is 
consistent with Liu & Shen (2005), but against Deng, Ma & Chiang (2009), which indicates 
that the fluctuations of house prices are not well explained by unemployment rates.  
The argument about the effect of monetary factors on Chinese house prices is inconclusive. 
The empirical analysis of Fu (2007), Deng, Ma & Chiang (2009), and Dong, Guan & Ming 
(2010) indicate that there is no significant relationship between Chinese property prices and 
the fluctuation of ‘nominal six-month to one-year benchmark lending rate’. However, Zeng 
(2008) explored a negative shock of money supply and a positive shock of the interest rate on 
house prices; also, Duan (2008) found a significant role for the three-year loan interest rate. 
With the more precise estimator generated by the highest statutory reserve ratio
54
 each year, 
our regressions overthrow the finding of the indistinctive impact of interest rates on house 
prices, as both coefficients of the statutory reserve ratio are strongly significant at the 1% 
significance level. Our results also correspond to the theoretical assumption: the decline of 
interest rates will drive up the house price and vice versa. More specifically, if statutory 
reserve ratio rise 1%, it will deteriorate house prices in the short run by 0.022% in the one-
step model and 0.024% in the two-step model individually, and in the long run by 0.071% 
(=0.022/(1-0.690)) in one-step model and 0.085% (=0.024/(1-0.719)) in the two-step model 
respectively. 
Some of the literature (Fu, 2007; Deng, Ma & Chiang, 2009; and Dong, Guan & Ming, 2010) 
                                                 
54 Alternatively, instead of ‘the highest statutory reserve ratio’ in every year, we adopt ‘the weighted average statutory 
reserve ratio’ to estimate our equation. The regression illustrates that the effects of the interest rate in both two estimations 
are still quite significant on the house price. However, it will change other results of excessive housing demand and housing 
consumption. More specifically, the excessive housing demand will not be a significant variable any more, while the effect 





suggests that the impact of housing units sold has a significant effect on Chinese house prices; 
while others (Gao & Leng, 2010) find that there is no significant effect of building supply on 
house prices. The results in Table 3.7 also show that Chinese house prices can be explained 
significantly by our new variable—the excessive housing demand this year—obtained 
through using the log of housing demand minus the log of housing supply . In the short run 
effects, the 1% positive change in excessive housing demand indicates that house prices 
increase by 0.155% in the one-step regression and 0.184% in the two-step regression 
respectively; while in the long run, the house price will ascend by 0.500% (=0.155/(1-0.690)) 
and 0.655% (=0.184/(1-0.719)) individually. 
Our findings suggest both real construction costs and real housing consumption per capita are 
not significant explanatory variables of house prices; the p-value of the t-tests illustrates both 
estimators fail to reject the null hypothesis at the 10% significance level. That largely 
depends on the fact that construction costs and housing consumption just account for a small 
portion of Chinese house prices to an extent, particularly in relatively developed areas, like 
Beijing, Shanghai and Guangdong. 
With another new explanatory variable, ‘investment actually completed by enterprises for 
real estate development this year’, the results of our estimation show that the coefficient of 
real investment is significant at the 5% significance level. Specifically, house prices will 
decline by 0.092% and 0.111% individually with a 1% increase of real investment in the short 
term, which is consistent with the findings of Zeng (2008), Cui (2009) and Yuan (2009). Also, 
in the long term, real house prices will fall by 0.297% (=0.092/(1-0.690)) and 0.395% 
(=0.111/(1-0.719)) respectively. 
Ding (2008), Yuan (2009) and Deng, Ma & Chiang (2009) discuss that the rapid increase of 
land prices has contributed to house price growth. In line with their evidence, our new 
variable, urban land use tax, shows a significant impact on house prices at the 5% significant 
level as well. In both regressions, an increase of 1% in the urban land use tax will push up the 
house prices by 0.089% and 0.088% in the short run, but by 0.287% (=0.089/(1-0.690)) and 
0.313% (=0.088/(1-0.719)) respectively in the long term, which is also coincident with the 
theoretical conclusion of a positive relationship between house prices and urban land use tax. 





overidentification test. The null hypothesis of the Arellano-Bond test is no autocorrelation. 
Thus, the test results indicate that the autocorrelation test will fail to reject the null hypothesis 
at the 5% significance level, which means there is no autocorrelation at the 5% significance 
level in both GMM regressions. Furthermore, we can see that the two-step system GMM 
estimation eliminates the autocorrelation more efficiently than the one-step system GMM 
estimation, since the p-value of Arellano-Bond test increases from 0.084 to 0.099. 
For the Hansen test, the null hypothesis of the overidentification test is ‘all instruments are 
valid’. We can conclude that, both tests for all instruments and test for levels, produce the 
same results for both estimations and fail to reject the null hypothesis at 10% significance 
level. The result shows our instruments are jointly valid, which also certifies the efficiency of 
our estimations. Overall, two-step system GMM estimation shows more efficiency than one-
step system GMM regressions. Although both autocorrelation test and overidentification test 
reveal the efficiency of our GMM estimations, the robustness checks are still desired. After 
all, correlation coefficients among explanatory variables are pretty high. 
3.5.2 Robustness Checks  
To test the robustness of GMM results, we adopt two approaches: one is to compare with 
different estimation, such as FE or RE; the other is to replace some of the explanatory 
variables, such as the proportion of urban population, the statutory reserve ratio, the excessive 
housing demand, and the urban land use tax, with alternative factors, urban population, 
nominal six-month to one-year benchmark lending rate, housing demand (housing units sold 
this year), housing supply (building completed this year), and the urban land value added tax. 
Table 3.8 exhibits the regression results of the FE and RE approaches respectively. Due to the 
exclusiveness of these two estimations, the Hausman test proposes that, the FE model is 
preferred with the rejection of the null hypothesis. Thus, the FE findings could be used as a 
comparison with GMM results. Most results with FE are consistent with the GMM 
regressions: the impacts of previous house prices, disposable income, the statutory serve ratio, 
and urban land use tax are all significant at the 5% level with quite similar coefficients; and 
the effects of urban population percentage, unemployment rate, and housing consumption are 
still not significant. However, they of course also indicate some discrepancies in the findings: 





investment completed do not play a significant role any more in FE, but the construction cost 
does. Hence, GMM estimations improved the explanatory power of excessive housing 
demand and investment, which FE fails to detect.  
Table 3.8: Estimation Results of FE and RE Models  
The Determinants of Chinese House Price 
Dependent Variable real house price 
No. of Observation 300 
Explanatory Variable 
FE approach RE approach 
Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value 
log of the lagged house price (L.lhp) 0.644 (13.10) 0.000*** 0.719 (3.82) 0.000*** 
log of disposable income (ly) 0.474 (5.39) 0.000*** 0.438 (2.03) 0.000*** 
urban population proportion (p) -0.004 (-1.13) 0.261 0.003 (0.97) 0.479 
unemployment rate in urban areas (ur) -0.020 (-1.52) 0.131 0.0004 (0.03) 0.887 
statutory reserve ratio (i) -0.015 (-4.75) 0.000*** -0.024 (-5.56) 0.000*** 
excessive housing demand (lds) 0.030 (0.97) 0.335 0.184 (2.94) 0.017** 
log of investment completed (linv) -0.013 (-0.52) 0.602 -0.111 (-2.29) 0.081* 
log of urban land use taxation (lt) 0.029 (2.12) 0.035** 0.088 (2.61) 0.119 
log of housing consumption (lhc) 0.001 (0.03) 0.976 -0.016 (-0.36) 0.944 
log of construction cost (lc) 0.165 (3.63) 0.000*** 0.142 (1.26) 0.001*** 
cons -2.517 (-4.70) 0.000*** -2.867 (-2.43) 0.000*** 
Hausman Test 
Prob.>Chi-square = 0.0000 
(reject the null, FE is preferred) 
Notes: 
1). ( ) denotes the t statistics of the respective coefficients. *** indicates significance at 1% level, ** 
indicates significance at 5% level. * indicates significance at 10% level.  
2). Ho for Hausman test is ‘difference in coefficients not systematic’; rejecting the null means the FE 
approach is preferred. 
 
Table 3.9 demonstrates the results of the robustness check by using different explanatory 
variables (urban population instead of urban population percentage, lending rate instead of 
statutory reserve ratio, housing demand and housing supply instead of excessive housing 
demand, urban land value added tax instead of urban land use tax). The influence of 
population and monetary factors coincide with the original variables. This implies that 
regardless of any variable we used, the population does not significantly affect Chinese house 
prices, but the monetary adjustment does. While, the new variable of urban land value added 
tax is not significant, comparing with the significance of urban land use tax, that indicates the 





Housing demand has a significant impact at the 5% level and housing supply at the 10% level. 
The original excessive housing demand factor shows a significant effect as well, in capturing 
the effects of both housing demand and housing supply. However, the alternative variables 
have changed the impact of other variables to some extent. More specifically, the original 
elements of income and investment fail to significantly affect house prices any more, that 
illustrates the new variables deteriorate the effectiveness of other original variables. 
Table 3.9: Estimation Results of System GMM Regressions with Alternative Explanatory 
Variables 
The Determinants of Chinese House Price 
Dependent Variable real house price 
No. of Observation 300 
Explanatory Variable 
One-step System GMM Two-step System GMM 
Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value 
log of the lagged house price (L.lhp) 0.900 (9.98) 0.000*** 0.974 (7.28) 0.000*** 
log of disposable income (ly) 0.044 (0.24) 0.812 -0.074 (-0.36) 0.718 
log of urban population (lup) -0.023 (-0.53) 0.602 -0.028 (-0.55) 0.590 
unemployment rate in urban areas (ur) -0.006 (-0.51) 0.617 0.006 (0.31) 0.762 
benchmark lending rate (ni) -0.030 (-3.28) 0.003*** -0.028 (-2.89) 0.007*** 
housing demand (ld) 0.224 (2.77) 0.010** 0.273 (3.11) 0.004*** 
housing supply (ls) -0.193 (-1.97) 0.059* -0.235 (-1.92) 0.065* 
log of investment completed (linv) 0.006 (0.06) 0.951 0.012 (0.11) 0.914 
log of land value added tax (llvat) -0.015 (-1.24) 0.227 -0.019 (-1.59) 0.123 
log of housing consumption (lhc) 0.040 (0.77) 0.446 0.084 (1.43) 0.165 
log of construction cost (lc) 0.120 (1.08) 0.288 0.114 (1.75) 0.091* 





(H0=all instruments are valid) 
0.365 0.365 




1). ( ) denotes the t statistics of the respective coefficients. *** indicates significance at 1% level, ** indicates 
significance at 5% level. * indicates significance at 10% level.  
2). p-values are reported for the AR(2) test, Hansen test and Difference in Hansen test. 
3). The standard instruments for exogenous variables are (ly, lup, ni, ur); the GMM-style instruments for 
endogenous variables are the lag 3 to lag 5 of (L.lhp, ld, ls, llvat, linv, lhc, lc). 
4) lhp, ly, p, ur, i, lhc, lc, lt, linv and lds represent log of house price, log of disposable income, urban population 
proportion, unemployment rate, statutory reserve ratio, log of housing consumption, log of construction cost, log of 






In summary, the efficiency and consistency of our GMM regressions have been substantiated 
by the robustness checks, to a great extent. The developed variables embodied are appropriate 
and the estimations are effective to investigate their effects on Chinese house prices. But due 
to the unavailability of data and the limitations of the GMM method, the future research 
could further improve our findings by using more data and more advanced methodology.  
3.6 Conclusion 
This chapter introduces dynamic panel data models with system GMM estimation, to 
investigate the determinants that impact on real house price variation in China by using a 
sample of 30 provinces/cities during the period of 1999 to 2009.  
We include some conventional factors to explain house price, such as disposable income, 
population factors, unemployment rate, interest rate, consumption, housing demand-supply, 
construction cost, land factors and investment factors. But compared with the conventional 
explanatory factors in the literature, we make further improvements on collecting these 
explanatory variables.  
For example, the urban population proportion is used instead of the absolute number of the 
urban population; for the interest rate, we use the statutory reserve ratio rather than the 
nominal six-month to one-year benchmark lending rate; also, aggregate consumption is 
replaced by real housing consumption in our equation. Excessive housing demand represents 
the demand-supply factor, denoted by log of housing demand minus log of housing supply in 
the same year; then, urban land use tax, as a new land factor variable, it is the first time it has 
been used in a Chinese house price model; Moreover, the investment actually completed by 
enterprises for real estate development measures the investment factor more precisely. 
The autocorrelation test (Arellano-Bond test) and overidentification test (Hansen test) 
indicate our estimations are efficient, since there is no autocorrelation and all instruments are 
jointly valid. More importantly, both robustness checks with FE and different independent 
variables emphasise the efficiency and consistency of our GMM estimations. Under this 
circumstance, the dynamic model with the lagged house price illustrates that the current 
house price is significantly affected by the house price in previous time periods – possibly 





improved explanatory variables have significant explanatory power for Chinese house price 
fluctuations, such as per capita disposable income of urban households, the statutory reserve 
ratio, excessive housing demand this year, urban land use tax, and investment actually 
completed by enterprises for real estate development this year. Moreover, their effects on 





 is greater than the short run coefficient  where is positivel and less 
than 1. However, the coefficients of other variables, like urban population proportion, the 
unemployment rate in urban areas, construction cost and housing consumption of urban 
households, are not significantly related to Chinese house prices. 
Based on the above empirical evidences, we can see that, in China’s macroeconomy, Chinese 
house prices are significantly influenced by monetary policy and land policy, but not affected 
by the urbanization process.  That reflects China’s house price is to a great extent influenced 
by government’s policies, which is identical with the non-fully market-oriented status quo. As 
Peng, Tam and Yiu (2008), Gao and Leng (2010), Dong, Guan and Ming (2010) indicated, 
the central and local authorities have played an important role in China’s housing market. 
Besides, the appreciable effect of excessive housing demand and real estate investment 
corroborates our preceding theoretical inference that the lack of efficient investment channels 
and the speculative asset demand of individuals and institutions have greatly contributed to 
the vigorous prosperity of China’s real estate market. Therefore, it is feasible and effective for 
the central and local authorities to administrate and regulate the Chinese house price via the 
policy instruments. More specifically, as Gao and Leng (2010) suggested, the government 
should combine the limitations of housing supply and the adjustments in monetary policy to 
control the excessive growth of real estate prices; meanwhile, the government needs to 





Chapter 4—Testing the Convergence and Ripple Effects of Regional 
House Prices in China 
4.1 Introduction 
House prices in China’s metropolitan areas have recently exhibited rapid growth, which has 
also attracted the attention of both researchers and policy-makers and encouraged 
investigations into the behaviour of regional house prices
55
. This chapter is going to analyse 
house price diffusion in China. In a recent literature, UK regional house price convergence 
has been mentioned the most frequently. Therefore, the literature review will focus on the UK, 
accompanied with studies of other countries. However, studies on Chinese regional house 
prices are extremely limited. According to the existing literature, there is some evidence of 
convergence between regional house prices in the UK. The Chinese housing market more 
than likely exhibits some distinct characteristics from other fully market-oriented housing 
markets in the developed countries.  
This chapter will use a wide range of quarterly House Price Indexes for 35 cities—30 capital 
cities (Sheng Hui Cheng Shi) and 5 municipalities with independent planning status (Ji Hua 
Dan Lie Shi)
56— in the period from 1998Q1 to 2010Q4. Prior to employing stochastic 
approaches, the original house price Link Index will be transformed into a usable index, i.e. a 
continuous index. Then, some recent and innovational methodologies which have not been 
used on the Chinese market as yet, such as univariate/panel unit root tests, σ-/β-convergence 
analysis, panel regression models, Engle-Granger/Johansen cointegration tests and Granger 
causality tests, will be used. 
Generally speaking, the findings of some approaches show that there is no evidence of 
convergence between regional house prices in China, such as unit root tests and σ-/β-
convergence. While to some extent, further results of panel regression models, cointegration 
tests and causality tests suggest that there exists ripple effects from several core cities, such as 
                                                 
55 The different parts of this chapter have been published in Applied Economics Letters, European Journal of Business 
Research, and the ‘International Academic Conference on Social Sciences (IACSS 2013)’ proceeding book. 
56 Five municipalities with independent planning status are Dalian, Qingdao, Ningbo, Xiamen and Shenzhen approved by 
The State Council of China on 18th July 1984, 15th October 1986, 24th February 1987, 18th April 1988 and 3rd October 1988 
respectively. The municipalities with independent planning status are big cities with more than 15 billion yuan gross social 
output value and more than 1 million population. With the strong industrial and commercial foundation and advanced 
science and technology, they play a significant role in the economic development of China. They are independent accounts in 
the state planning like other capital cities; under the direct instructions from the State, they have the decision-making power 





Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou and Shenzhen, to other generic cities. Even so, the Chinese 
regional house prices might show convergence in the future, when economic growth 
stabilises, as the current time period is an extraordinary stage of economic growth in China. 
Our chapter proceeds as follow. This first section is the ‘Introduction’; the next section is a 
‘Literature Review’ on both the Chinese housing market and other economies’ housing 
markets; the section of ‘Methodology’ introduces the techniques used in this chapter, 
specifically unit root tests, σ-/β-convergence, panel regression models, cointegration tests and 
causality tests; the fourth section is ‘Data Description and Data Transformation’, primarily 
describing the data and data transformations; the following part is the ‘Empirical Results’, 
which explains our findings through the above approaches. The ‘Conclusion’ is of course the 
last section.   
4.2 Literature Review 
4.2.1 Literature on the Convergence and Ripple Effects of Regional House 
Prices Worldwide  
With the worldwide real estate boom in the 1990s, an extensive literature has 
comprehensively analysed the properties and behaviour of regional house prices by 
principally focusing on testing the convergence or ripple effects of regional house prices in a 
certain economy, such as the U.S. (Gallet, 2004; Clark and Coggin, 2009; Holmes, Otero, and 
Panagiotidis, 2011; Kim and Rous, 2012), UK (Holmans, 1990; Gussani and Hadjimatheou, 
1991; MacDonald and Taylor, 1993; Alexander and Barrow, 1994; Drake, 1995; Ashworth 
and Parker, 1997; Mean, 1999; Cook, 2003; Cook and Thomas, 2003; Holmes, 2007; Holmes 
and Grimes, 2008; Cook, 2012) and Taiwan (Chien, 2010; Lee and Chien, 2011; Chen, Chien 
and Lee, 2011).  
As a result of the immobility of housing assets, there are reasons to expect the variations in 
regional house prices to be persistent or even be permanent; therefore, much of the literature 
tries to explain the structure of regional house prices. Around the world, the studies of 
convergence and ripple effects in regional house prices appeared the earliest and were most 
popular in the UK. Therefore the broad literature, concentrated on the UK, has provided us 
with examples to allow us to study the Chinese case. More importantly, the mega city of 





the rest of the country. This might be a similar parallel to China, as Beijing is also a huge 
urban centre, and the housing market in the remainder of the country bears significantly 
distinctive natures.          
As early as in the 1990s, a range of studies supported the hypothesis of a causal link between 
house prices in the South East and other regions in the UK, through cross-correlation 
matrices and Granger causality tests (Holmans, 1990; Gussani and Hadjimatheou, 1991; 
MacDonald and Taylor, 1993; Alexander and Barrow, 1994). Not all the findings are 
consistent with the convergence hypothesis in the UK. For example, using the Augmented 
Dickey-Fuller unit root test as a means of detecting convergence, Holmans (1990) fails to 
find evidence of stationary over a long time period of data from the 1930s. Analogously, 
Meen (1999) and Peterson et al. (2002) examine the constancy, or stationarity in 
regional/national house price ratios. MacDonald & Taylor (1993) and Alexander & Barrow 
(1994) examine whether regional house prices are tied together in a long-run relationship 
over time, implying structural stability in house prices for different regions. So far, the 
evidence illustrates that there seems to exist a long-run relationship, but only within either the 
North or the South of Great Britain.  
Alexander and Barrow (1994) use a methodology of cross correlation matrices and Granger 
causality tests to estimate causality between regional house prices. This approach is similar to 
the literature on the ‘ripple effect’, whereby shocks to house prices firstly observed in the 
South East ‘ripple’ across to other regions. Meanwhile, most studies, by using a range of 
‘forcing’ economic variables—income and opportunity cost variables—into the equations, 
indicate a clear mode of causality spreading from the South East via the Midlands to the 
North in the UK, (MacDonald and Taylor, 1993; Alexander and Barrow, 1994). 
With respect to testing for convergence of UK regional house prices, Drake (1995) adopts the 
time varying parameter (TVP) technique (Kalman, 1960) to examine the basic equation as 
follows: 
   ]log)[log()(loglog HPSEHPUKtbtatHPWMHPUK                                          (4.1) 
where HPUK is the index of UK house prices; HPSE is the index of house prices in the South 
East; HPWM is the house price index of the specified region (the West Midlands in this case). 





Midlands and UK series are converged, b is expected to be 0. Therefore, if the two series 
were in the process of converging, the time varying parameter estimate of b is tending 
towards 0 over time.  Secondly, if the West Midlands and South East series are converging, b 
is expected to approach unity over time. Alternatively, if the gap between house prices in the 
South East and other regions, such as the northern regions, was tending to widen over time, b 
is tending to diverge away from unity over time. Clearly, if the movements of regional house 
prices are genuinely dominated by a ‘ripple effect’ emanating from the South East, there will 
be clear evidence of cyclical effects with the b coefficient alternately converging towards 1 
and diverging away from 1 but remaining relatively stable over the longer term reflecting the 
hypothesized ‘norm’ differential between house prices in the South East and in other regions. 
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, Drake finds evidence of convergence in most regional 
house prices. His results imply that regional differentials vary across the UK and there is 
greater house price divergence from the North and Scotland to the South East region than 
from the Southern to Midlands regions. 
Compared with the above studies, Ashworth and Parker (1997) use the maximum likelihood 
VAR cointegration approach to estimate the determinants of house prices in each of the 
eleven regions of the UK (Anglia, East Midlands, Northern Ireland, North, North West, 
Scotland, South East, South West, Wales, West Midlands, Yorkshire). They derive an 
econometric estimation model from Drake (1995)’s specification written as: 
tttt PSHSRYHP lnlnln 321                                                                                      (4.2) 
where HP is house price, Y is household income, R is an opportunity cost variable, and PSHS 
is personal sector housing starts; whereby, the Y and R are ‘demand side’ variables and PSHS 
is a ‘supply side’ variable.  
Based on the investigation of the regional structure of UK house prices since the end of 
mortgage rationing, Ashworth and Parker’s findings show that the strong structural 
similarities in house price determinant are present across the regions in the UK, with 
cointegration for each region except for Scotland and Northern Ireland, and with some slight 
and geographically variable negative impacts on house prices from the opportunity costs. 
This implies the differences in regional house prices between England and Wales are likely to 





Although of course R is unlikely to differ between regions if it is dominated by interest rates. 
As Meen (1999) points out, one implication of the ripple effect is the existence of a long-run 
constancy or stationarity in the ratio of house prices in different regions to the aggregate UK 
house prices. Meen (1999) and Petersen et al. (2002) were unable to present evidence to 
support the above implication through standard econometric techniques; despite their 
assumption of the existence of such convergence. However, Cook (2003) proposes an 
approach with an underlying asymmetry in the adjustment process to examine regional house 
price ratios. His work primarily was based on the unit root tests as well. The results suggest 
that the South East regions exhibit more rapid convergence following a drop in house price, 
while other regions experience faster convergence following upswings in house prices.  
In the same year, Cook and Thomas (2003) produced alternative approaches—Friedman’s 
non-parametric test of ranking and business cycle dating procedures—to verify the results of 



















j                                                                                       (4.3) 
where T refers to the number of observations, k refers to the number of regions and Sj
2
 refers 
to the sum of squared rankings
57
 for region j. The sum of ranks (Sj) for the regions of the UK 
illustrates the variation in house price volatility. To examine whether the increased volatility 
is significant, the Fr statistic can be compared to a 
2
1k  critical value. They also employ the 
business cycle dating techniques of Birchenhall et al. (2001).  With the integration of the two 
approaches, they supply strong evidence that the changes of house prices occur earlier and 
more extensively in the South East of England than other regions in the UK. 
In recent years, some new evidence from panel datasets indicates the convergence of regional 
house prices in the UK (Holmes, 2007; Holmes and Grimes, 2008). Holmes (2007) employs a 
three-stage testing approach for regional house price convergence by using quarterly data 
from 1973 to 2005. The first stage includes the standard univariate ADF unit root tests on 
house price differentials. The second stage uses the panel data unit root tests which offer 
enhanced test power over the univariate counterparts. The last stage adopts an alternative 
                                                 
57 In each period, the regions are ranked by the absolute value of the logarithm of house prices, with the ranking 1 awarded 





procedure of SURADF (Seemingly Unrelated Regression Augmented Dickey-Fuller). 
The regional house price differential for region i is defined as dit; 
ititit MXd                                                                                                                          (4.4) 
where X denotes the natural logarithm of the house price index of region i and M denotes the 
natural logarithm of the UK house price index, i = 1,2,…N regions and t = 1,2,…T time 
periods. Suppose dit is generated by a first order autoregressive process, ititiiit dd   1










1                                                                                      (4.5) 
where i = 1i . The null hypothesis (H0) of ADF is i =0 ( i =1). The acceptance of H0 
means that dit is non-stationary; whereas the rejection of H0 indicates dit is stationary, which 
refers to the existence of a long-run convergence of regional house price indices. 
Alternatively, he utilizes another two panel unit root tests by Levin at al (2002) and Im et al. 
(2003) to increase the power of his stationary results. 
In the last stage, Holmes (2007) uses a recently advocated SURADF test by Breuer et al. 
(2002) based on SUR analysis with no cross panel restrictions under either the null or 
alternative hypotheses. More specifically, a series of equations for the SURADF method can 





































                                                                               (4.6) 
where ηi denotes the SUR residual for region i. The critical values for i in the SURADF test 
are generated through Monte Carlo Simulations. This test can amend the joint null hypothesis 





identify which panel members are stationary or non-stationary based on individual rather than 
joint hypotheses.   
In Holmes’s (2007) work, the application of univariate ADF tests provides evidence strongly 
against long-run convergence because the majority of regions’ house price differentials are 
non-stationary at the 5% significance level, except for London and the Northern regions. His 
SURADF findings imply that most of the 13 regions exhibit regional house price 
convergence, which are linked by long-run homogeneous cointegrating relationships. 
However, there is an east-west split in terms of whether regional house prices have a 
tendency towards a long-run equilibrium relationship with UK prices as a whole. There is 
evidence of segmentation because three regions—the South West, Wales and West Midlands 
do not show long-run convergence with the UK house price series. 
Holmes and Grimes (2008) proposed a similar procedure to investigate the long-run 
convergence of UK regional house prices. Their two-stage application includes: Stage One 
involving a new unit root test of the first principal component
58
 based on regional-national 
house price differentials by using mix-adjusted quarterly data from 1973 to 2006. All data 
used in this study are mix-adjusted to allow for variations in housing quality when computing 
the regional or national house price series.
59
 Stage Two involves the SURADF test as well. 
They find the first principal component is stationary, which shows that a single common 
stochastic trend drives all UK regional house prices. Furthermore, their results imply that 
those regions, that are more distant from London, exhibit the highest degree of persistence in 
line with deviations in house price differentials. 
A more recent study on UK regional house prices is proposed by Cook (2012), which 
employs the notions of β-convergence (Drennan and Lobo, 1999) and σ-convergence 
(Friedman, 1992; Quah, 1993), that are applied to test the convergence of income. Friedman 
(1992) argues that the convergence of income distribution across the given country can be 
                                                 
58 ‘Principal components represent transformations of the original dataset. If the original dataset comprises N series, the first 
principal component will be a linear combination of these N series combined in such a way that it summarises the maximum 
possible variation in the original series. The second principal component then summarises the maximum variation in the 
unexplained portion of the original series after extracting the influence of the first principal component, and so on up to the 
Nth principal component.’ (Holmes and Grimes, 2008, pp.1532) 
59 ‘The purpose of mix adjustment is to isolate pure price changes. One can show how changes in the mixture of properties 
sold each quarter could give a misleading picture of what is actually happening to house prices. Moreover, the set of 
properties sold from quarter to quarter will vary by location and design etc. and some adjustment is necessary to make sure 
these factors do not give a false impression of the actual changes to house prices. A mix-adjusted or ‘standardised’ index is 
not affected by such changes because the relative weight given to each characteristic of a property in the ‘mix’ (or ‘basket’, 





tested more appropriately by simply tracking the intertemporal change of the coefficient of 
variation. Sala-i-Martin (1996) defines this notion of convergence as ‘σ-convergence’.  
Simply, based on conditional probabilities of high and low growth rates, the β-convergence 
is to test the reaction of the growth rate of regional house prices on its level value of house 
prices in a previous time period. β is the coefficient of the bivariate regression and the 
convergence test is if β is significantly less than 0. While σ-convergence is achieved by 
calculating the coefficient of variation across all regions for each year with its movements 
through each time period. Cook’s work demonstrates there is β-convergence not only over 
the full sample of observations available, but over cyclical sub-samples also; however, the 
findings of σ-convergence fail to detect convergence, probably as a result of its episodic 
nature.  
Apart from the UK cases, there are also other studies on the convergence of regional house 
prices in other economies, such as Taiwan and the USA. For the regional house prices in 
Taiwan, Chien (2010) applies the endogenous two-break LM (Lagrangian Multiplier) method 
unit root test derived by Lee and Strazicich (2003) to overcome the bias and spurious 
rejections of the conventional unit root test without structural breaks. The empirical findings 
support that there are ripple effects for each city in Taiwan except Taipei City.  
More than that, Lee and Chien (2011) find a mixture of stationary and non-stationary 
processes for Taiwan’s regional house prices from 1996Q1 to 2009Q2 by employing the 
panel SURADF test as well. In addition, their results of the cointegration test show a long-run 
relationship among all regions except Taipei City, indicating a diffusion of regional house 
prices among each regional market except Taipei City. Innovatively, a new analysis of half-
lives is introduced in their work to estimate the speed of adjustment back towards the long-
run equilibrium,  where the ‘half-life’ is defined as the number of periods required for a unit 
shock to dissipate by one half. This approach supposes the deviations of the real regional 
house prices Zi,t from the long-run value  Zi,0 follow an AR(1) process: 
tiitiiti ZZZZ ,0,1,0,, )(                                                                                                  (4.7) 
where ti ,  is the error term. The half-life is defined as the horizon at which the percentage 













 hh                                                                                                             (4.8) 
In the USA, many scholars have done some work on testing the convergence of house prices. 
For example, by utilizing the application of the ADF unit root test, Gallet (2004) examines 
the convergence of house prices in the Los Angeles region via single-family house price data 
over 1992Q1 to 2001Q3 and Clark and Coggin (2009) investigate the convergence of U.S. 
regional house prices from 1975Q1 to 2005Q2. Gallet (2004) suggests that the convergence 
of house prices is specific to various county clusters, implying there are unique housing 
markets throughout the LA region. Clark and Coggin (2009) divide nine U.S. regional house 
price indexes into two groups by principal components factor analysis, where Factor 1 
includes the four lowest ranked regions by mean price level for the full period and Factor 2 
includes the five highest ranked. He finds the two super-regions have slightly different 
patterns of house price trends and cycles, which indicates mixed evidence for regional 
convergence in the U.S, with little evidence for a first super regional factor and some 
examples of relative convergence within the second factor. 
Subsequently, Kim and Rous (2012) suggest that there is little evidence of overall 
convergence in panels of U.S. states and metropolitan areas through the log t convergence 
test advocated by Phillips and Sul (2007). Therefore, they investigate the general 
characteristics of the various convergence and divergence subgroups as well as some primary 
driving forces of convergence clubs. Alternatively, Holmes et al. (2011) discuss long-run 
house price convergence across the U.S through a novel econometric approach—a pair-wise 
approach—proposed by Pesaran (2007) and Pesaran et al. (2009). The basic idea of Pesaran’s 
pair-wise approach is to examine the time series properties of all N(N-1)/2 possible house 
price differentials/gaps between any two states, and then apply the ADF test to each of the 
possible house price differentials. They also construct confidence intervals and find evidence 
of convergence by utilizing a sieve bootstrap procedure. In addition, their findings show that 
the speed of adjustment towards long-run equilibrium is inversely related to distance; in 
another words, the farther the distance of two states are apart, the slower the speed of 
adjustment is. 
To sum up, the current literature on regional house price convergence mainly focuses on the 





SURADF unit root test and the two-break LM unit root test etc (Cook, 2003; Gallet, 2004; 
Holmes, 2007; Holmes and Grimes, 2008; Clark and Coggin, 2009; Chien, 2010; Lee and 
Chien, 2011). The alternative approaches applied to convergence analysis include Granger 
causality tests (Holmans, 1990; Gussani and Hadjimatheou, 1991; MacDonald and Taylor, 
1993; Alexander and Barrow, 1994), the time varying parameter (TVP) estimation (Drake, 
1995), Friedman’s non-parametric test (Cook and Thomas, 2003), log t convergence (Kim 
and Rous, 2012), a pair-wise approach (Holmes et al., 2011), β -convergence andσ -
convergence (Cook, 2012). Specifically, the following table summarises the major literature 
on the convergence and ripple effect of regional house prices across the world. This literature 
mainly focuses on the convergence of regional house prices of the UK, the USA and Taiwan, 
initially starting from the UK and more recently for the USA and Taiwan. 
Table 4.1: The Summary of Literature on the Convergence and Ripple Effect of Regional 
House Prices in the Worldwide 




ADF unit root test 
and Granger 
causality test 
Fail to find evidence of stationarity over a long time 








Evidence of a segmentation of housing markets in 
Britain, linked through East Anglia, with Southern 
Britain on the one side and the Midlands, the North, 
Wales and Scotland on the other. The interaction amongst 
regional house prices clearly revealed the oft-quoted 





Shocks to house prices firstly observed in the South East 
‘ripple’ across to other regions. Meanwhile, a range of 
‘forcing’ economic variables indicates a clear mode of 
causality spreading from the South East via the Midlands 
to the North in the UK. 
Drake (1995) TVP estimation 
Regional differentials vary across the UK and there is 
greater house price divergence from the North and 
Scotland to the South East region than from the Southern 





The strong structural similarities in house price 
determinant are present across the regions in the UK, 
with cointegration for each region except for Scotland 
and Northern Ireland, and with some slight and 
geographically variable negative impacts on house prices 
from the opportunity costs. 
Mean (1999), 
Petersen et al. 
(2002) 
Unit root test for the 
regional-national 
house price ratios 
Unable to present evidence to support the implication of 
the existence of a long-run constancy or stationary 
through standard econometric techniques. 
Cook (2003) 
Unit root tests with 
an underlying 
asymmetry in the 
adjustment process 
The South East regions exhibit rapider convergence 
following a drop in house price, while other regions 
experience faster convergence flowing upswings in 
house prices. 







statistic (Fr) occur earlier and more extensively in the South East of 
England than other regions in the UK. 
Holmes (2007) 
Univariate ADF unit 
root test, panel unit 
root test, and 
SURADF test 
The application of univariate ADF tests is strongly 
against long-run convergence, except for London and the 
Northern regions. His SURADF findings imply that most 
of the 13 regions exhibit regional house price 
convergence. However, there is an east-west split in 
terms of whether regional house prices have tendency 
towards long-run equilibrium relationship with UK 
prices as whole. 
Holmes and 
Grimes (2008) 




The first principal component is stationary, which shows 
that a single common stochastic trend drives all UK 
regional house prices. Furthermore, their results imply 
that those regions, that are more distant from London, 
exhibit the highest degrees of persistence in line with 




There is β-convergence not only over the full sample of 
observations available, but over cyclical sub-samples 
also; however, the findings of σ-convergence fail to 
detect convergence, probably as a result of its episodic 
nature. 
USA 
Gallet (2004) ADF unit root test 
The convergence of house prices is specific to various 
county clusters, implying there are unique housing 
markets throughout the Los Angeles region. 
Clark and 
Coggin (2009) 




Two super-regions have slightly different patterns of 
house price trend and cycles, which indicates mixed 
evidence for regional convergence in the U.S, with little 
evidence for first super regional factor and some 
examples of relative convergence within the second 
factor. 
Kim and Rous 
(2012) 
Log t convergence 
test 
There is little evidence of overall convergence in panels 
of U.S. states and metropolitan areas by investigating the 
general characteristics of the various convergence and 
divergence subgroups as well as some primary driving 
forces of convergence clubs. 
Holmes et al. 
(2011) 
ADF test via 
pairwise approach 
The speed of adjustment towards long-run equilibrium is 
inversely related to distance; in another words, the 
farther the distance of two states is, the slower the speed 




break LM method 
unit root test 
There are ripple effects for each city in Taiwan except 
Taipei City. 
Lee and Chien 
(2011) 




There is a long-run relationship among all regions except 
Taipei City, indicating a diffusion of regional house 






4.2.2 Literature on the Convergence and Ripple Effects of Regional House 
Prices in China 
In the current world, studying the convergence and ripple effects of regional house prices has 
been popularised for the developed countries using comprehensive and cutting-edge 
technologies. However, there is an extremely limited literature on testing China’s regional 
house price convergence or ripple effects (Liu and Zhang, 2008; Zhang and Liu, 2009).  
In 2008, Liu and Zhang applied a qualitative model—the Regional Economy Three-sector 
Equilibrium Model proposed by Dipasquale and Wheaton (1996)—to examine house price 
ripple effects within cities. In their model, a regional economy consists of three parts: 
regional product market (including product and service)
60
, regional labour market and 
regional housing market. These three markets in the same city are interrelated and interact 
with each other. Liu and Zhang (2008) assert that the housing market is decided by the 
product market and labour market, and at the same time the product market and labour 
market are affected by the housing market. Moreover, they incorporate external regions and 
analyse how the external factors affect the internal product market and internal labour market 
and affect the internal house prices, which is the ‘house price ripple effect’. Eventually, they 
draw the relationship of house prices between big and small cities as Figure 4.1 shows where 
the house price of the big city is the determinant of the house price of the middle/small city 
regardless of whether the house price rises or drops. Therefore the house price of the big city 
leads to ripple effect on the small city. 
Afterwards, based on quantitative econometric principles, Zhang and Liu (2009) select eight 
main capital cities’ house price indexes (Beijing, Chengdu, Harbin, Hangzhou, Nanjing, 
Shanghai, Shenzhen and Xi’an) from the second quarter of 1998 to the fourth quarter of 2007, 
and then investigate the ripple effects of house prices between cities by using the univariate 
unit root test, the Engle-Granger test and the error correction model. Their findings reveal 
that there are ripple effects between eight cities’ house price indices; simultaneously, the 
significant evidence shows that Shenzhen is the original region of nationwide house price 
rising and Beijing and Shanghai are the secondary ones. 
 
                                                 
60 The product and service is a final good and service, which is not include the exchange of  raw materials, scarce resources, 











(Source: Liu and Zhang 2008, Figure 4, pp.498) 
Figure 4.1: Theoretical interaction model of house prices 
Unfortunately, there is little literature on the convergence and ripple effects of Chinese 
regional house prices, apart from Zhang and Liu’s work. Even though Liu and Zhang 
achieved some results on the regional house prices in China, the limited data set for both the 
geographical dimension and the time dimension make their conclusions somewhat 
unconvincing. China is a large country with many different geographical areas, while there 
are only 8 cities that they selected; and their time period across 1998 to 2007 only covers the 
effects of the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis excluding the more influential global financial 
crisis of 2008. Another major limitation of their work is that the house price index they used 
is a link index based on the same quarter of last year. This kind of link index is not sufficient 
for econometric estimations. In order to generate more persuasive findings, in our estimation 
the link index of house prices will be transformed into a new continual index. 
4.3 Methodology 
4.3.1 Unit Root Tests 
4.3.1.1 Univariate Unit Root Test 
Dickey and Fuller (1979) generated a classic paper about unit root test in the econometric 
literature, which is named the ‘DF unit root test’. Firstly, consider a simple general AR(p) 
process of a time series model as: 
tptpttt YYYY    2211                                                                                (4.9) 




















ttt YY   11                                                                                                                (4.10) 
where  
tptptt YY    22                                                                                                 (4.11) 
Due to the presence of the lagged Y terms, the autocorrelation between t and kt  for k>1 
will be non-zero. Therefore, considering the autocorrelations of the residual from the fitted 
models can aid to check whether it is appropriate to fit the AR(1) model. 
In order to demonstrate the extended autoregressive process of the DF test with the order 
greater than 1, an AR(2) process can be expressed as: 
tttt YYY    2211                                                                                                   (4.12) 
By adding 12 tY and subtracting 12 tY on the right side of Equation 4.12, it can be re-written 
as: 
ttttt YYYY    )()( 212121                                                                            (4.13) 
Then subtracting 1tY  from both sides, we can get: 
tttt YYY    111                                                                                               (4.14) 
where 121   and 21   . 
Equation 4.14 implies if the appropriate order of the AR process is 2 rather than 1, the term 
1 tY  should be included in the regression model. A unit root test can be carried out in the 
same way as for the DF test, whereby the t-statistics of the   coefficient is used as the unit 
root test statistics. This test is to examine the t-statistic, then comparing it with the critical 
value provided by Dickey and Fuller.  0  means there is a unit root, indicating no 
stationarity.  
Therefore, a unit root test on an AR(p) model can be performed by extending Equation 4.14 













                                                                                         (4.15) 
The standard Dickey-Fuller model has been ‘augmented’ by jtY  . In this case, the ADF test 
referred to the regression model and the ‘t-test’ of coefficient  with the null hypothesis of a 
unit root 0 . 
Referring to our estimation, to test the convergence of regional house prices in China the 
ratios of regional-national house price indexes for each city (35 cities) will be examined by 
the ADF test individually. Moreover, in order to support the ADF test, other univariate unit 
root tests are conducted, such as Dickey-Fuller GLS (DF-GLS) test and Kwiatkowski-
Phillips-Schmidt-Shin (KPSS) test. If the regional-national house price ratio is stationary, 




4.3.1.2 Panel Unit Root Test 
The studies of panel unit root tests have quickly increased since Abuaf and Jorion (1990) 
applied a panel unit root test to real exchange rates. A substantial contribution has been done 
by Im et al. (2003), Levin et al. (2002), and Hadri (2000) to the asymptotic theory and finite 
sample properties of panel unit root tests. Their work discloses that the univariate time series 
unit root tests such as the ADF test are not able to take cross sectional information into 
account (Guloglu and Ivrendi, 2010). Therefore, due to a relatively smaller sample size, the 
univariate unit root tests have fewer degrees of freedom than the panel unit root tests; 
consequently, they have lower power on explaining the stationarity. However, the efficiency 
of estimation can be improved by the panel unit root tests. Levin et al. (2002) find that even 
relatively small panels offer large improvements in power when compared to univariate time 
series unit root tests. 
The general model of a panel model with N cross sections and T periods can be expressed as: 
                                                 
61 In fact, the unit root tests for house price ratios can also be achieved by the bivariate cointegration tests between the 
regional house price and the national house price, since both tests for different variables have the same logical explanation. 












,1,,   

                                                                          (4.16) 
where t is a time trend and Tt ,2,1 . 
The panel unit root tests based on the ADF, Im et al. (2003) and Levin et al. (2002) start with 
the null hypothesis of a unit root for all panel members. The exception to this approach is the 
Hadri (2000) test with the null hypothesis of stationarity rather than a unit root. 
The difference between these tests is their specification of the null and alternative hypotheses. 
Abuaf and Jorion (1990), and Levin et al. (2002) assume the coefficient of the lagged 
dependent variable to be homogenous across all sections ( Nii ,,2,1,0   , where N 
is the number of cross sections), where the null and alternative hypotheses are: 
),,2,1(,0:0 NiH i   and 0:1  iH . 
By contrast, Im et al. (2003) loosen the restriction to allow for different first-order 
autoregressive coefficients, where the null and alternative hypotheses are: 0:0 iH   for all 
i and 0:1 iH  for at least one i. 
The assumption of the panel unit root tests mentioned above is that all series in the panel are 
independently generated and the error term ( ti , ) in Equation 4.16 consists of two random 
components: one is the idiosyncratic random component and the other is a stationary 
common time-specific effect. This indicates that the common time-specific effect exists 
across cross-sections. Nevertheless, shocks can possibly affect house prices differently over 
time. Thus the assumption of common time-specific effects is most likely unrealistic 
(Guloglu and Ivrendi, 2010). 
Because of the existence of the common time-specific effect (‘δit’ in Equation 4.16) across all 
cross-sections, Levin et al. (2002) and Im et al. (2003) propose to subtract cross-sectional 
averages from observations to reduce contemporaneous correlations in order to address the 
weakness of cross-section dependence. But this procedure is only valid under the assumption 
that the cross-sectional correlations are generated by a common stationary time-specific effect. 
Furthermore, as Luintel (2001) explained, this approach can only reduce the cross-sectional 





Again, if the regional-national house price ratios pass the panel unit root test, there is the 
evidence of convergence between regional house prices and the national level. Nevertheless, 
in order to investigate the convergence with ‘clubs’, we can employ the unit root tests on the 
ratios of two cities. More specifically, to estimate the convergence of house prices between 
other cities and the base city (such as ‘Beijing’), the house price ratios (HPIi/HPIBeijing) can be 
tested by the unit root techniques. In order to supplement the disadvantages of unit root tests, 
alternative approaches will be applied to test the convergence of regional house prices, such 
as σ- and β-convergence analysis. What is more, it is necessary to apply the unit root tests for 
the regional house price indices, because the stochastic techniques used later (the panel 
regression model, cointegration tests and Granger causality tests) need to identify the 
stationarity of data series. 
4.3.2 σ-convergence and β-convergence 
The use of unit root tests is referred to as a means of examining stochastic convergence, with 
movement towards underlying equilibria considered. The alternative common forms of 
convergence in the economic growth literature are referred to as σ-convergence and β-
convergence. Cook (2012, pp. 205-206) describes these two notions as: 
“The first of these notions, σ-convergence, refers to the narrowing of the spread of the cross-
sectional distribution of a group of series over time. In the context of the analysis of regional 
house prices, this necessitates calculation of the coefficient of variation across regions for 
each time-period, prior to examining changes in this coefficient through time. If the 
coefficient decreases through time, the spread can be seen to narrow and hence convergence 
can be deemed to have occurred. The second form of convergence, β-convergence, refers to 
the notion of series with lower (higher) initial values experiencing faster (slower) growth 
than series with higher (lower) initial values. Hence, β-convergence refers to a drawing-
together of differing series via the initial gaps between them closing. If lower (higher) initial 
values do lead to higher (lower) growth as required under β-convergence, the coefficient on 
the initial level term will be negative. Hence, subsequent testing for the presence of β-






The studies of σ-convergence have been developed by Friedman (1992) and Quah (1993) to 
test the convergence of some macroeconomic variables, GDP and income across countries. 
Cook (2012) applies σ-convergence as one of the comparable methodologies to analysis the 
convergence of UK house prices. As they suggest, the existence of σ-convergence is implied 
by the decline of the coefficient of variation. 
To use the σ-convergence test for China’s house price indexes, the coefficient of variation is 
calculated across all regions/cities for each quarter, with its movements chronicled. The 








 , where tDS.  and 
tX are the standard deviation and the average value of regional house price indexes 
respectively at time t. Therefore, if the value of tCV is decreasing, there will be evidence of σ-
convergence between regional house prices in China.  
4.3.2.2 β-convergence 
To compare with the unit root tests for convergence, an alternative form is considered, which 
is β-convergence promoted by Drennan and Lobo (1999) and Cook (2012). In the early 1990s, 
Sala-i-Martin (1996) discusses the income convergence in the USA and illustrates the 
difference between σ-convergence and β-convergence: the former indicates how the 
distribution of income evolves over time and the latter shows the mobility of income within 
the same distribution. Afterwards, Arbia, Basile and Piras (2005) develop two kinds of β-
convergence—the cross-section β-convergence and the panel β-convergence—to analyse 
regional growth behaviour in Italy. Recently, Cook (2012) has applied the β-convergence test 
with UK regional house prices.   
As they argue, β-convergence aims to use a regression equation in which the growth rate is 
regressed against the initial level. In the cross-section version, the house price growth rate for 
each city needs to be identified firstly in the following way: 
100*/)( 11 HPIHPIHPIGHPI N                                                                                     (4.17) 





the house price in the first period. After obtaining the growth rates for all the regions, the 
cross-section regression is run between the growth rate and the house price index in the first 
time period: 
  1,ii HPIG                                                                                                             (4.18) 
where Gi is the growth rate for region i, HPIi,1 is the house price index of region i in the first 
time period, and   is the error term. 
One of the major advantages of the panel data approach to convergence is that it can be 
helpful for the correction of the bias generated by omitted variables and heterogeneity in the 
classical cross-sectional regression (Islam, 2003). Panel data, in fact, allows for technological 
differences across regions (or at least the unobservable and unmeasurable part of these 
differences) by modelling the regional specific effect (Arbia et al., 2005). More formally, the 
panel version of the growth equation can be expressed as: 
  1,, titi HPIGHPI                                                                                                   (4.19) 
where tiGHPI ,  is the growth rate of HPI (House Price Index) for region i in the time period t; 
1, tiHPI  is HPI for region i in the previous time period t-1; and   is the error term.  
Hereby, for both β-convergence models, if the coefficient   is negative and significant, we 
can say there is β-convergence between regional house prices in China, and the house prices 
in cities with lower house prices grow faster than in cities with higher house prices.  
To speak of panel β-convergence, recent research has drawn attention to the issue of 
cyclicality in the housing market. A salient extension of the analysis of convergence is then 
based upon the recognition of the potential importance of cyclical factors and the 
examination of sub-samples based upon cyclical movements (Cook, 2012). To explore the 
possibility of convergence in regional house prices over cyclical sub-samples, Cook and 
Thomas (2003) employ London as the region with which to determine cyclical peaks and 
troughs to identify the turning-points with the techniques of Birchenhall et al. (2001).
62
 The 
                                                 
62 Cook and Thomas (2003) identify peaks as periods with values: greater than or equal to values observed in the previous 
two years; strictly greater than values in the following six months; and, greater than or equal to values observed between six 
months and two years ahead. Conversely, troughs are defined as periods with values (i) less than or equal to values observed 





sub-sample convergence consideration can be employed into our investigation as well, if 
there is such a cyclical movement of regional house prices in China. 
The next step will adopt cointegration test, panel regression models and Granger Causality 
tests to examine the ripple effects of regional house price changes, which can further verify 
whether these findings coincide with the convergence analysis. 
4.3.3 Cointegration Tests 
4.3.3.1 Engle-Granger Cointegration Test for Bivariate Model 
Engle and Granger (1987) propose a widely-accepted cointegration test called the ‘Engle-
Granger Cointegration Test’ to estimate the long run equilibrium relationship between two 
series. The ‘Engle-Granger Test’ is based on the ADF test for the unit roots in the residuals 
from a single estimated cointegrating relationship. The cointegration test requires all series to 
be I(1) or have unit roots, which means all series are not stationary (Greene, 2007). As 
reviewed by Granger, Huang and Yang (2000), the Engle-Granger cointegration test is a two-
stage process of which the first step is to estimate the following bivariate linear OLS 
regression (x and y): 
ttt exy                                                                                                                      (4.20) 
where yt and xt are I(1) and et is the error term. The second step is to test the stationarity of et 
via the ADF unit root test. If et is consistent with I(0), one may assert that cointegration exist 
between yt and xt, which indicates there is a long run equilibrium relationship between two 
series; but if et is not stationary, then cointegration does not exist.  
In reality, macroeconomic variables are usually affected by the lagged value of the dependent 
variable and the seasonal impact as well. Therefore, the lagged values and seasonal dummy 
variables can be included in our estimations when investigating the cointegration of house 
prices between different regions. In this case, the expanded Engle-Granger cointegration 
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where Di denotes the dummy variable. In the seasonal dummy model, i = 1,2,3 which 
indicates the first quarter, the second quarter and the third quarter respectively. Di = 1 for the 
quarter i; otherwise, Di = 0. The lag length of the Engle-Granger test can be chosen by using 





As we mentioned before
65
, the logic behind the bivariate cointegration tests is similar with 
the principle of the stationarity tests for house price ratios. For instance, if we need to 
investigate the equilibrium of house prices between city X and city Y, the equation for the 
cointegration test can be written as:   xy HPHP lnln . If they are cointegrated, the 
coefficient of β will be one and the equation will be expressed as:   xy HPHP lnln ,  
and then  )ln( xy HPHP . Since α +E(ε) will be constant when there is cointegration, 
ln(HPy/HPx) will be constant as well, which suggest the house price ratios between city X and 
city Y is constant or stationary. These two tests can mutually represent each other’s results. 
4.3.3.2 Johansen Cointegration Test for Multivariate Model 
Greene (2007) explains the ‘Engle-Granger method is based on assessing whether single-
equation estimations of the equilibrium errors appear to be stationary. In contrast to the 
Engle-Granger estimation based on a single OLS estimation, Johansen (1991, 1995) performs 
a VAR-based approach to test for more than one cointegrating relationship between 
multivariate series. All the variables are assumed to be endogenous, although it is possible to 
include exogenous variables.  
Consider a VAR of order p: 
ttptpttt BxyAyAyAy   2211                                                                         (4.22) 
where yt is a k-vector of non-stationary I(1) variables, xt is a d-vector of deterministic 
variables, and εt is a vector of innovations
66
.  This VAR can be rewritten as: 
                                                 
63 AIC: the Akaike Information Criterion (Akaike, 1974) 
64 SIC: the Schwarz Information Criterion (Schwartz, 1978) 
65 In section ‘5.2.1.1 Univariate Unit Root Tests’ 






























                                                                                        (4.24) 
Granger’s representation theorem claims that if the coefficient matrix Π has reduced rank r < 
k, then there exist k  r matrices α and β each with rank r such that Π = αβ of dimension (k  
r) and (r  k) respectively, and βyt is I(0). β gives the long-run coefficients of the 
cointegrating vectors, α is known as the vector of adjustment parameters which are similar to 
error correction terms. r is the number of cointegrating relations (the cointegrating rank) and 
each column of β is the cointegrating vector. When r = 0, there are no cointegrating vectors. 
If there are k variables in the system of equations, there can be a maximum of k-1 
cointegrating vectors. Johansen’s method is to estimate the Π matrix from an unrestricted 
VAR and to test whether we can reject the restrictions implied by the reduced rank of Π. 
Similarly, we can also add dummy variables into the ‘Johansen Cointegration Test’, such as 
seasonal dummies. The lag length of the Johansen test can be chosen by using information 
criteria as well, such as AIC or SIC. 
4.3.4 Panel Regression Model for Ripple Effects  
The panel regression models are also applied to the estimation of the ripple effects of regional 
house prices in China. In line with the development strategy of China’s central government, 
there are three major economic zones leading the whole macroeconomic revolution across 
China
67
: The Beijing-Tianjin-Tangshan economic community (BTT-EC), Yangtze River Delta 
economic community (YRD-EC) and Pearl River Delta economic community (PRD-EC). 
Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou, are the core cities of these three economic circles 
respectively, and their economic development conditions affect other cities’ or regions’; thus, 
the growth of HPI in Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou may be expected to ‘ripple out’ to 
                                                 
67 Since the 1990s, the big urban economic circles have been growing up in China. Therein, three major economic zones 
have raised people’s attention and been very much formed after 2000. They are generally called as BTT-EC, YRD-EC and 





other cities. In order to examine the ripple effects of house prices in these three core cities, a 
linear panel regression model is established by using panel HPI data: 
tititGtStBti HPIHPIHPIHPIHPI ,1,1,31,21,1,                                           (4.25) 
where t denotes the time period from 1998Q1 to 2010Q4; i=1,2,…,32, which denotes 32 
cities except for Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou. HPIB, HPIS and HPIG are house price 
indexes of Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou respectively. We are going to test the 
significance of the coefficients for HPIB, HPIS and HPIG: if their coefficients (  ) are 
significant, that indicates the house prices in the core cities have a ripple effect to the other 
cities’ house prices.  
In addition, the disparity of house prices can be induced by the diverse development levels 
across eastern coastal cities to western inland cities to some extent; consequently, our model 
will include some geographic parameters to investigate the impact of geographic factors for 
the house price index, such as the distance between other cities and the three core cities
68
. In 
this case, three new variables are applied to Equation 4.25: DHPIB, DHPIS and DHPIG, which 
are the distance between city i and core cities multiplied by HPI in the core cities. In this case, 




























Where LB, LS and LG are the log distance between city i and Beijing, Shanghai and 
Guangzhou respectively; HPIB, HPIS and HPIG are house price index (HPI) in Beijing, 
Shanghai and Guangzhou respectively. If the coefficients ( ) are significant, that indicates 
the ripple effects of regional house prices are also affected by the geographic factor—the 
distance to the core cities. 
                                                 
68 Ashworth and Parker (1997) mentioned the geographically variable negative impacts on house prices. In addition, Holmes 





4.3.5 Granger Causality Tests 
As noted by Greene (2007), causality defined by Granger (1969) and Sims (1972) is inferred 
when the past value of a variable X has explanatory power in a regression of a variable Y on 
the past values of Y and X. Such regressions do not imply causality as economists generally 
use the term, but it may be suggestive of such causality. In order to complement the 
implications of panel regression models, the Granger Causality Test is used to investigate 
whether each city’s house price shocks ‘Granger cause’ other cities’ house price changes or 
not.  
As Granger (1969) defined, the ‘Granger Causality Test’ is a statistical hypothesis of causality 
to test whether one factor causes another based on prediction. Simply, if a time-series variable 
X ‘Granger causes’ variable Y, then lagged values of X should contain information 
forecasting Y above and beyond the information included in lagged value of Y alone. The 
mathematical formulation of the Granger Causality Test is based on linear regression 
modelling of stochastic processes (Granger 1969). The null hypothesis is ‘A does not cause 
B’. This test requires that all the variables to be stationary, which means unit root tests need 
to be done prior to the causality test. If variables are not stationary, the difference format of 
variables needs to be introduced into the Granger causality estimations. 
Additionally, as Granger, Huang and Yang (2000) suggested, this causality test uses different 
models to investigate the short-run relationship between variables regarding the existence of 
cointegration. Thus after the Engle-Granger cointegration test, if the cointegration does not 




































                                                                               (4.27) 
In our samples, the bi-variable Granger Causality tests are performed using each of two cities’ 
house price changes as variables X and Y. The F-test for joint significance of the lagged 
explanatory variables is conducted to determine if there is any evidence of causality from Y 





 = χk = 0 suggests that Y does not Granger cause X. Likewise, failing to reject the H0: γ1 = 
γ2 =  = γk = 0 implies that X does not Granger cause Y. 
If cointegration exists between X and Y, an error correction term (ECM) is required in testing 







































                                                   (4.28) 
where λ1 and λ2 denote speeds of adjustment. According to Engle and Granger (1987), the 
existence of cointegration implies a causality among the set of variables as manifested by λ1 
+ λ2 > 0. Failing to reject the H0: χ1 = χ2 =  = χk = 0 and λ1 = 0 indicates that Y does not 
Granger cause X while failing to reject the H0: γ1 = γ2 =  = γk = 0 and λ2 = 0 implies that X 
does not Granger cause Y. 
The lag length of the VAR can be chosen by using information criteria, such as AIC or SIC. 
Due to the quarterly data we used, the number of lags is fixed at 2. The Granger Causality test 
is run in both directions between each of two cities, so called ‘Pairwise Granger Causality 
Test’.  
4.3.6 Conclusion of Methodology 
To sum up, this chapter applies unit root tests and σ-/β-convergence methods to analyse the 
convergence of regional house prices in China. The alternative approaches including, panel 
regression models, the cointegration tests and Granger causality tests are conducted to find 
evidence of ripple effects between house price changes. Through comparing the results of 
these methods, we can verify the existence of convergence or non-convergence of house 
prices within regions. 
Specifically, unit root tests are used prior to the cointegration test and the causality tests, 
because both estimations need to identify the stationarity of the variables. The cointegration 
test is to investigate the long-run equilibrium relationship between variables and needs 





investigate the short-run relationship between variables and needs variables to be stationary, 
so the difference format of data will be used for this test.  
Moreover, the Engle-Granger cointegration tests are used for the bivariate model and 
Johansen cointegration tests are used for the multivariate model. After running the 
cointegration tests, if there is no cointegration, the VAR model is applied for the Granger 
causality test; otherwise, if there is cointegration, the ECM model is applied for the Granger 
causality tests (Granger et al., 2000).  
4.4 Data Description and Transformation 
4.4.1 Data Description 
All the studies mentioned above on regional house price convergence adopt the quarterly date 
across different regions. Therefore, this chapter will use the house price link index (HPI)
69
 
(the same quarter of last year=100) for 35 cities from 1998Q1 to 2010Q4, wherein 35 cities 
include 30 capital cities and 5 municipalities (Dalian, Qingdao, Ningbo, Xiamen and 
Shenzhen) with independent planning status (see Table 4.2). Each city will be indicated by 
the city code (1, 2,…, 35 ). The link index of HPI data comes from the official database of the 
NBSC (http://www.stats.gov.cn/). Except for regional HPIs, another variable involved is the 
highway mileage between other cities and Beijing/Shanghai/Guangzhou respectively. The 
reason for using highway mileage as the distance factor is that, currently this form of vehicle 
transportation is the most dominant travel type for Chinese people. On the one hand, the cost 
of flight tickets is relatively high for low income groups, and the railway network is not as 
developed as the motorway network in China. On the other hand, the wealthier individuals 
purchase their own private cars and use highways instead of using public transportation. 
Table 4.3 shows the distance between different cities. In order to display the geographic 
location of cities, Figure 4.2 shows the map of China with 35 cities’ locations. 
 
Table 4.2: Classes and City Codes of 35 cities 
City 
Code 
Cities Classes of Cities 
City 
Code 
Cities Classes of Cities 
                                                 
69 Link index is based on the same quarter of last year; for example, if the index of 1998Q1=100, 1998Q2=100, 1998Q3=100, 
and 1998Q4=100; then the index of 1999Q1 is based on 1998Q1, 1999Q2 is based on 1998Q2, 1999Q3 is based on 1998Q3, 





1 Beijing Beijing 19 Nanjing Capital city of Jiangsu 
2 Changchun Capital city of Jilin 20 Nanning Capital city of Guangxi 
3 Changsha Capital city of Hunan 21 Ningbo Municipality in Zhejiang 
4 Chengdu Capital city of Sichuan 22 Qingdao 
Municipality in 
Shandong 
5 Chongqing Chongqing 23 Shanghai Shanghai 
6 Dalian Municipality in Liaoning 24 Shenyang Capital city of Liaoning 
7 Fuzhou Capital city of Fujian 25 Shenzhen 
Municipality in 
Guangdong 
8 Guangzhou Capital city of Guangdong 26 Shijiazhuang Capital city of Hebei 
9 Guiyang Capital city of Guizhou 27 Taiyuan Capital city of Shanxi 
10 Haikou Capital city of Hainan 28 Tianjin Tianjin 
11 Hangzhou Capital city of Zhejiang 29 Urumchi Capital city of Xinjiang 
12 Harbin Capital city of Heilongjiang 30 Wuhan Capital city of Hubei 
13 Hefei Capital city of Anhui 31 Xi'an Capital city of Shaanxi 
14 Hohhot 
Capital city of Inner 
Mongolia 
32 Xiamen Municipality in Fujian 
15 Jinan Capital city of Shandong 33 Xining Capital city of Qinghai 
16 Kunming Capital city of Yunnan 34 Yinchuan Capital city of Ningxia 
17 Lanzhou Capital city of Gansu 35 Zhengzhou Capital city of Henan 
18 Nanchang Capital city of Jiangxi - - - 
 
 
Table 4.3: Highway Mileage between Cities (km) 
Distance 
(km) 
Beijing Shanghai Guangzhou 
Distance 
(km) 
Beijing Shanghai Guangzhou 
Beijing - 1490 2478 Qingdao 832 1006 2121 
Tianjin 118 1380 2374 Zhengzhou 722 1095 1756 
Shijiazhuang 279 1338 2199 Wuhan 1253 919 1225 
Taiyuan 503 1562 2251 Changsha 1645 1223 833 
Hohhot 578 2068 2840 Guangzhou 2478 1653 - 
Shenyang 717 2084 3078 Shenzhen 2639 1814 161 
Dalian 903 2270 3264 Nanning 2657 2195 729 
Changchun 1032 2399 3393 Haikou 2777 2131 612 
Harbin 1392 2759 3753 Chongqing 2136 2150 1870 
Shanghai 1490 - 1653 Chengdu 2161 2411 2200 
Nanjing 1141 349 1540 Guiyang 2618 2121 1359 
Hangzhou 1493 213 1440 Kunming 3228 2786 1706 
Ningbo 1448 301 1434 Xi'an 1224 1498 2033 
Hefei 1106 511 1378 Lanzhou 1782 2189 2724 
Fuzhou 2257 1107 985 Xining 2006 2413 2948 
Xiamen 2216 1069 688 Yinchuan 1253 2178 2713 
Nanchang 1609 837 875 Urumchi 3820 4227 4762 
Jinan 457 1033 2027 - - - - 







Figure 4.2: China Map with 35 Cities’ Geographic Locations 
Figure 4.3 plots the link index of house prices for each city, and Figure 4.4 plots the house 
price indices by groups based upon their geographic locations through putting close cities 
together. These are link indices and more actually reflect house price changes over a year 
than a house price index per quarter. Some basic characteristics of regional house prices can 
be described from the two figures. From the overall trend, Figure 4.3 indicates several 
significant peaks for the link index of HPIs: the first peak stage appeared between 2002 and 
2004, which is most likely affected by the implementation of a new land policy in 2002—the 
‘Bidding Auction Listing Transferring State-owned Land Use Rights Provision’;  then, 
China’s house prices experienced the second boom period in 2007; but under the impact of 
the global financial crisis, the house prices sharply dropped in 2008 and fell to the bottom in 
2009. Lately, in 2010, China’s economy then started to recover from the financial crisis and 
the HPIs have returned to growth. 
Combining the two figures, we can also see that the link HPIs in most cities range between 90 
and 120 over the time period, except for Shanghai, Urumchi, Haikou and Shenzhen. The 
HPIs have risen to extraordinary peak values—129.1 for Shanghai in 2003Q4, 124.5 for 
Urumchi in 2008Q1, and 152.2 for Haikou in 2010Q2. Furthermore, Shenzhen’s HPI fell to 





price indexes exactly reflect the above prosperity and depression stages in China. But, the 
link index (the same quarter of last year=100) cannot be used for our econometrical methods, 
as we need an index where all of the values are related to some base quarter when the index 
was 100; so in order to investigate more precise relationships between China’s regional HPIs, 
we need to replace the link index by such an index (the first quarter=100), which use quarter 
1998Q1 as the base period. 
 








































































4.4.2 Data Transformation 
There are several steps to revise the link index data (HPI) into a continuous price index: 
(1) The first step is to find the most stable period (covering four quarters) for each city. 
Appendix 4.1 exhibits the link index of house prices and highlights the most stable four 
quarters for each city and the nation. The stable periods are stated in Table 4.4. Firstly, in the 
four quarters of stability, we make the assumption of annual price change equal to the 
constant growth of quarterly change (annual rate = (quarterly rate)
4
), which means the link 
index is adjusted for quarterly rate. The underlying assumption is that if over a sustained 
period annual house price change is x, then the increase in any one quarter is proportional to x. 































2010Q4), the calculation can be started from quarter τ+1 by setting up the previous index 





























                                                                                              (4.29)                    






















                                                                                                   (4.30) 
Remember HPI is an index if house price increased by 10% over the previous 12 months, 






















                                                                                                   (4.31) 
(2) After getting the adjusted index (P), the purpose of this exercise has been primarily to 
identify an index for the first four quarters. The following step is to use the first four quarters 
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                                                                                                        (4.32) 





all values by the index value of P
c
 in 1998Q1 (P1
c
) and then multiply by 100, which will 






















                                                                                                 (4.33) 
(4) Finally, the data set can be extended backwards to 1997 as well, based on the HPI link 
index in 1998, which will ensure no valid data has been omitted. The following equations 





















                                                                                        (4.34) 
After the above steps, the original link index of HPI has been revised into the constant growth 
house price index (HP) from 1997Q1 to 2010Q4. It will be recalled that the HPI gap is the 
difference between the highest HPI and the lowest HPI over a time period, and this is 
smallest during the stable period for each city. Table 4.4 lists the HPI gaps during the stable 
periods. It can be seen from Figure 4.5 that most cities have a relatively stable period with the 
link index (HPI) gap smaller than 1, especially for Beijing, Changchun and Tianjin with a 0.2 
gap and Harbin, Taiyuan, Xi’an and Xiamen with a 0.3 gap. But some cities have been 
through a quite volatile period with the HPI gap higher than 1.5, for instance, 1.5 for Haikou 
and 1.6 for Kunming and Qingdao. As for the emerging coastal tourism cities of Haikou and 
Qingdao, the overheated tourist economy in certain periods is likely to cause their greater 
volatility of HPI changes. 
The original link index is based on the same quarter of last year; for example, if HPI in the 
last quarter is 100 and the house price increased by 10% over the last 12 months, HPI in this 
quarter is 110. To transfer the link index into the constant growth index (the first period 
index=100), we made the assumption of annual price change in the stable four-quarter period 
equal to the constant growth of quarterly change (annual rate = (quarterly rate)
4





link index is adjusted for the quarterly rate.  





























1 Beijing 2004Q4—2005Q3 0.2 106.3 106.4 0.1 
2 Changchun 1998Q1—1998Q4 0.2 100.5 100.4 -0.1 
3 Changsha 2006Q2—2007Q1 0.9 106 105.6744 -0.3256 
4 Chengdu 1998Q3—1999Q2 0.5 105.8 105.5748 -0.2252 
5 Chongqing 2001Q4—2002Q3 0.5 101.8 101.4998 -0.3002 
6 Dalian 2007Q1—2007Q4 0.7 107.6 107.1747 -0.4253 
7 Fuzhou 1998Q3—1999Q2 0.7 101.4 101.1495 -0.2505 
8 Guangzhou 2001Q1—2001Q4 0.5 100.3 100.2998 -0.0002 
9 Guiyang 2004Q3—2005Q2 0.6 102.8 102.6997 -0.1003 
10 Haikou 2001Q2—2002Q1 1.5 100.8 100.2484 -0.5516 
11 Hangzhou 2006Q2—2007Q1 0.7 102.9 102.8997 -0.0003 
12 Harbin 2002Q4—2003Q3 0.3 100 99.99992 -8E-05 
13 Hefei 2001Q1—2001Q4 0.5 100.4 100.4748 0.0748 
14 Hohhot 2007Q1—2007Q4 0.5 104.6 104.3498 -0.2502 
15 Jinan 1998Q2—1999Q1 0.5 101.6 101.4498 -0.1502 
16 Kunming 2006Q1—2006Q4 1.6 100.6 101.322 0.722 
17 Lanzhou 2005Q2—2006Q1 0.6 105.6 105.4498 -0.1502 
18 Nanchang 2006Q3—2007Q2 0.9 106.7 106.3243 -0.3757 
19 Nanjing 2006Q1—2006Q4 1.0 104.7 104.3492 -0.3508 
20 Nanning 2006Q2—2007Q1 0.7 104.3 103.9497 -0.3503 
21 Ningbo 2006Q1—2006Q4 0.9 102.2 102.1495 -0.0505 
22 Qingdao 2006Q3—2007Q2 1.6 105.9 105.9985 0.0985 
23 Shanghai 1999Q4—2000Q3 0.8 97.8 98.37443 0.57443 
24 Shenyang 1998Q3—1999Q2 0.5 101.8 101.7248 -0.0752 
25 Shenzhen 2002Q1—2002Q4 0.9 99.9 100.3995 0.4995 
26 Shijiazhuang 1999Q1—1999Q4 0.6 103.3 103.7247 0.4247 
27 Taiyuan 2002Q1—2002Q4 0.3 103.4 103.3249 -0.0751 
28 Tianjin 2000Q1—2000Q4 0.2 100 99.94996 -0.05004 
29 Urumchi 2001Q1—2001Q4 0.5 100.7 100.9497 0.2497 
30 Wuhan 2006Q2—2007Q1 0.4 103.2 103.0499 -0.1501 
31 Xi'an 2002Q3—2003Q2 0.3 101.1 101.1999 0.0999 
32 Xiamen 2002Q4—2003Q3 0.3 102.4 102.4249 0.0249 
33 Xining 2006Q3—2007Q2 0.8 103 102.6246 -0.3754 
34 Yinchuan 2005Q4—2006Q3 0.7 102.4 102.2747 -0.1253 
35 Zhengzhou 2001Q1—2001Q4 0.6 100.8 100.5747 -0.2253 






Figure 4.5: Link Index (HPI) Gap during Stable Period 
 
Figure 4.6: The Difference Between Link Index (HPI) and Adjusted Index (P) 
Therefore, in order to estimate the efficiency of our assumption in the first step, Table 4.4 
compares the link index (HPI) with the adjusted index (P) at the last quarter of the stable 
period. Figure 4.6 exhibits more straightforwardly the difference by drawing a bi-column 
chart and shows our estimated index (P) very close to the original index (HPI) for all the 
cities. The underlying assumption is that if annual house price change is x over a sustained 
period, then the increase in any one quarter is proportional to x. The column graph verifies 
our assumption is valid and efficient.  
After transferring the original link index (HPI) into the constant growth index (HP), we can 
display the logarithm of new transferred house price indices for each city over 1997Q1 to 
2010Q4 in the following Figure 4.7. It can be seen that, although the intensities of their 
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The difference between link index (HPI) and adjusted index (P) 





implies the house prices across China have been through sustained growth over this decade. 
For instance, Ningbo and Qingdao (the top two lines) have apparently exhibited the most 
rapid ascending tendency since 2002. More specifically, since then the house price indices of 
Ningbo and Qingdao have maintained a higher level than the other cities. Because both cities 
are municipalities with independent planning status (Ji Hua Dan Lie Shi), the strong 
motivation of economic development has contributed the fast growth of their house prices. 
By contrast, Guangzhou (the bottom line) has the lowest growth rate during this period, and 
its house price index has fluctuated around 4.6 with the lightly upward trend.  







































































It is also worth drawing our attention to the fact that, all above tests we applied—the unit root 
tests, the cointegration tests and the causality tests—contain a starting model we need to 
choose, i.e specify either a constant or constant & trend. As Figure 4.7 displayed, generally 
there is an upward trend in the regional house prices over the decade; thus necessarily, the 
significance of the trend needs to be tested further. Table 4.5 illustrates the significance test 
for regional house price indices; and there is strong evidence of all the cities having a 
significant trend at the 1% level. Consequently, for the above mentioned tests we are going to 































Table 4.5: Tests of the Significance of the Trend for House Price Indexes of Each City 
The Significance Test of the Trend for Each City 




Trend for each city Trend for each city 
Beijing 0.010 (15.50) 0.000*** Nanjing 0.014 (30.40) 0.000*** 
Changchun 0.006 (11.60) 0.000*** Nanning 0.008 (16.77) 0.000*** 
Changsha 0.007 (15.59) 0.000*** Ningbo 0.020 (36.22) 0.000*** 
Chengdu 0.010 (22.55) 0.000*** Qingdao 0.018 (31.40) 0.000*** 
Chongqing 0.013 (31.55) 0.000*** Shanghai 0.015 (18.82) 0.000*** 
Dalian 0.009 (15.32) 0.000*** Shenyang 0.014 (28.87) 0.000*** 
Fuzhou 0.007 (18.28) 0.000*** Shenzhen 0.010 (14.11) 0.000*** 
Guangzhou 0.004 (7.11) 0.000*** Shijiazhuang 0.008 (32.14) 0.000*** 
Guiyang 0.008 (24.90) 0.000*** Taiyuan 0.008 (20.16) 0.000*** 
Haikou 0.009 (9.85) 0.000*** Tianjin 0.012 (22.69) 0.000*** 
Hangzhou 0.016 (49.24) 0.000*** Urumchi 0.007 (12.87) 0.000*** 
Harbin 0.008 (18.33) 0.000*** Wuhan 0.010 (27.16) 0.000*** 
Hefei 0.008 (16.73) 0.000*** Xi'an 0.008 (21.08) 0.000*** 
Hohhot 0.009 (19.27) 0.000*** Xiamen 0.010 (22.28) 0.000*** 
Jinan 0.011 (29.34) 0.000*** Xining 0.007 (23.69) 0.000*** 
Kunming 0.005 (15.62) 0.000*** Yinchuan 0.011 (30.92) 0.000*** 
Lanzhou 0.011 (23.91) 0.000*** Zhengzhou 0.009 (24.80) 0.000*** 
Nanchang 0.014 (46.03) 0.000*** - - - 
Note: ( ) denotes the t statistics of the respective coefficients. ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level 
respectively. 
 
4.5 Empirical Results 
4.5.1 Results of Unit Root Tests 
4.5.1.1 Unit Root Test Results for House Price Index 
For the following tests and regressions, we adopt the logarithm format of final transformed 
index (LHP). The stationarity of regional house price indices need to be identified prior to the 
following stochastic techniques, such as the cointegration tests, the panel regression models 
and Granger causality tests; for instance, as mentioned in the methodology, Engle-Granger 
cointegration tests need all data series to be I(1), but the panel regression models and Granger 
causality tests need the series to be stationary.  
Firstly, the stationarity for each city is tested by the univariate ADF test; moreover, the 
Dickey-Fuller GLS (DF-GLS) test and Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin (KPSS) test are 
introduced to support the evidence of the ADF test. Appendix 4.2 shows us the univariate unit 
root tests’ results for LHP. As explained before, the unit root tests will determine the starting 
model with ‘intercept and trend’. Because our data are quarterly data, the ADF tests take the 





cities chosen with more than 4 lags. Hence, we will fix the lag length at 4 for DF-GLS tests 
and KPSS tests later, in order not to reduce using too many degrees of freedom. Appendix 4.2 
demonstrates that for ADF tests, no matter whether the lag length has been decided by SIC or 
fixed at 4, the concordant results suggest that all the cities’ house prices are non-stationary by 
failing to reject the null. As for the ADF test, the null hypothesis of the DF-GLS test is ‘has a 
unit root’ as well, but the null hypothesis of KPSS test is ‘no unit root or stationary’. The 
conclusions of failing to reject the null of the DF-GLS tests and strongly rejecting the null of 
KPSS tests, are consistent with the ADF tests. As a complement to the unit root tests with the 
trend, Appendix 4.3 shows the tests without a ‘trend’. Again, all the tests come to the same 
conclusion with strong evidence of non-stationarity.   
In short, the house prices in 35 cities have a unit root and are not stationary over 1997Q1 to 
2010Q4. However, the implementation of panel regression models and Granger causality 
tests needs the variables to be stationary. So the first difference of LHP (DLHP) has been 
tested by ADF tests as well in Appendix 4.2. The lag length for testing DLHP is decided by 
SIC, as SIC usually chose less than a lag of 4, which means it is unnecessary to lose more 
degrees of freedom by fixing at lag 4. The results illustrate that most series are I(1) at the 10% 
level and rarely cities are I(2), such as Dalian, Jinan, Ningbo, Qingdao, Shenyang and 
Zhengzhou. As we can see from Figure 4.8, except for Haikou, the first differences of other 
cities’ house prices have fluctuated within a certain band (-0.2~0.2), which implies their first 





Figure 4.8: The Graph of the 1
st

























































































Next, the panel unit root tests for LHP and DLHP show the evidence of further divergence. 
Table 4.6 summarises the results from the panel unit root tests. Except for the Hadri test, the 
null of other tests indicate the existence of unit root; while the null of the Hadri test is ‘all 
panels are stationary’. Whether the lag length is specified by SIC or fixed at lag 4 has no 
effects on the results; even in the tests for DLHP, SIC also chose the lag of 4. As explained 
before, unit root tests for LHP are with the trend, while unit root tests for DLHP are without 
the trend, as there is no sign of a trend for DLHP in Figure 4.8. Levin, Lin & Chu (LLC) test, 
Im, Pesaran & Shin (IPS) test, ADF test and PP test all strongly fail to reject the null testing 
LHP and reject the null testing DLHP at 1% significant level; conversely, the Hadri test 
strongly rejects the null testing LHP and fail to reject the null testing DLHP. In short, all the 
results suggest the same conclusion of non-stationary LHP and stationary of DLHP. 
Table 4.6: Panel Unit Root Tests for LHP and DLHP  
Panel Unit Root Test 
LHP (with trend) LHP (with trend) DLHP (without trend) 
















Method Cross-sections: 35 Cross-sections: 35 Cross-sections: 35 
Levin, Lin & Chu 
(H0: Unit root (assumes 





















































775.607 0.0000*** Reject 
Method Cross-sections: 35  Periods: 56 Cross-sections: 35  Periods: 55 
Hadri 
(H0: All panels are 
stationary) 




(1) ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively, which means to reject H0 at 1%, 5% and 10% 
level respectively. 
(2) The lag specification of tests for LHP by SIC: 5. 
(3) The lag specification of tests for DLHP by SIC: 4. 
(4) Tests for LHP with trend. 
(5) Tests for DLHP without trend. 
In short, both the univariate unit root tests and the panel unit root tests manifest that the 
regional house price index is not stationary; hence, it can be directly used for Engle-Granger 
cointegration tests, but the difference format of LHP needs to be introduced into the panel 
regression models and Granger causality tests. 
4.5.1.2 Unit Root Test Results for Regional-national House Price Ratios 
As the literature review mentioned before, Drake (1995) and Cook (2003) employ the 
regional-national house price ratios (HPR) to test for convergence. So we create the regional-
national house price ratio to test for convergence between the regional index and the national 
index. The original link index of national house price (HPIn) can be modified by the above 
method, and we get the final constant house price index (HPn) for the nation. To create house 
price ratios, the logarithm of national house price index (HPn) is subtracted from the 
logarithm for a given city (HPi, i=1, 2, …, 35 representing the city code). The new house 
price ratios (HPRi,τ) cover between 1997Q1 and 2010Q4 and it can be expressed as following: 
 ,,,,, lnln)/ln( ninii HPHPHPHPHPR                                                                        (4.35) 
Rewrite as in Equation 4.25, ttni eHPHP  ,, lnln  , hence testing the stationary of 35 
ratios is equivalent to assuming β =1. Under the assumption of β =1, we can get





ttnitntiti eHPHPHPHPHPR   ,,,,, lnln)ln( . If α + et is stationary, then HPRi,t is 
stationary as well. Again, the two tests are the same but for the further restriction β = 1. 
We investigate the convergence of house price ratios by univariate unit root tests and panel 
unit root tests, which results are stated in Table 4.7 and Table 4.8 respectively. Again, the lag 
specification by SIC is 4 for most cities, which means lag 4 is an efficient lag length; thus 
DF-GLS tests and KPSS tests use the fixed lag length of 4. Also, due to the significance of 
the time trend, the unit root tests for regional-national house price ratios choose the starting 
model with ‘constant and trend’. Table 4.7 illustrates that all the house price ratios are non-
stationary by ADF tests at the 5% level. Only Guangzhou and Shenzhen house price ratios 
show convergence under the DF-GLS test at 5% significance level; however, under the KPSS 
test, more cities’ house price ratios show stationarity at the 5% significance levels, such as 
Chengdu, Fuzhou, Guangzhou, Harbin, Hohhot, Lanzhou, Xiamen and Zhengzhou. But 
overall, most of results do not support evidence of convergence in China’s regional-national 
house price ratios. 




ADF Test by SIC 










t-Statistic Prob. t-Statistic LM-Stat. 
1 Beijing -1.893243 0.6435 4 - - -2.250672 0.246496*** 
2 Changchun -2.434184 0.3584 4 - - -1.814179 0.157664** 
3 Changsha -1.394536 0.8509 4 - - -1.548639 0.160865** 
4 Chengdu -2.017661 0.5781 3 -2.425224 0.3628 -1.642507 0.136816* 
5 Chongqing -2.344234 0.4034 4 - - -1.367169 0.154474** 
6 Dalian -1.774627 0.7024 4 - - -1.727027 0.185916** 
7 Fuzhou -2.777474 0.2120 4 - - -2.843284 0.094290 
8 Guangzhou -3.387076 0.0644 4 - - -3.441039** 0.136335* 
9 Guiyang -2.047554 0.5618 4 - - -1.845631 0.155765** 
10 Haikou 2.316334 1.0000 5 1.802900 1.0000 -1.003652 0.197143** 
11 Hangzhou -1.271743 0.8837 4 - - -1.736947 0.270580*** 
12 Harbin -1.946324 0.6158 4 - - -2.051343 0.129576* 
13 Hefei -2.500032 0.3269 4 - - -2.116501 0.193739** 
14 Hohhot -2.678221 0.2496 4 - - -2.132987 0.097286 
15 Jinan -2.562884 0.2983 4 - - -2.136739 0.153752** 
16 Kunming -2.623823 0.2720 4 - - -1.786141 0.176692** 
17 Lanzhou -2.114312 0.5256 4 - - -2.118703 0.130446* 
18 Nanchang -0.931730 0.9441 4 - - -1.352802 0.262906*** 
19 Nanjing -0.616801 0.9736 4 - - -1.125316 0.203061** 





21 Ningbo -1.952125 0.6128 4 - - -2.461857 0.222354*** 
22 Qingdao -0.627763 0.9729 4 - - -1.540238 0.205067** 
23 Shanghai -2.400139 0.3752 4 - - -2.490258 0.157000** 
24 Shenyang -2.547250 0.3053 4 - - -2.676437 0.152533** 
25 Shenzhen -1.619418 0.7711 5 -3.507194 0.0492 -3.242649** 0.174065** 
26 Shijiazhuang -3.329056 0.0731 4 - - -2.565654 0.184001** 
27 Taiyuan -3.174152 0.1011 4 - - -2.238615 0.154977** 
28 Tianjin -2.008064 0.5822 7 -3.496234 0.0505 -2.711303 0.195024** 
29 Urumchi -2.305434 0.4234 4 - - -2.377961 0.148377** 
30 Wuhan -1.274659 0.8830 4 - - -0.848555 0.285741*** 
31 Xi'an -1.270541 0.8840 4 - - -1.662644 0.152189** 
32 Xiamen -0.665801 0.9702 4 - - -1.485815 0.141056* 
33 Xining -1.666239 0.7528 0 -2.428344 0.3612 -2.238259 0.147014** 
34 Yinchuan -2.979474 0.1479 4 - - -2.554824 0.164514** 
35 Zhengzhou -2.594804 0.2844 7 -2.704161 0.2394 -1.926236 0.127848* 
Notes: 
(1) The null of ADF and DF-GLS tests is ‘unit root’, the null of KPSS test is ‘stationary’. 
(2) All the tests choose the model with ‘intercept and trend’. 
(3) The ADF tests take the lag by both SIC and fixed lag 4. 
(4) The DF-GLS and KPSS tests take the fixed lag 4. 
(5) ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively, which means to reject H0 at 1%, 5% and 10% level 
respectively. 
As introduced in the methodology, compared with the univariate unit root tests, the efficiency 
of estimation can be improved by the panel unit root tests. Similarly, the lag length is 
specified by SIC at lag 4 again, and the tests are all with the ‘constant and trend’ model. Table 
4.8 demonstrates same conclusions with the tests for the house price index. Both failing to 
reject the null of LLC, IPS, ADF and PP tests and rejecting the null of Hadri tests indicate 
there is unit root in house price ratios. Therefore, all the panel unit roots indicate the 
phenomenon of non-convergence between China’s regional house price and the national 
house price.  
Table 4.8: Panel Unit Root Tests of HPR 
Panel Unit Root Test 
House Price Ratio (HPR) 
Statistic Prob. 
Reject or Fail to 
reject 
Method Lags by SIC: 4  Cross-sections: 35 
Levin, Lin & Chu 
(H0: Unit root (assumes common unit root process)) 
-0.9481 0.1715 Fail to reject 
H0: Unit root 
(assumes individual unit root 
process) 
Im, Pesaran and 
Shin 
1.40407 0.9199 Fail to reject 
ADF – Fisher 30.8593 1.0000 Fail to reject 
PP – Fisher 1.76404 1.0000 Fail to reject 
Method Cross-sections: 35  Periods: 56 






(1) ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively, which means to reject H0 at 1%, 5% and 10% 
level respectively. 
(2) The lag specification of tests for LHP by SIC: 4. 
(3) All tests with ‘intercept and trend’. 
 
4.5.1.3 Unit Root Test Results for Convergence within ‘Clubs’ 
The above unit root test results demonstrate there is no evidence for regional house price 
indices converging to the national index; in order to test the convergence within ‘clubs’, the 
panel unit root tests are employed for house price ratios by using each city as the benchmark 
city. As shown in Equation 4.35, the house price ratio is expressed as: 
 ,,,,, lnln)/ln( BenchmarkiBenchmarkii HPHPHPHPHPR  , where HPi is the house price index 
in other city and HPBenchmark is the house price index in benchmark city; thus, every city will 
be used as benchmark city. If the house price ratio passes the panel unit root tests, there is 
evidence for convergence between the benchmark city and other cities. Table 4.9 summaries 
the panel unit root tests for each house price ratio. Once again, since there is no significant 
difference between the SIC lag specification and fixed lag of 4, so the panel unit root tests use 
lags of 4 with the trend. We can see that only a few house price ratios, based on Beijing, 
Shanghai, Shenzhen, Urumchi and Yinchuan, pass all three tests and show the stationarity. In 
another words, within ‘clubs’, there is evidence of other cities’ house prices converging to the 
house prices of Beijing, Shanghai, Shenzhen, Urumchi and Yinchuan. 
Table 4.9: Panel Unit Root Tests for House Price Ratios Based on Different Benchmark City  
Benchmark 
City 
H0: Unit root (assumes 
common unit root process)) 
H0: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process) 
Levin, Lin & Chu Im, Pesaran and Shin ADF-Fisher 
Statistic Prob. Statistic Prob. Statistic Prob. 
Beijing -7.50256 0.0000*** -7.04588 0.0000*** 151.627 0.0000*** 
Changchun -2.82453 0.0024*** 0.57790 0.7183 36.7552 0.9993 
Changsha 9.22421 1.0000 5.36079 1.0000 9.36949 1.0000 
Chengdu 11.1665 1.0000 12.3391 1.0000 0.82015 1.0000 
Chongqing 1.13248 0.8713 5.67350 1.0000 8.49252 1.0000 
Dalian 9.76869 1.0000 4.55312 1.0000 12.0460 1.0000 
Fuzhou 16.6876 1.0000 15.4277 1.0000 0.22060 1.0000 
Guangzhou 11.6040 1.0000 8.21499 1.0000 3.72458 1.0000 
Guiyang -5.96016 0.0000*** -0.83515 0.2018 50.9463 0.9329 
Haikou 19.9502 1.0000 5.93490 1.0000 7.81949 1.0000 
Hangzhou 2.05449 0.9800 5.96285 1.0000 7.75057 1.0000 
Harbin 7.33834 1.0000 5.26960 1.0000 9.64115 1.0000 
Hefei -2.53085 0.0057*** 0.08368 0.5333 41.3845 0.9955 
Hohhot 3.79790 0.9999 7.49475 1.0000 4.73320 1.0000 
Jinan 1.92534 0.9729 4.62603 1.0000 11.7781 1.0000 





Lanzhou 5.75892 1.0000 2.83578 0.9977 20.1261 1.0000 
Nanchang 4.69374 1.0000 9.75530 1.0000 2.18282 1.0000 
Nanjing 2.08060 0.9813 5.05946 1.0000 10.2955 1.0000 
Nanning 17.1910 1.0000 11.6827 1.0000 1.06202 1.0000 
Ningbo -5.32260 0.0000*** 0.42833 0.6658 38.1174 0.9987 
Qingdao 3.95924 1.0000 4.71452 1.0000 11.4599 1.0000 
Shanghai -8.78960 0.0000*** -4.15884 0.0000*** 95.6734 0.0151** 
Shenyang -0.90768 0.1820 1.42539 0.9230 29.6546 1.0000 
Shenzhen -1.69713 0.0448** -4.68747 0.0000*** 104.186 0.0031*** 
Shijiazhuang -4.66157 0.0000*** 3.87941 0.9999 14.7971 1.0000 
Taiyuan 7.28040 1.0000 9.14160 1.0000 2.71125 1.0000 
Tianjin -1.22229 0.1108 -1.45709 0.0725* 58.1237 0.7978 
Urumchi -15.8944 0.0000*** -5.86844 0.0000*** 124.492 0.0000*** 
Wuhan 2.25585 0.9880 7.63923 1.0000 4.51323 1.0000 
Xi'an -4.02224 0.0000*** -1.12522 0.1302 54.2215 0.8876 
Xiamen 15.6656 1.0000 13.5225 1.0000 0.50539 1.0000 
Xining -12.4305 0.0000*** -1.19769 0.1155 55.0595 0.8709 
Yinchuan -14.8574 0.0000**** -3.98867 0.0000**** 93.0126 0.0237** 
Zhengzhou -3.84476 0.0001*** 5.42423 1.0000 9.18487 1.0000 
Notes: 
(1) ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively, which means to reject H0 at 1%, 5% and 10% 
level respectively. 
(2) The lag length is fixed at 4. 
(3) All tests with ‘intercept and trend’. 
(4) Shaded cities indicate convergence when they are used as the comparators. 
 
Due to the advanced economic development of these powerful cities, their house price 
changes can signally affect the house prices of other cities. For example, as the capital of 
China, Beijing has the absolute superiority of economic development. While Shanghai, is one 
of four municipalities (Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin and Chongqing) directly under the central 
government, and the core cities of YRD-EC as well. Moreover, Shenzhen is one of five 
municipalities with independent planning status, which have the strong industrial and 
commercial foundation and advanced science and technology. Furthermore, with the 
implementation of ‘the West Development Strategy (Xi Bu Da Kai Fa)’70, Urumchi and 
Yinchuan, as the capitals of Xinjiang province and Ningxia province respectively, are two of 
twelve major cities in this important strategy; since then Urumchi and Yinchuan have 
experienced a rapid developmental period. To this extent, that can explain why other cities’ 
house prices remain an equilibrium relationship with these well-developed cities.  
                                                 
70 In order to bridge the disparity between eastern coastal developed regions and western inland developing regions, the 
National People’s Congress passed the West Development Strategy (Xi Bu Da Kai Fa) in 2001, that covering 12 provinces or  






4.5.2 Results of σ-/β-convergence 








 ) for the regional house price index of 35 cities, 
follows the pattern as in Figure 4.9. As during the data revising process, the index has been 
set up at 100 in 1998Q1 for all the cities, the CV of zero in 1998Q1 has been dropped from 
the line graph. From inspection of this figure, it can be seen that CV exhibits a significant 
upward trend before 2004; afterwards it turns into a relative flat movement with slight 
fluctuation. The initial period is misleading. Obviously if we constrain all observations to 
equal 100 in the base quarter, then in succeeding quarters they will more upward, with the 
coefficient of variation increasing. This will continue until the equilibrium has been reached. 
The graph suggests this is by the end of 2004, after this date there is no compelling evidence 
for divergence or convergence. 
 
Figure 4.9: The Coefficient of Variation of LHP over 1997Q1-2010Q4 
While, the σ-convergence shows how the distribution of house prices changes over time; in 
order to show the mobility of house prices with the same distribution, we apply the β-
convergence as the complement of convergence analysis. As mentioned before, following 
Equation 4.18, we get the cross-section β-convergence model is   1,ii LHPGLHP , 
where GLHPi is the growth rate for city i and LHPi,1 is LHP for city i in the first time period. 
Additionally, the panel data version of β-convergence model is written as Equation 4.19, 













   1,, ii LHPGLHP , where ,iGLHP  is the growth rate of LHP in the current time 
period and 1, iLHP  is LHP in the previous time period. 
However, since the line graph for σ-convergence (Figure 4.9) does not reach an equilibrium 
until 2004, the sub-sample convergence consideration can be applied into our panel β-
convergence estimation upon the example of Cook (2012). Hereby, the panel β-convergence 
regression is employed again with the cyclical sub-sample of observations from 2004Q1. 
Table 4.10 illustrates the results for both β-convergence models with full sample (1997Q1 to 
2010Q4) and sub-sample (2004Q1 to 2010Q4). 
Table 4.10: : Results of Both β-convergence Models with Full Sample and Sub-sample 
Cross-section β-convergence 
model 
Panel β-convergence model (full 
sample) 






















































Note: ( ) denotes the t-statistics of the respective coefficients. *** indicates significance at 1% level, ** indicates 
significance at 5% level. * indicates significance at 10% level. 
 
It can be seen from above table, for the full sample, the value of both coefficient β are 
negative; but the t-statistics are 0.415 and 0.635 respectively, which are not significant. 
Therefore, both results are not significant enough in support of β-convergence between 
regional house prices for the whole sample of observations. However, the regression of sub-
samples exhibits the coefficient β (-0.557) is negative and significant at the 1% level, 
indicating apparent β-convergence for the sample level since the distribution reached an 
equilibrium. 
In summary, the unit root techniques suggest that there is no evidence of China’s regional 
house price indices converging to the national index. However, the panel version of β-
convergence estimation detects the existence of convergence for sub-samples that is the 
convergence between regional house price indices during the period after 2003. The reason 
we use the period since 2004 is that before that the prices are being heavily influenced by the 





are doing is seeing whether the differences in prices which have built up between 1997 and 
2004 are subsequently corrected for. Therefore, regressions based on the period as a whole 
don’t make much sense. Once the distribution had settled down, also in this period there is a 
strong evidence for either β-convergence or divergence. 
4.5.3 Results of Cointegration Tests 
As the results of unit root tests showed, the regional house price indexes are not stationary; 
thus, in order to test the long-run equilibrium relationship between regions, the next step is to 
estimate the cointegration of house price indexes. On one hand, Engle-Granger cointegration 
test is used for the bivariate varies between each two cities’ house price indexes. On the other 
hand, Johansen cointegration test is used to investigate the long-run relationship between one 
specific city and core cities— Beijing, Shanghai, and Guangzhou. 
Before the Engle-Granger cointegration test, seasonal dummy variables (S1 denoting the 1
st
 
quarter, S2 denoting the 2
nd
 quarter and S3 denoting the 3
rd
 quarter) are introduced into the 
basic OLS models in the first step, and the results suggest that the seasonal dummies are 
significant. Thus, the seasonal dummies have been applied into Engle-Granger cointegration 
test. The lag length is specified by SIC. The null hypothesis is ‘series are not cointegrated’, in 
other words, rejecting the null means there is cointegration between series. Again, due to the 
significance of the time trend in Figure 4.7 and Table 4.5, the starting model used in the 
Engle-Granger cointegration tests is the ‘linear trend’. Also, depending on the ‘linear trend’ 
model, Mackinnon (1996) critical values should be used. 
Appendix 4.4 exhibits the pairwise Engle-Granger cointegration test results. It can be found 
that most of two cities do not have long-run equilibrium relationships, and the cointegration 
only exists between a few specific cities. Figure 4.10 highlights the cities which are linked by 
different colours. There is either one-way or two-way cointegration between these cities. As 
shown in the map, there is cointegration relationship between Hohhot, Taiyuan and Jinan, 
which are located around Beijing. The cointegration also exists between some coastal cities, 
such as Dalian, Fuzhou and Xiamen. In addition, more west inland cities illustrate 
cointegration relationship among Guiyang, Xi’an, Xining, Yinchuan and Urumqi; their 






Figure 4.10: The Map of Highlighted Cities with Cointegration Relationship 
Table 4.11 summarises the statistical results of cointegration relationship between specific 
cities. It can be seen that there are bidirectional cointegration between Dalian and Fuzhou, 
Hohhot and Taiyuan at the 1% significance level; between Changchun and Guiyang, 
Changchun and Urumchi at the 5% significance level; between Nanchang and Qingdao, 
Shenzhen and Zhengzhou at the 10% significance level. And other two-way cointegration is 
between Hohhot and Jinan: Hohhot is cointegrated with Jinan at the 5% significance level; 
however Jinan is cointegrated with Hohhot at the 10% significance level. The other one-way 
cointegrations are significant only at the 10% significance level. In short, there are quite a 
few significant cointegration relationships between specific two cities without any trend or 
regular pattern. Thus, Granger causality test based on VAR model can be used to investigate 
the short-run relationship between cities in the next following part. 









Dalian long-run causality causes 
Fuzhou 
1% 
Both coastal cities. 





Hohhot long-run causality causes 
Taiyuan 
1% Both inland cities roughly equal 
distance from Beijing. 








Changchun long-run causality 
causes Guiyang 
5% 
Both interior cities relatively 





Changchun long-run causality 
causes Urumchi 
5% 
Urumchi or Urumqi (on map) both 





Hohhot long-run causality causes 
Jinan 
5% 
Both interior cities roughly equal 





Nanchang long-run causality 
causes Qingdao 
10% 
No obvious shared charateristics. 





Shenzhen long-run causality 
causes Zhengzhou 
10% 
No obvious shared charateristics. 





Fuzhou long-run causality causes 
Xiamen 
10% 
Both coastal cities in Fujian 




Harbin long-run causality causes 
Guiyang 
10% No obvious shared charateristics. 
One-way 
cointegration 
Xi’an long-run causality causes 
Xining 
10% 




Xining long-run causality causes 
Changchun 
10% 




Xining long-run causality causes 
Yinchuan 
10% 
Both inland cities are remote and 
close to each other. 
Notes:  
(1) The lag length is specified by SIC. 
(2) The seasonal dummies ‘S1, S2 and S3’ have been applied into the Engle-Granger cointegration tests. 
(3) The null hypothesis is ‘series are not cointegrated’. 
(4) The trend specification is ‘linear trend’. 
(5) Mackinnon (1996) p-values. 
(6) ‘1%’, ‘5%’ or ‘10%’ means to reject H0 at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. 
(7) ‘Two-way cointegration’ means two cities are cointegrated with each other; while ‘one-way cointegration’ means one city 
is cointegrated with the other one, but not vice versa.71  
Then, we can choose the most important cities in three economic zones—Beijing, Shanghai 
and Guangzhou—to run Johansen system cointegration test. The hypothesis is ‘there are at 
most n cointegration equations’. For example, if we fail to reject the null of ‘None’ means 
there is no cointegration at the 5% level; and if we fail to reject the null of ‘At most 1’ means 
there is 1 cointegration equation among multivariate series at the 5% level. As mentioned 
before, the seasonal dummies are significant and applied into Johansen cointegration test as 
                                                 
71 More specifically, I have run two regressions, with each variable as the dependent variable, and then causality goes from 
the explanatory to the dependent variable. This is because according to Granger representation theorem, if there is 
cointegration it implies there is a valid error correction model, as the error correction term must then be significant it means 
there is long-run causality from the explanatory to the dependent variable. However, the E-G test for cointegration is 





well. However, the critical values for Johansen cointegration test from MacKinnon-Haug-
Michelis (1999) assume no exogenous series. Meanwhile, since we have four series for each 
system for the cointegration test and only have 56 time periods (1997Q1 to 2010Q4), too 
many lags will cause too many instruments and reduce the degrees of freedom of the test; 
thus, the lag interval is fixed at 1 to 2.  
As Figure 4.7 and Table 4.5 displayed, generally there is an upward trend of regional house 
prices over the decade; necessarily, the significance of the trend needs to be tested in order to 
compare the results of Johansen cointegration tests without the trend and with the trend. 
Error! Reference source not found. illustrates the significance test for regional house price 
indices; and there is strong evidence of all the cities having a significant trend at the 1% level. 
Consequently, the test with the trend is more appropriate than the test without the trend to this 
extent. Table 4.12 states the results of Johansen cointegration test with trend and without 
trend. According to the table, the results without the trend suggest most of the 32 cities are 
cointegrated with the core cites—Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou, except for Fuzhou, 
Hohhot, Jinan, Nanchang, Shijiazhuang, Taiyuan, Wuhan and Xiamen; while the results with 
the trend suggest most cities area cointegrated with the core cities except for Harbin and 
Wuhan. As a general view of both tests, only Wuhan has no cointegration relationship with 
the core cities, which means there is a long run equilibrium relationship of house prices 
between most cities with the core cities. Therefore, the primary results of Johansen 
cointegration test supports our assumption of house prices in core cites having effects on 
other cities; hence, the panel regression models based on core cities are applied in the next 
step. 
Table 4.12: Johansen System Cointegration Test with Trend and Without Trend 




Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test 
(without trend) 
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test 
(with trend) 
Hypothesized 












None* 58.90005 0.0033 None* 74.36717 0.0051 
At most 1 25.61340 0.1407 At most 1 40.87171 0.0789 
3 Changsha 
None* 49.80504 0.0324 None* 65.52791 0.0361 
At most 1 22.50229 0.2714 At most 1 35.67966 0.2182 
4 Chengdu 
None* 58.29007 0.0039 None* 78.41005 0.0019 
At most 1* 30.81345 0.0381 At most 1* 43.14009 0.0475 
At most 2 12.17790 0.1486 At most 2 24.20348 0.0795 





At most 1 28.18070 0.0759 At most 1* 45.89864 0.0244 
- - - At most 2 17.35555 0.3889 
6 Dalian 
None* 57.61763 0.0047 None* 80.51302 0.0011 
At most 1 28.47877 0.0704 At most 1* 47.21820 0.0175 
- - - At most 2 23.92520 0.0857 
7 Fuzhou 
None 37.33932 0.3317 None* 64.82067 0.0416 
- - - At most 1 30.96046 0.4462 
9 Guiyang 
None* 98.05702 0.0000 None* 106.5473 0.0000 
At most 1* 42.98064 0.0009 At most 1* 51.37191 0.0058 
At most 2 10.76964 0.2261 At most 2 16.88051 0.4239 
10 Haikou 
None* 50.21040 0.0295 None* 75.89816 0.0035 
At most 1 25.15976 0.1558 At most 1 37.54103 0.1555 
11 Hangzhou 
None* 59.62898 0.0027 None* 84.78710 0.0003 
At most 1 28.65690 0.0672 At most 1* 53.46092 0.0032 
- - - At most 2* 26.30457 0.0442 
- - - At most 3 8.877495 0.1880 
12 Harbin 
None* 50.50816 0.0276 None 62.55810 0.0642 
At most 1 27.08429 0.0996 - - - 
13 Hefei 
None* 54.23344 0.0112 None* 66.06710 0.0323 
At most 1 26.13153 0.1248 At most 1 33.83572 0.2961 
14 Hohhot 
None 44.73019 0.0955 None* 88.43577 0.0001 
- - - At most 1 42.03264 0.0611 
15 Jinan 
None 47.00286 0.0600 None* 75.93379 0.0035 
- - - At most 1 42.41320 0.0561 
16 Kunming 
None* 57.98307 0.0042 None* 85.96066 0.0002 
At most 1 19.01378 0.4919 At most 1 38.54337 0.1279 
17 Lanzhou 
None* 52.53835 0.0170 None* 68.78649 0.0182 
At most 1 20.88872 0.3646 At most 1 33.47070 0.3133 
18 Nanchang 
None 42.11999 0.1554 None* 79.33746 0.0015 
- - - At most 1 40.88809 0.0787 
19 Nanjing 
None* 67.25250 0.0003 None* 83.95765 0.0004 
At most 1 22.41248 0.2761 At most 1 39.03650 0.1159 
20 Nanning 
None* 53.72163 0.0127 None* 69.24690 0.0165 
At most 1* 31.00858 0.0361 At most 1* 43.46488 0.0440 
At most 2 12.83358 0.1211 At most 2 20.77698 0.1891 
21 Ningbo 
None* 62.66966 0.0011 None* 89.63761 0.0001 
At most 1 25.28947 0.1513 At most 1 42.75370 0.0519 
22 Qingdao 
None* 51.31096 0.0228 None* 93.99455 0.0000 
At most 1 21.57660 0.3226 At most 1 41.73242 0.0654 
24 Shenyang 
None* 49.01355 0.0388 None* 78.27096 0.0019 
At most 1 23.37997 0.2279 At most 1 36.14773 0.2009 
25 Shenzhen 
None* 64.13964 0.0007 None* 103.0161 0.0000 
At most 1 26.59983 0.1118 At most 1* 53.45467 0.0032 
- - - At most 2 22.33071 0.1297 
26 Shijiazhuang 
None 45.05481 0.0895 None* 67.83422 0.0224 
- - - At most 1 39.24833 0.1110 
27 Taiyuan 
None 42.09701 0.1560 None* 67.14942 0.0259 






None* 54.29697 0.0110 None* 70.50989 0.0125 
At most 1* 33.40388 0.0184 At most 1* 49.37258 0.0100 
At most 2 15.19190 0.0555 At most 2* 29.48993 0.0169 
- - - At most 3* 12.82161 0.0445 
29 Urumchi 
None* 53.98219 0.0119 None* 96.06180 0.0000 
At most 1 25.18902 0.1548 At most 1* 47.00979 0.0185 
- - - At most 2 21.40736 0.1628 
30 Wuhan None 39.77416 0.2307 None 62.43863 0.0657 
31 Xi'an 
None* 72.08303 0.0001 None* 95.49763 0.0000 
At most 1* 31.01317 0.0361 At most 1* 43.48027 0.0438 
At most 2 9.589703 0.3136 At most 2 18.37217 0.3195 
32 Xiamen 
None 41.65254 0.1687 None* 72.44612 0.0080 
- - - At most 1 34.14298 0.2820 
33 Xining 
None* 59.99855 0.0024 None* 82.67064 0.0006 
At most 1* 31.17489 0.0345 At most 1* 44.51556 0.0343 
At most 2 15.21060 0.0551 At most 2 22.16436 0.1352 
34 Yinchuan 
None* 66.96116 0.0003 None* 78.92184 0.0016 
At most 1 29.16793 0.0590 At most 1 35.95126 0.2080 
35 Zhengzhou 
None* 50.30812 0.0289 None* 71.39502 0.0102 
At most 1 28.77638 0.0652 At most 1 39.13441 0.1136 
Notes: 
1) The null hypothesis is ‘there are at most number of n cointegration equations’. 
2) Exogenous series: seasonal dummy variables (s1 s2 s3). 
3) Lags interval (in first difference): 1 to 2. 
4) * denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 5% level. 
5) **MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values. 
6) Warning: Critical values assume no exogenous series. 
 
4.5.4 Results of Panel Regression Models 
As multivariate cointegration tests showed, house prices in most cities are cointegrated with 
house prices in core cities—Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou, recalling Equation 4.25 and 
4.26, we use the stationary variable of DLHP to replace the index and then achieve the 
following models:  















                                       (4.37) 
The above equations indicate the ripple effects of quarterly house price changes in Beijing, 
Shanghai and Guangzhou; in order to identify the impact of yearly house prices swings in 
these cities, the variable of the 4
th







difference variable (DLHP). The advantage of using the annual change is that it is actual data. 
The quarterly data is estimated and may contain error terms as we reconstruct the constant 
growth index from the link index. But the annual data has a problem too. Clearly the annual 
change for this quarter is very similar to last quarter. To overcome this we regress the annual 
change not on last quarter's annual change but the annual change four quarters previously. In 


































                           (4.39) 
Where τ denotes the time period from 1997Q1 to 2010Q4; i=1,2,…,32, which denotes 32 
cities excluding Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou. DLHPB, DLHPS and DLHPG are quarterly 
house price changes of core cities—Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou respectively. dDLHPB 
is the log of distance between city i and Beijing multiplying DLHP in Beijing; dDLHPS is the 
log of distance between city i and Shanghai multiplying DLHP in Shanghai; and dDLHPG is 
the log of distance between city i and Guangzhou multiplying DLHP in Guangzhou. D4LHPB, 
D4LHPS and D4LHPG are yearly house price changes in Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou 
respectively. dD4LHPB is the log of distance between city i and Beijing multiplying D4LHP 
in Beijing; dD4LHPS is the log of distance between city i and Shanghai multiplying D4LHP 
in Shanghai; and dD4LHPG is the log of distance between city i and Guangzhou multiplying 
D4LHP in Guangzhou. Table 4.13 and Table 4.14 exhibit the results of the panel regression 
models for quarterly and yearly house price changes respectively. 
From Table 4.13 and Table 4.14, it can be seen that both quarterly and yearly house price 
changes in other cities are significantly affected by their own lagged changes and house price 
changes in Beijing and Shanghai, no matter including the distance factor or not. In another 
words, the house price shocks in core cities ‘ripple out’ to the other regions; because the 
development situations in these three biggest economic zones stimulate the economic growth 
of comparatively low developed regions, which is the major aim of  China’s central 






Table 4.13: Results of Ripple Effect Regressions for Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou (the 
first difference for quarterly change) 
Dependent Variable Quarterly house price changes (DLHP) in city i 
Explanatory 
Variable 












L.DLHPB 0.414(8.04) 0.000*** 





L.DLHPS 0.604(2.37) 0.018** 





L.DLHPG 0.778(2.61) 0.009*** 









1). ‘L.’ indicates the first lag of variables. ‘D’ indicates the first difference. 
2). ( ) denotes the t statistics of the respective coefficients. *** indicates significance at 1% level, ** indicates 
significance at 5% level. * indicates significance at 10% level. 
3). These correspond to equations 5.36 and 5.37. 
 
Table 4.14: Results of Ripple Effect Regressions for Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou (the 
fourth difference for yearly change) 
Dependent Variable Yearly house price changes (D4LHP) in city i 












L4.D4LHPB -0.520(-2.66) 0.008*** 





L4.D4LHPS 0.681(5.18) 0.000*** 





L4.D4LHPG -0.148(-0.47) 0.637 









1). ‘L4.’ indicates lag 4 of variables. ‘D4’ indicates the fourth difference. 
2). ( ) denotes the t statistics of the respective coefficients. *** indicates significance at 1% level, ** indicates 
significance at 5% level. * indicates significance at 10% level. 
3). These correspond to equations 5.38 and 5.39. 
 
Additionally, the positive coefficients of core cities’ quarterly house price changes indicate 
that house prices in core cities play a motivational role in other regions. More interestingly, 
the coefficients of previous house price changes are significantly negative in the short run (in 





previous house price shocks have a negative influence on the current house prices in the short 
run, but the house price turbulences have a positive impact on the current house prices in the 
long run. Specifically, if the house price increases in the short-run current quarter, it will drop 
in the next quarter; but if it rises in the long-run current year, it will increase in the next year 
as well. The quarterly change may be more influenced by random stochastic factors than the 
annual figure, which will be dominated perhaps more by the underlying trend. This suggests 
that the stochastic factors are corrected for, whilst the long term factors have a continuing 
impact.  
Another interesting result is the different ripple effect of Beijing’s house price shocks in the 
short run and in the long run. As we can see that, the increase of quarterly house price 
changes in Beijing drive up other cities’ house price, but the growth of yearly house price 
changes in Beijing decreases other cities’ house prices. Although when we bring in the 
distance factors, the coefficient of Beijing stops being significant. One interpretation of these 
results is that the impact of a house price change in Beijing is felt quickly in other cities, as 
reflected by the coefficient in Table 4.13 (0.410) in comparison with the other core cities 
coefficients, this not diluted by distance. Thus when we consider a year lagged effects are 
reflected in cities by their own prices and Beijing prices perform the role of a correction 
factor. This may be because in the long-run, Beijing acts as a magnet for migration, as extra 
people move to the capital and they push prices up. But this then may lead to downward 
pressure on other cities. That is one possibility, and there are of course others.  
Furthermore, for the quarterly house price swings, the ripple effects seem to be impacted by 
the distance factor in Shanghai and Guangzhou but not in Beijing, because the coefficients of 
distance factors are significant at the 5% level in Shanghai and Guangzhou but not significant 
in Beijing. However, for the yearly house price fluctuations, only the distance factor of 
Shanghai is significant at the 1% level. Also the coefficients of distance factors (L.dDLHP 
and L4.dD4LHP) in Table 4.13 and Table 4.14 are negative, where the negativity of 
coefficients of price factors implies that the farther the city is away from economic zones, the 
less powerful the distance factor is. This evidence suggests that the ‘ripple effects’ of house 
price turbulence in core cities weakens with the increase of the distance and in the long run 
(in terms of year). We should expect the distance factor to decline with the length of the time 
period. It takes time for price effects to spread across the country and the farther the distance, 





4.5.5 Results of Granger Causality Tests 
As the supplement of cointegration tests, the alternative method of Granger Causality Test 
can be adopted into regional house price estimation. Since the unit root tests demonstrate all 
the series are non-stationary and Engle-Granger pairwise cointegration tests illustrate there is 
no cointegration relationship between most of two cites. Thus, we can run Granger causality 
test for the difference format of house price indexes in the following step.  Appendix 4.5 and 
Appendix 4.6 show the results of ‘Pairwise Granger Causality Tests’ for 1st difference and 4th 
difference of LHP respectively and also highlight the most powerful cities in impacting on 
other cities’ house prices. We fixed the lag length for the Granger Causality tests at 2, as we 
have limited data with only 56 time periods. The null of Granger causality test is ‘A does not 
cause B’, so reject the null means house price changes in city A causes house price changes in 
city B. 
Once more we reproduce the map and highlight the key cities (Figure 4.11). Granger 
causality test, for the 1
st
 difference of LHP, investigates whether the quarterly house price 
changes in one city affects the other cities’. Whilst the test with 4th the difference of LHP 
estimates whether the yearly price shocks in one city affects the other cities. Table 4.15 
summarise the results of pairwise Granger causality tests from Appendix 4.5 and Appendix 
4.6. It shows that the quarterly changes of house prices (the lagged variables lagged 1 period) 
in Beijing, Hangzhou and Shenzhen affect house prices of most other cities, and the yearly 
changes (the lagged variables lagged 4 periods) in most other cities are impacted upon by the 
house price shocks in Beijing, Guangzhou, Hangzhou and Shenzhen. These four influential 






Figure 4.11: The Map of Highlighted Cities by Granger Causality Test  
Table 4.15: Number of Cities of Each City Causes Other Cities 
Granger Causality Test for  
1
st
 Difference of LHP 
Granger Causality Test for  
4
th

























1 Beijing 19 7 2 6 1 Beijing 15 8 5 6 
2 Changchun 13 8 2 11 2 Changchun 1 2 2 29 
3 Changsha 12 9 2 11 3 Changsha 5 8 5 16 
4 Chengdu 11 7 4 12 4 Chengdu 0 7 2 25 
5 Chongqing 10 4 3 17 5 Chongqing 5 6 6 17 
6 Dalian 9 8 3 14 6 Dalian 4 7 1 22 
7 Fuzhou 8 4 4 18 7 Fuzhou 0 5 2 27 
8 Guangzhou 8 4 4 18 8 Guangzhou 12 8 5 9 
9 Guiyang 4 6 4 20 9 Guiyang 1 5 6 22 
10 Haikou 6 2 2 24 10 Haikou 1 3 4 26 
11 Hangzhou 16 3 5 10 11 Hangzhou 6 14 3 11 
12 Harbin 12 6 3 13 12 Harbin 3 5 5 21 
13 Hefei 12 3 2 17 13 Hefei 3 4 2 25 
14 Hohhot 13 6 4 11 14 Hohhot 0 2 3 29 
15 Jinan 15 2 3 14 15 Jinan 6 2 1 25 
16 Kunming 12 5 0 17 16 Kunming 3 7 4 20 
17 Lanzhou 12 1 2 19 17 Lanzhou 4 1 2 27 
18 Nanchang 2 7 4 21 18 Nanchang 2 5 1 26 





20 Nanning 4 3 2 25 20 Nanning 3 4 1 26 
21 Ningbo 7 5 3 19 21 Ningbo 1 9 4 20 
22 Qingdao 8 4 4 18 22 Qingdao 3 4 4 23 
23 Shanghai 6 2 5 21 23 Shanghai 3 3 6 22 
24 Shenyang 16 1 1 16 24 Shenyang 2 5 8 19 
25 Shenzhen 16 7 3 8 25 Shenzhen 22 7 1 4 
26 Shijiazhuang 6 6 1 21 26 Shijiazhuang 4 8 8 14 
27 Taiyuan 12 1 2 19 27 Taiyuan 0 2 1 31 
28 Tianjin 11 3 3 17 28 Tianjin 5 7 6 16 
29 Urumchi 4 4 7 19 29 Urumchi 5 10 3 16 
30 Wuhan 13 2 0 19 30 Wuhan 2 1 1 30 
31 Xi'an 12 10 1 11 31 Xi'an 4 10 4 16 
32 Xiamen 9 8 3 14 32 Xiamen 5 6 6 17 
33 Xining 9 5 2 18 33 Xining 0 3 1 30 
34 Yinchuan 9 6 0 19 34 Yinchuan 2 6 6 20 
35 Zhengzhou 7 10 4 13 35 Zhengzhou 1 1 2 30 
Notes: 
1) Pairwise Granger Causality Tests take 2 lags. 
2) The null hypothesis is ‘the city X does not cause the city Y’. 
3) ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively, which means ***, ** and * reject the null 
hypothesis at 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. 
As mentioned above, Beijing is the core city of Beijing-Tianjin-Tangshan economic zone, 
Hangzhou is another core city of Yangtze River Delta economic zone except for Shanghai, 
Guangzhou and Shenzhen are the core cities of Pearl River Delta economic zone; therefore, 
the pairwise Granger causality results coincide with our regression estimation in Table 4.13 
and Table 4.14, to some extent. But not as expected, Shanghai’s house prices affect just few 
other cities’ house price changes. This may reflect the degree of difference between Shanghai, 
the commercial hub of China and probably the most westernized city, and other major cities. 
In addition, house prices in Guangzhou do not impact other cities’ in a manner of quarterly 
changes; but in the long run, Guangzhou has much wider influence on other cities by yearly 
turbulences. 
Based on the above results, for the quarterly house price changes, if we assume Hangzhou 
and Shenzhen play a core role rather than Shanghai and Guangzhou in Yangtze and Pearl 
River Delta economic zones respectively, Equation 4.36 & 4.37 can be rewritten as: 




















In addition, the above results suggest that for the yearly house price changes, one more city—










































                                     (4.43) 
where τ denotes the time period from 1997Q1 to 2010Q4; i=1,2,…,32, which denotes 32 
cities excluding Beijing, Hangzhou and Shenzhen. Other new variables DLHPHZ/ D4LHPHZ, 
DLHPSZ/D4LHPSZ, and DLHPG/D4LHPG are quarterly/yearly house price changes of 
Hangzhou, Shenzhen and Guangzhou respectively; dDLHPHZ/dD4LHPHZ are the log of 
distance between city i and Hangzhou multiplying DLHP/D4LHP in Hangzhou; 
dDLHPSZ/dD4LHPSZ are the log of distance between city i and Shenzhen multiplying 
DLHP/D4LHP in Shenzhen; and dDLHPG/dD4LHPG are the log of distance between city i 
and Guangzhou multiplying DLHP/D4LHP in Guangzhou. Table 4.16 and Table 4.17 
illustrate the results of the panel regression models for quarterly and yearly house price 
changes respectively. 
As the Granger Causality results suggest, the quarterly house price changes of Beijing, 
Hangzhou and Shenzhen affect most other cities’ house prices, and the yearly house price 
changes of Beijing, Hangzhou, Guangzhou and Shenzhen impact most other cities’ house 
prices. The same conclusions with Table 4.13 and Table 4.14, the coefficients of previous 
house price changes in Table 4.16 and Table 4.17 are significantly negative in the short run 
(in terms of quarter) and significantly positive in the long run (in terms of year). 
Table 4.16: Results of Ripple Effect Regressions for Beijing, Hangzhou and Shenzhen (the 
first difference for quarterly change) 


















L.DLHPB 0.232(3.59) 0.000*** 









L.DLHPHZ 0.129(0.59) 0.558 





L.DLHPSZ 0.966(2.88) 0.004*** 









1). ‘L.’ indicates the first lag of variables, ‘D’ indicates the first difference. 
2). ( ) denotes the t statistics of the respective coefficients. *** indicates significance at 1% level, ** indicates 
significance at 5% level. * indicates significance at 10% level. 
3). These correspond to equations 5.40 and 5.41. 
 
Table 4.17: Results of Ripple Effect Regressions for Beijing, Hangzhou, Shenzhen and 
Guangzhou (the fourth difference for yearly change) 
Dependent Variable Yearly house price changes (D4LHP) in city i 
Explanatory 
Variable 












L4.D4LHPB -0.626(-3.28) 0.001*** 





L4.D4LHPHZ 0.127(0.79) 0.429 





L4.D4LHPSZ -0.746(-2.09) 0.036** 





L4.D4LHPG 0.736(1.11) 0.269 









1). ‘L4.’ indicates lag 4 of variables, ‘D4’ indicates the fourth difference. 
2). ( ) denotes the t statistics of the respective coefficients. *** indicates significance at 1% level, ** indicates 
significance at 5% level. * indicates significance at 10% level. 
3). These correspond to equations 5.42 and 5.43. 
From Table 4.16, the implications of regression models are slightly different with our 
assumption based on the Granger Causality tests: the quarterly house price shocks in Beijing 
and Shenzhen significantly disturb other cities’ housing market regardless of distance factors 
at the 1% level; but Hangzhou’s quarterly house price changes do not have a significant effect 
on other cities’ in both situations, excluding and including distance factor. Meanwhile, from 
Table 4.17, the yearly house price shocks are significant in Beijing, Hangzhou and 
Guangzhou without the distance factors; but with the distance factors, the yearly house price 





respectively. In the long run, Shenzhen’s yearly house price changes cannot significantly 
affect other cities; but including the distance factor, its coefficient is significant as well as the 
coefficient of Shenzhen’s distance factor.  
Speaking to the distance factor, in the quarterly house price change regression, the coefficient 
of Beijing is not significant either. However, the distance factor of Shenzhen plays a 
significant role in other cities’ house prices at the 5% level. According to the policies of 
reform and opening-up, Shenzhen has become the first window of China’s reform and 
opening up in the south of China, and also one of the first special economic cities. The 
advanced economic status contributes to its leading economic role in China, which is the 
most important reason of Shenzhen’s profound influence on other cities’ housing markets. In 
the long run yearly term, the distance factors of Beijing and Guangzhou are not significant, 
which means the distance factor cannot affect the house price swings in the long run 
equilibrium. By cross comparing with Table 4.14 and Table 4.17, the original results in Table 
4.14 are overall better than these results in Table 4.17 which indicating the original intuition 
on choice of cities (Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou) was more efficient and valid. 
In a sense these tables (Table 4.13, Table 4.14, Table 4.16 and Table 4.17) generalise the 
Granger causality tests which just focus on a relationship between TWO variables. This 
reflects the possibility that city house prices may be impacted upon by more than one ‘core 
city’. 
4.6 Conclusion 
This chapter analyses the house price indexes for 35 cities over 1998Q1 to 2010Q4, to study 
the convergence and ripple effects of China’s regional house prices, through univariate/panel 
unit root tests (Levin et al., Im et al., ADF, PP, and Hadri tests), σ-/β-convergence analysis, 
panel regression models, cointegration tests and Granger causality test. Overall, the results 
indicate non-convergence between China’s regional house prices during this period. However, 
there is evidence of ripple effects of some core cities in three major economic zones—BTT-
EC, YRD-EC and PRD-EC, especially in the short run (in terms of quarterly). The fact that 
we have ripple effects but not convergence may indicate that the influence from one city to 
another exists, but is not in itself enough to ensure convergence. On the other hand we may 





Before running the econometric tests and regressions, the original link index for house prices 
(index in the same quarter of last year=100) is revised into a continual index (index in the 
first quarter=100) by making an assumption of ‘annual growth rate = (quarterly growth rate)4’ 
in periods of high stability. The results are reasonable and suggest our assumption is valid and 
the transferred index can estimate the house price changes efficiently. Afterwards, the new 
index has been used in the following estimations. 
Firstly, we test the stationarity of the regional-national house price ratio for each city by ADF, 
DF-GLS and KPSS unit root tests, and there is no evidence of convergence between these 
cities. Furthermore, the panel unit root tests—LLC, IPS, ADF, PP and Hadri tests—
reemphasize the non-convergence of China’ regional house price indexes to national index. 
We further identify different ‘clubs’ by using each city as benchmark city to get house price 
index ratios, for example, a ‘club’ of house price index ratios can be obtained via using each 
other city’s house price index dividing Beijing’s house price index. Within ‘clubs’, panel unit 
root tests indicate there is evidence of limited convergence to Beijing, Shanghai, Shenyang, 
Shenzhen, Urumchi and Yinchuan. 
Then, both the σ-convergence test and the β-convergence test demonstrate the non-
convergence of regional house prices as well. This is the period from when the distribution of 
house prices ‘settled down’ after being ‘forced’ to coincide initially with all having a value of 
100. The σ-convergence from this period onwards showed no signs of either convergence or 
divergence. However, for the sub-sample of variation starting from 2004Q1, the panel 
regression suggests there is a strong evidence of the β-convergence between regional house 
prices. These of course are not necessarily inconsistent as the two definitions of convergence 
to an extent reflect different aspects of convergence. 
The inequality in China recently explains the non-convergence in China’s regional house 
prices, to a great extent. As introduced in the background chapter (Chapter 2), the housing 
inequity for householders with different income is one of the major problems in Chinese 
housing market. Sicular (2011) uses ‘the China Household Income Project (CHIP)’ survey 
data to reveal the wider gap. The data of disposable net income per capita come from the 
1988, 1995, 2002 and 2007 CHIP survey respectively, and the income inequity is measured 
by Gini coefficient
72
. Figure 4.12 indicates the Gini coefficient has a significant growth from 
                                                 





1980s (0.395 in 1988) to 1990s (0.469 in1995) and remains stable over 1990s (0.468 in 2002); 
however, the inequality starts to widen again after 2002 (0.497 in 2007).  
 
Figure 4.12: Income Inequality in China, 1988-2007 (Gini Coefficient; CHIP data) 
Sicular (2011) also points out the two key factors for the wider disparity of income. The long-
standing issue is the urban-rural income gap, and the other new factor is the asset income due 
to expansion of household wealth in the 2000s. To some extent, that reflects the house price 
gaps between east-coastal developed cities and west-inland developing cities. Table 4.18 
discloses the evidence of the bigger urban-rural income gap attributing to the national 
inequity. Table 4.19 shows the driving power of the growth of share of income to the inequity 
via the 2002 and 2007 CHIP survey data. Further, the wider income inequality eventually 
contributes on the divergence of China’s regional house prices.  






1988 2.7 - 
1995 3.1 41% 
2002 3.3 47% 
2007 4.1 52%-54% 






2002 10% 9% 
2007 15% 20% 
                                                                                                                                                        
to 0.5-0.6 (high). 
0.395 













Note: Asset income includes incomes from financial assets and 
imputed rental income from owner-occupied housing. 
Both the unit root tests for regional-national house price ratios and α-/β- convergence method 
indicate that there is no significant evidence of convergence; nevertheless, there are some 
cities’ house prices affecting other cities’. Zhang and Liu (2009) find that there is a 
significant long-run cointegration relationship between each two of the eight cities
73
 they 
chose. Compared with the findings of Zhang and Liu (2009), in total 35 sample cities, our 
pairwise Engle-Granger cointegration tests suggest there is no long-run cointegration 
relationship between most of two cities pairs but only between a few specific cities, such as 
the two-way cointegration between Dalian and Fuzhou, Hohhot and Taiyuan, Changchun and 
Guiyang, Changchun and Urumchi, Nanchang and Qingdao, Shenzhen and Zhengzhou, 
Hohhot and Jinan. 
Furthermore, the results of the Johansen system cointegration test for multivariate series 
indicate house prices in most cities have a long-run equilibrium relationship with core 
cities—Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou. Then, the panel regression estimations verify the 
indication of Johansen system cointegration test by showing that house price shocks in 
Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou affect other cities’ house price changes in both the short-
run and long-run term. Also, the coefficients of previous house price changes are significantly 
negative in the short run (in terms of quarter) and significantly positive in the long run (in 
terms of year). The quarterly change may be more influenced by random stochastic factors 
than the annual figure, which will be dominated perhaps more by the underlying trend. This 
suggests that the stochastic factors are corrected for, whilst the long term factors have a 
continuing impact. 
Additionally, the panel regressions show that, the distance factors of Shanghai and 
Guangzhou significantly impact upon house price changes in other cities in the short run, but 
this effect become less significant in the long run. Interestingly too, the house price changes 
in Beijing have a positive effect on other cities’ house prices in the short term74 but a negative 
effect in the long run
75
. One explanation is that the effect of Beijing’s house price change is 
felt more quickly than other core cities, and is not diluted by distance. Therefore when a 
                                                 
73 Zhang and Liu (2009) select quarterly house price index from 1998-2007 for eight cities—Beijing, Chengdu, Harbin, 
Hangzhou, Nanjing, Shanghai, Shenzhen and Xi’an.  
74 See Table 4.13 with positive coefficients for Beijing. 





year’s lagged effects are considered for their impact on other cities any short run changes 
from Beijing have filtered into the own lagged city prices and the house prices of Beijing then 
perform the role of a correction factor.  
Next, the pairwise Granger causality test investigates the short-run relationship of house price 
changes between each two cities and finds complementary evidences of the significant impact 
of house price fluctuations in Beijing and Shenzhen; however, the panel regression models 
indicate their influence has weakened over time as well. The maps of Figure 4.13 and Figure 
4.14 highlight which cities’ house prices caused by the house prices changes of core cities in 
the short- (in terms of quarterly changes) and long- (in terms of yearly changes) run 
respectively. As shown in the maps, the purple rectangles feature core cites; in order to 
distinguish results of pairwise Granger causality tests, the red, green and yellow ellipses 
highlight the cities which are significantly affected by core cities at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
significance level respectively.  
According to pairwise Granger causality tests, the development of three big economic zones 
pulling up China’s economic growth explains the effects of house price rising ‘ripple out’ 
from core cities—Beijing in BTT-EC, Shanghai and Hangzhou in YRD-EC, Guangzhou and 
Shenzhen in PRD-EC—to other cities. In the short run, the most influential cities are Beijing 
in the north, Hangzhou on the coast and Shenzhen in the south respectively; while in the long 
run, the most infusive cities are Beijing, Hangzhou, Shenzhen and Guangzhou. To some 
extent, our Granger causality findings are consistent with Zhang and Liu (2009) about 
‘Shenzhen being the primary original regions of nationwide house price rising’. But we 
extend this to include a limited number of other influential cities. Once again, the panel 
regression models, based on the core cities chosen by the Granger causality tests, indicate that 
the increase of house price in Beijing drives up house prices in other cities in the short run but 
brings down other cities’ house prices in the long run76.  
In summary, the unit root tests and α-/β- convergence models support the evidence of non-
convergence between regional house prices of 35 cities in China from 1997 to 2010. For the 
record, we need notice that this is an extraordinary period of economic growth in China over 
this time period, and when growth stabilises in the future we may see the convergence of 
house prices. In the long run, the house prices in different regions do not exhibit cointegration 
                                                 





relationship; however, in line with the panel regression estimations and Granger causality 
tests, house prices shocks in some core cities have ripple effects on other cities’ house price 
changes, wherein Beijing, Shanghai, Hangzhou, Guangzhou and Shenzhen are original 
regions of nationwide house price swings. 
Finally we reflect on the nature of convergence and house price differences. The latter can 
either be because average houses are better in A than B or the same quality house is more 
expensive in A than B. The latter is likely to be capable of being corrected more quickly than 
the former – which requires a change to the housing stock and may take decades. There is 
little discussion of this in the literature, but it would be interesting in future analysis to 
distinguish between these two aspects of convergence. 
Figure 4.13: The Granger Causality Effects of Quarterly House Price Changes of Core Cites 














Figure 4.14: The Granger Causality Effects of Yearly House Price Changes of Core Cites 

































1998Q1 102.4 99.7 100.3 101.6 104.2 102.9 100.9 100.4 98.3 99 109.8 101.1 
1998Q2 101.4 100.4 100.6 104.6 101.5 103.1 99.3 100.4 101.1 98.5 106.5 103.2 
1998Q3 99.8 101.1 100.5 102.8 100.5 101.9 101.4 100.3 98.5 93.8 102.5 102.8 
1998Q4 100 101.2 101.3 104.5 106.8 101.4 96.2 100.5 99.1 91.5 102 103.3 
1999Q1 99.9 100.5 103.9 97.4 100.7 101.8 102.6 101.6 99 96.3 101.5 104.3 
1999Q2 100.5 99.6 103.9 97.6 95.3 101.8 101.7 103.8 99.4 93.9 100.6 102 
1999Q3 100.2 99.8 103.8 98.7 98.3 100.7 101 101.1 101.8 95.8 102.4 103.3 
1999Q4 99.7 99.9 103.3 97.6 98.6 102.7 104.4 111.8 100.6 98.6 101.9 102.3 
2000Q1 100.3 99.8 101.2 101.7 101.5 102.4 98.2 100.7 99.3 98.5 100.8 102.2 
2000Q2 99 100 101.3 100.8 103.2 103.5 102.2 102.2 101.3 98.6 100.9 106.9 
2000Q3 99 100 101.9 100.4 101.1 103.9 95.8 108.1 104.4 97.8 102 105.6 
2000Q4 99.7 100 102.9 101.5 102 102.1 104.7 109.5 102 99.5 102.7 104.7 
2001Q1 101.6 100.2 103.3 101.1 102.4 104.2 100.7 104 100.5 100 99 106.3 
2001Q2 101.3 102.3 104.1 100.5 103.7 102.4 100.3 104.1 101 104.7 102.2 107.2 
2001Q3 101.1 101.4 105.2 100.2 103.1 102 100.6 102.3 103.6 107.8 100.7 105.4 
2001Q4 101 100.7 103.1 99.1 100.3 101.9 96.6 100.1 102.5 105.1 100.2 104.3 
2002Q1 99.9 101.1 103 103.2 103.1 101.3 94.4 101.7 102.9 105.7 102 105.5 
2002Q2 101.4 101.3 102.1 103.2 101.5 99.9 99.5 94.4 100.5 106 103.9 106.9 
2002Q3 100.8 102.2 100.5 103.5 103 99.2 99.8 96.3 101.1 107.9 103.5 108.4 
2002Q4 99 101.6 100.1 103.4 101.7 99.9 99.9 96.5 99.8 109.7 102.5 106.6 
2003Q1 100.2 101.5 100.2 102.8 101.1 101.4 98.5 101.2 100.1 111.8 107.4 104.3 
2003Q2 100.2 102.8 99.7 102.2 100.5 103.8 102.2 101.2 100.1 118.1 109.5 105.4 
2003Q3 100.2 104.6 100.1 102.6 100.3 109.4 101.5 100.1 100 121.5 108.9 105.6 
2003Q4 100.6 107.5 101 103.6 100.7 115.8 100.4 99.3 100.6 129.1 113.4 109 
2004Q1 101.8 114.2 102.2 104.4 101.4 119.6 103.4 97.5 101.1 128.3 112.1 110.5 
2004Q2 103.3 116.7 104 103.6 105 112.8 103.8 99.9 109.2 121.4 116.2 113 
2004Q3 103.5 113.4 104.5 108.7 106.9 119.2 106.9 101.9 104.4 114.9 117.7 110.1 
2004Q4 106.3 109.5 103.5 108.8 107.3 112 104.1 101.3 104.1 110.4 115.2 113.4 
2005Q1 106.5 106.5 106.5 101.5 107.7 109.3 107.2 99.2 104.8 119.1 111.6 113.8 
2005Q2 106.5 106.1 106 109.3 112.2 107.6 108.7 102.1 104 111.6 107.9 112.5 
2005Q3 106.3 105.7 104.3 107.9 113.5 107 108.3 104.2 104.2 106.5 107.7 107.4 
2005Q4 107.4 105.6 105.4 103.7 103.7 106.1 112.4 102.2 105.4 101.7 105 105.4 
2006Q1 107.1 105.8 106.1 101.9 112.4 106.6 114.9 101.8 103 98.7 104.8 102 
2006Q2 108.7 106.7 104.5 104.1 111.3 106.6 111.9 101.5 103.4 97.2 104.1 102.8 
2006Q3 109.7 107.1 103 105.1 108.3 106.3 108.5 101.2 103.4 98.9 103.8 102.6 
2006Q4 109.5 107.2 103.8 104.5 105.8 106.8 108.2 102.1 103.2 99.9 104.7 103.3 
2007Q1 109 106.9 105 103.7 104.4 106.4 107.2 102.9 105 100.2 105.5 102.9 
2007Q2 109.5 106.7 107.5 104 104.1 105.2 106.9 104.7 106.3 100.8 107 104.1 





2007Q4 115 107.3 110 104.9 104.6 107.7 107.6 110.3 110.6 108.7 107.3 113.3 
2008Q1 113.9 106.9 109.9 105.1 100.6 109 106.8 111.3 109.4 109.8 106.9 113.7 
2008Q2 112.2 107.2 108.1 106.3 101.3 105.9 105.6 108.6 107.3 109.3 105 112.7 
2008Q3 108.7 106 104.4 106.5 102 102.8 104.4 104.8 105.6 105.3 101.8 106.9 
2008Q4 103 103.2 100.6 105 101.1 100.6 102.5 103.2 103.1 99.3 97.3 101 
2009Q1 99.3 101.6 96.4 102.3 99.6 101.2 100.2 101.2 101.9 97.8 96.5 99.6 
2009Q2 99.1 101.1 94.3 100.2 99.2 101.7 99.5 100 102.1 98.6 97.3 99.2 
2009Q3 101.1 103.4 95.5 99.5 99.7 101.4 101.5 101 102.7 101.2 101.7 103 
2009Q4 105.9 106.7 99.4 100.5 101.9 101.5 103.6 102.2 104.4 105.6 108.3 109.2 
2010Q1 111.1 110.1 105.2 103.0 106.6 103.0 106.8 105.2 106.1 109.5 110.9 113.3 
2010Q2 114.2 111.6 109.5 104.4 109.4 106.0 110.0 107.4 107.4 110.2 110.9 115.7 
2010Q3 111.8 108.7 109.9 103.8 108.8 107.0 107.7 105.1 106.9 106.1 105.9 109.6 
2010Q4 108.8 106.6 108.4 103.0 107.7 108.1 106.9 104.3 106.3 103.2 102.5 102.7 
HPI (Link Index) for 35 cities from 1998Q1 to 2010Q4 (con.) 
















1998Q1 100.7 101.4 98.1 102.5 99.5 101.6 97.9 108.5 105.2 103.7 102.9 102.9 
1998Q2 99.7 104.6 104.6 101.4 100.8 101.6 101.1 112.5 102.6 103.6 97.7 100.8 
1998Q3 99.9 102.1 100.9 98.6 101.5 101.1 100.5 103.4 104.4 102.2 99.2 96.3 
1998Q4 98.6 98.8 100.8 99.8 100.2 101.5 100.9 102.1 98.7 102.2 96.9 98.3 
1999Q1 99.6 98.8 101.5 99.7 103.9 101.6 101.7 99.6 95 97.4 94.4 98.2 
1999Q2 97.5 99.6 101.4 99.6 99.3 101 103.1 101.2 99.1 99.2 91.6 98 
1999Q3 102.4 99.1 99.3 100.8 102.3 102 102.8 100.9 99.4 99.4 98.7 96.5 
1999Q4 102.9 99.9 97.3 101.9 100.9 101.3 107.1 102.7 101 97.9 95.8 98.5 
2000Q1 103.3 100.5 102.7 98.1 102.5 101.6 99.3 100.8 100.7 97.7 95.7 98.7 
2000Q2 106.9 100.3 100 100.2 103.3 103 102.8 101.3 100.3 99.8 96.7 99.4 
2000Q3 105.2 99.5 99.4 100.7 104.4 104.2 103.7 97.5 101.1 100.4 98.2 99.5 
2000Q4 106.5 99.8 99.2 101.6 102.4 102.5 103.3 98.5 103.1 100.3 98.7 99.2 
2001Q1 104.7 100.3 99.8 100.5 103.7 101.6 109.3 100.6 111.2 102.3 100 98.5 
2001Q2 106.5 100.4 100.9 100.3 102.5 102 103.7 100.2 111.7 101.7 100.5 102.2 
2001Q3 108.5 100.8 100.3 104.1 105.2 102 101 100.7 100.9 102.3 100.4 102.1 
2001Q4 109 100.4 102.8 103.9 104.5 101.6 102.2 100.8 100.6 102.2 100.3 101.2 
2002Q1 112.5 104 99.9 102.2 109.3 101.5 104.7 101.3 101.2 101.2 101.2 100.5 
2002Q2 115.9 104.4 100.8 102.9 113 101.2 105.4 101.5 101.5 101.6 98.8 100.8 
2002Q3 119.2 103.5 101.7 104.4 109.5 104.4 108.7 101.6 103.3 101.5 98.9 100.4 
2002Q4 117.8 103.9 102 102.6 114.6 103 111.5 103.3 101.6 100.1 99.6 99.9 
2003Q1 120.6 105.5 101.6 102.3 105.9 101.6 111.4 102 104.8 99.8 100.8 101.8 
2003Q2 116.4 104.9 101.3 102.4 103.1 102.3 113.4 102.3 103.5 100.2 99.4 101 
2003Q3 116.1 103 100.6 102.4 103.9 103.2 115.9 101.2 102.4 100.7 99.2 102.4 
2003Q4 113.4 102.9 101 104 106.1 105.2 117.6 102.3 104.5 101.2 97.8 103.5 
2004Q1 111.9 108.5 102.4 108 106.9 110.2 116 102 105.9 101.2 101.3 103.4 
2004Q2 119.9 107.2 103.1 104.8 105.7 107.6 112.5 103.1 110 104.9 102 103.7 





2004Q4 111.1 105.2 104.9 109.7 108.5 113.7 119.8 106.2 107.8 103.3 105 106.8 
2005Q1 111.6 109.7 106 112.4 108.6 108.7 111.7 107.4 111.2 101 104.8 106.3 
2005Q2 106.2 104.7 104 109.5 110.3 106.7 112.4 107.6 106.6 101.7 105.9 105.9 
2005Q3 104.7 106.4 104.2 104.7 108.4 107.7 111.1 107.5 105.7 104.2 104.3 106.5 
2005Q4 102.6 103.8 103.4 105.4 105.9 107.1 108.5 105.4 103.8 104.4 103.6 110.2 
2006Q1 102.6 102.3 104.1 105.2 105.7 105.2 107.8 105.9 103.1 104.5 104.5 110.2 
2006Q2 101.7 101.7 107.7 107 106.7 103.8 107 105.3 103.2 105.7 107.1 114.4 
2006Q3 102.1 100.6 107 108 106.7 104 106.8 105.1 103 105.1 106.2 112.8 
2006Q4 102.2 100.4 107.8 107.6 105.8 104.1 106.1 106.5 102.8 105.9 107 111.8 
2007Q1 104.5 100.4 107.2 107.2 106.1 103.8 105.2 106.4 103.2 106 108 112.6 
2007Q2 106 100.9 106.1 106.3 106.7 104.8 105.9 106.3 104.3 106.5 105.7 114.3 
2007Q3 109.4 101.4 106.3 106.8 106.9 105.4 107 106.5 105.6 108.1 106.5 120.2 
2007Q4 114.5 104.4 107.5 107.6 107.6 106.6 108.1 106.1 107.7 112.9 106.3 118.2 
2008Q1 114.6 110.5 107.2 106.5 107.7 107.4 106.6 105.8 108.2 111.5 103.1 111 
2008Q2 112 110.9 105.1 105 105.5 108.3 106.3 103.9 106.5 108.9 102 102.5 
2008Q3 108.3 109.2 102.7 102.3 101.9 108.2 105.1 102.4 104.2 105.5 98.6 93.2 
2008Q4 101.7 102.9 100.3 97 101.5 105 102.4 101.3 100.7 100.7 95.6 85.8 
2009Q1 100.7 99.2 99.6 95.6 100.1 101.9 99.2 101.3 98.2 99.3 95.7 85.1 
2009Q2 101.9 98.8 99.8 97.1 100.2 100.8 98.8 101.5 97.8 99.3 96.7 94.7 
2009Q3 104.6 99.9 100.4 100.7 102.1 101 100.3 102.2 98.6 100.6 101.4 106.8 
2009Q4 106.6 102.1 101 105.7 104 103.1 102.8 103.2 100.9 105 106.9 116.4 
2010Q1 108.0 107.0 103.4 109.1 107.9 105.8 106.9 105.3 105.0 110.2 110.7 120.5 
2010Q2 106.9 110.9 103.9 107.8 109.3 106.5 108.1 108.0 108.4 111.2 107.6 114.2 
2010Q3 105.2 108.2 103.0 103.6 105.9 106.4 106.3 108.0 108.4 108.7 102.9 104.5 
2010Q4 102.6 108.7 102.9 102.4 106.2 105.4 106.3 108.8 107.6 107.7 100.5 102.2 


















1998Q1 101.5 98.7 110.6 102.9 110.1 100.6 99.2 97.1 99.7 105.6 100.5 101.3 
1998Q2 101.1 99 106.7 104.4 106.7 100.1 100.9 97.7 101.4 110.2 104.5 102.1 
1998Q3 95.6 102.1 104.7 105.6 108.7 100.5 101.1 100 103.5 115.4 104.7 101.3 
1998Q4 95.9 106 103.7 105.3 106.7 104.3 100.6 99.1 101.4 113.5 102.8 101 
1999Q1 89.4 96.2 103.7 105.6 103 102.2 99.4 103.8 100.2 109.8 103.3 99.7 
1999Q2 101.2 98.6 103.7 105.8 103.6 105.2 99.8 101.2 101.6 109.4 109.5 99.6 
1999Q3 98.7 96.2 102.9 106 103.9 101.3 100.9 99.8 102.1 100.9 100.1 99.9 
1999Q4 102.4 92.5 102.7 95.9 102.5 100.6 101.3 101.2 100 104.3 101.2 100.7 
2000Q1 103.5 98.2 102 100.5 103.8 99.9 101.5 100.1 102 99.1 101.8 100.7 
2000Q2 100.1 99.8 101 100.7 103.5 99.1 101.6 99.7 100.9 101.8 102.4 101.1 
2000Q3 99.4 98.8 101.4 103.9 102.8 101.5 101.2 102.1 99.5 104.4 102.6 101.5 
2000Q4 94.2 100.9 102.7 100 105.3 100.3 100.9 100.1 101.8 103.4 102.7 101.2 
2001Q1 101.5 99.1 99.2 101.5 98.8 101.5 101.2 103.4 100.3 103.5 101.2 101.9 
2001Q2 102.2 99.3 100.7 99.2 99 102.2 101.6 103.4 99.8 104.6 101.2 102.5 





2001Q4 100.5 100.4 101.3 101.7 100.1 100.4 101.3 101.9 100.4 104.7 100.7 101.8 
2002Q1 100.6 100.8 101.5 101.8 100.5 101 101 104.5 102.3 102.8 98.7 104.3 
2002Q2 102.7 104.5 101.4 100 102 98.9 101.1 102.5 101.6 103.4 99.3 102.8 
2002Q3 102.3 100.2 101.8 102 102.5 99.5 101.1 104.6 103.2 104.8 99.7 104 
2002Q4 104.2 102.1 101.4 101.2 100.4 103.5 101.2 105.4 101.7 103.5 99.1 103.5 
2003Q1 101.8 103.7 106.8 101.3 100.6 99.3 101.4 100.5 102.3 102.5 99.6 104.8 
2003Q2 101.7 100.7 105.5 101.8 101.6 99.3 101.1 100 101.5 102.1 99.9 105 
2003Q3 103 102 101.3 102.5 101.3 97.3 101.4 100.4 101.3 101.4 99.8 104.1 
2003Q4 101.7 104.3 110.9 105.9 101.5 100.3 101.7 106.1 102.5 102.2 100.4 105.1 
2004Q1 102.6 108.9 114.5 105.5 102.1 100.1 104.5 104.4 104.5 103.9 100.3 107.7 
2004Q2 106 106.6 115 106.4 103 100.9 104 108.6 104.9 103.9 101 110.4 
2004Q3 107.1 105.1 115.6 108.3 102.3 104.6 106.6 113.1 103.3 104.8 101 109.9 
2004Q4 107.1 102.8 110.3 111.4 102.8 103.4 104.9 108.7 103.4 104.8 100.4 110.8 
2005Q1 107.6 104 107.8 112.5 102.9 104.6 104.7 106 103.3 103 101.9 109.8 
2005Q2 102 104.2 107.6 110.7 102.8 102.4 103.7 105.1 104.1 102.7 101 108 
2005Q3 104.6 102.5 108.1 101.6 103 106.9 104.2 105.4 102.5 102.3 100.7 106.1 
2005Q4 105.5 99.4 107.8 103.1 101.6 106.5 104.5 105.7 103.5 102.6 100.1 106.5 
2006Q1 104.9 101.7 103.5 108 104.2 102.1 103.3 105.6 102.4 101.9 100.4 105.5 
2006Q2 104.1 102.7 102.7 106.2 103.7 102.1 103.5 104.1 104 102.2 101.1 105.7 
2006Q3 103.8 104.1 102.1 107.3 104.9 100.5 103.6 104.5 102.2 102.4 101.3 105.5 
2006Q4 103.6 102.7 103.7 107 104.8 100.6 103.9 104.6 102.6 102.8 102 105.3 
2007Q1 104.3 103.3 103.3 106.7 106.6 102.2 104.4 104.5 102.7 102.5 102.1 105.6 
2007Q2 105.7 104.1 104 106.7 106.5 103.3 105.1 104.6 103 103.2 104 106.3 
2007Q3 108.4 108.6 108.3 107.6 106.6 103.5 106 105.6 103.6 104.1 112.3 108.2 
2007Q4 111.9 110.3 112.1 109.3 107.9 105 110.1 109.2 105.7 105.9 117.7 110.2 
2008Q1 114.5 112.1 113.1 107.9 110.9 105.8 111.1 113 109 109.4 124.5 111 
2008Q2 110.8 112.4 111.2 105.1 106.4 106.1 110.2 111 108.2 113.1 120.9 109.2 
2008Q3 105.9 110.8 105 102.2 105 101.3 108.2 110.2 107.9 113.9 111.5 105.3 
2008Q4 101.4 106.5 95.9 98.4 104.1 99.6 102.7 104.9 104.9 110.7 105.1 100.5 
2009Q1 100.2 101.3 98.4 97.5 103 97.4 100 103.7 104.5 107 102.4 98.9 
2009Q2 99.3 99.4 99.4 99.1 103 97.6 98.6 104.5 104.1 103.7 101.5 99.5 
2009Q3 99.9 101.6 101.4 101.1 103.4 102.5 99.4 103.6 104 105.1 101.6 101.9 
2009Q4 102.9 106.8 105.2 103.9 104.8 106.6 104 104.6 104.9 108.4 104.2 105.8 
2010Q1 106.3 145.4 110.3 105.7 110.0 109.4 111.2 105.3 106.1 113.8 106.8 110.6 
2010Q2 107.3 152.2 111.1 105.8 109.3 107.4 113.7 106.5 107.2 114.5 107.5 112.2 
2010Q3 105.2 146.3 109.5 104.0 107.7 105.1 113.5 106.6 106.7 110.6 107.4 109.6 










ADF Test by SIC 



























1 Beijing -1.029318 0.9304 5 -1.464999 0.8287 -1.452419 0.302276*** -2.962352 0.0455** 4 - - 
2 Changchun -1.343898 0.8653 4 - - -1.559360 0.188310** -3.296185 0.0202** 3 - - 
3 Changsha -0.803546 0.9583 5 -1.675246 0.7478 -1.170187 0.301367*** -3.887771 0.0199** 4 - - 
4 Chengdu -1.906791 0.6365 4 - - -1.693224 0.199176** -2.856344 0.0577* 3 - - 
5 Chongqing -2.774470 0.2131 4 - - -2.601997 0.186601** -9.659912 0.0000*** 1 - - 
6 Dalian -1.822337 0.6792 4 - - -1.204748 0.279224*** -2.215614 0.2034 3 -15.28451 0.0000*** 
7 Fuzhou -1.619090 0.7715 4 - - -1.062191 0.265244*** -2.752513 0.0724* 3 - - 
8 Guangzhou -2.446602 0.3523 5 -2.949921 0.1562 -1.956520 0.269723*** -2.513278 0.0129** 4 - - 
9 Guiyang -0.815780 0.9572 4 - - -1.417182 0.243950*** -2.893129 0.0531* 3 - - 
10 Haikou 1.744813 1.0000 7 0.847784 0.9997 -0.839884 0.259771*** -4.311433 0.0067** 6 - - 
11 Hangzhou -2.438818 0.3560 5 -3.357816 0.0687 -2.149520 0.159258** -4.872118 0.0002*** 4 - - 
12 Harbin -1.286141 0.8802 4 - - -0.615669 0.304541*** -3.871160 0.0206** 3 - - 
13 Hefei -2.092863 0.5372 4 - - -1.262627 0.205380** -3.897092 0.0194** 4 - - 
14 Hohhot -2.226056 0.4654 4 - - -1.891655 0.204626** -1.831411 0.0624* 3 - - 
15 Jinan -2.445689 0.3528 4 - - -1.697986 0.248797*** -2.221130 0.2015 3 -33.18464 0.0001*** 
16 Kunming -1.232432 0.8928 4 - - -1.266955 0.265244*** -3.092985 0.0334** 3 - - 
17 Lanzhou -1.444063 0.8356 4 - - -0.564178 0.298095*** -3.631871 0.0369** 3 - - 
18 Nanchang -2.953651 0.1545 0 -2.295859 0.4285 -1.519359 0.159233** -10.28841 0.0000*** 0 - - 
19 Nanjing -3.291746 0.0792 4 - - -2.630463 0.154371** -6.983502 0.0000*** 0 - - 
20 Nanning -3.131748 0.1101 4 - - -1.070379 0.281038*** -3.298903 0.0201** 3 - - 
21 Ningbo -2.580518 0.2905 4 - - -2.527444 0.1333827* -1.833218 0.3607 3 -12.96781 0.0000*** 
22 Qingdao -2.012686 0.5805 4 - - -1.818012 0.156452** -2.322951 0.1689 3 -23.10393 0.0001*** 
23 Shanghai -3.073971 0.1234 4 - - -2.666208 0.137716* -1.837392 0.0634* 4 - - 
24 Shenyang -2.986865 0.1459 4 - - -2.399959 0.177940** -1.886688 0.3358 3 -21.38357 0.0001*** 





26 Shijiazhuang -1.723282 0.7261 5 -2.955336 0.1547 -2.729346 0.196307** -5.024282 0.0001*** 4 - - 
27 Taiyuan -1.982907 0.5965 4 - - -1.187578 0.254852*** -3.321254 0.0190** 3 - - 
28 Tianjin -2.335285 0.4079 5 -2.235837 0.4602 -1.515111 0.264810*** -3.911556 0.0187** 4 - - 
29 Urumchi -1.457822 0.8320 0 -1.429980 0.8400 -1.631389 0.244153*** -10.49693 0.0000*** 0 - - 
30 Wuhan -3.401811 0.0624 4 - - -3.152068* 0.150755** -2.775462 0.0689* 3 - - 
31 Xi'an -0.671596 0.9696 6 -0.848729 0.9538 -0.802348 0.305233*** -3.208802 0.0253** 4 - - 
32 Xiamen -2.904259 0.1699 4 - - -1.654709 0.223252*** -3.041794 0.0378** 4 - - 
33 Xining 0.240907 0.9978 4 - - -0.504942 0.301826*** -3.882154 0.0200** 3 - - 
34 Yinchuan -1.446344 0.8337 8 -1.642773 0.7617 -1.899340 0.179522** -3.281620 0.0811* 4 - - 
35 Zhengzhou -1.992681 0.5912 4 - - -1.966402 0.261747*** -2.083420 0.2520 3 -12.91683 0.0000*** 
Notes: 
(1) The null of ADF and DF-GLS tests is ‘unit root’, the null of KPSS test is ‘stationary’. 
(2) All the tests choose the model with ‘intercept and trend’. 
(3) The ADF tests take the lag by both SIC and fixed lag 4. 
(4) The DF-GLS and KPSS tests take the fixed lag 4. 
(5) The ADF tests for 1st difference LHP take the lag by SIC. 
(6) The ADF tests for 2nd difference LHP take the lag by SIC, but SIC choose lag 2 for all of them. 









Appendix 4.3: Univariate Unit Root Tests of LHP without Trend  
City Code City 
ADF test DF-GLS test  KPSS test 
t-Statistic Prob. t-Statistic LM-Stat. 
1 Beijing 0.615411 0.9889 0.207294 1.066271*** 
2 Changchun 0.209322 0.9707 0.672957 1.066974*** 
3 Changsha 1.404123 0.9988 0.756016 1.083967*** 
4 Chengdu -0.193875 0.9323 0.330354 1.174042*** 
5 Chongqing 0.624070 0.9891 1.143201 1.200336*** 
6 Dalian 0.667103 0.9902 0.374778 1.072810*** 
7 Fuzhou 0.293730 0.9758 0.079164 1.116677*** 
8 Guangzhou -0.896452 0.7815 1.002222 0.792791*** 
9 Guiyang 1.697021 0.9995 1.862717* 1.154808*** 
10 Haikou 2.08535 0.9999 0.881753 0.947727*** 
11 Hangzhou -0.269749 0.9219 -0.232993 1.213994*** 
12 Harbin 1.813928 0.9997 0.490600 1.126852*** 
13 Hefei 0.999838 0.9960 1.032860 1.170507*** 
14 Hohhot 0.660646 0.9901 1.027801 1.175000*** 
15 Jinan 0.389525 0.9806 0.171446 1.197820*** 
16 Kunming 1.063798 0.9967 1.014886 1.132102*** 
17 Lanzhou 1.718117 0.9996 0.694580 1.162698*** 
18 Nanchang 0.001929 0.9538 0.193682 1.209980*** 
19 Nanjing -0.069665 0.9470 0.293022 1.190734*** 
20 Nanning 0.939073 0.9953 0.558555 1.096690*** 
21 Ningbo -1.219409 0.6592 -0.836428 1.192148*** 
22 Qingdao -0.732278 0.8291 -0.384173 1.190695*** 
23 Shanghai -1.118395 0.7017 -0.834409 1.115575*** 
24 Shenyang -0.072735 0.9467 0.234283 1.189761*** 
25 Shenzhen -0.042656 0.9498 -0.006606 1.050406*** 
26 Shijiazhuang 0.085377 0.9615 0.578062 1.190002*** 
27 Taiyuan 0.827668 0.9936 0.843739 1.176514*** 
28 Tianjin 0.368445 0.9796 -0.003897 1.154141*** 
29 Urumchi 0.116227 0.9640 0.107566 0.975830*** 
30 Wuhan 0.411986 0.9816 1.037489 1.214371*** 
31 Xi'an 1.874882 0.9997 1.009798 1.141473*** 
32 Xiamen 0.040557 0.9577 0.032718 1.160516*** 
33 Xining 2.760561 1.0000 0.775389 1.153168*** 
34 Yinchuan 0.741594 0.9920 1.060464 1.170708*** 
35 Zhengzhou 1.927041 0.9998 2.033935** 1.178520*** 
Notes: 
(1) The null of ADF and DF-GLS tests is ‘unit root’, the null of KPSS test is ‘stationary’. 
(2) All the tests choose the model with ‘intercept and trend’. 
(2) All unit root tests take the lags of 4. 







Appendix 4.4: Pairwise Engle-Granger Cointegration Tests for HPI 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 
1 - × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × 
2 × - × × × × × × ** × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × ** × × × × × × 
3 × × - × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × 
4 × × × - × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × 
5 × × × × - × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × 
6 × × × × × - *** × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × 
7 × × × × × *** - × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × * × × × 
8 × × × × × × × - × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × 
9 × ** × × × × × × - × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × 
10 × × × × × × × × × - × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × 
11 × × × × × × × × × × - × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × 
12 × × × × × × × × * × × - × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × 
13 × × × × × × × × × × × × - × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × 
14 × × × × × × × × × × × × × - ** × × × × × × × × × × × *** × × × × × × × × 
15 × × × × × × × × × × × × × * - × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × 
16 × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × - × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × 
17 × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × - × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × 
18 × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × - × × × * × × × × × × × × × × × × × 
19 × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × - × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × 
20 × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × - × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × 
21 × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × - × × × × × × × × × × × × × × 
22 × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × * × × × - × × × × × × × × × × × × × 
23 × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × - × × × × × × × × × × × × 
24 × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × - × × × × × × × × × × × 
25 × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × - × × × × × × × × × * 
26 × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × - × × × × × × × × × 
27 × × × × × × × × × × × × × *** × × × × × × × × × × × × - × × × × × × × × 





29 × ** × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × - × × × × × × 
30 × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × - × × × × × 
31 × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × - × * × × 
32 × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × - × × × 
33 × * × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × - * × 
34 × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × - × 
35 × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × * × × × × × × × × × - 
Notes: 
1) Pairwise Engle-Granger Cointegration Tests: lag specification by SIC. 
2) The null hypothesis is ‘series are not cointegrated’. 
3) The trend specification is ‘linear trend’. 
4) Mackinnon (1996) p-values. 
5) If there is cointegration between two cities, it means ‘city in the row is cointegrated with city in the column’. 
6) When run the Pairwise Engle-Granger Cointegration test, add seasonal dummy variables (s1 s2 s3) into the regression. 
7) ‘***, **, and *’ indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively, which means ‘***, ** and *’ reject the null hypothesis at 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively; ‘×’ indicates 
















Appendix 4.5: Pairwise Granger Causality Tests for First Difference of LHP 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 
1
8 
19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 
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1) Pairwise Granger Causality Tests take 2 lags. 
2) The null hypothesis is ‘the city in the row does not cause the cities in the column’. 























Appendix 4.6: Pairwise Granger Causality Tests for Fourth Difference of LHP 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 
2
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Notes: 
1) Pairwise Granger Causality Tests take 2 lags. 
2) The null hypothesis is ‘the city in the row does not cause the cities in the column’. 







Chapter 5—Housing and Life Satisfaction in Urban China 
5.1 Introduction 
Housing is considered to be one of the basic requirements for daily living and the single 
biggest cost factor for most individuals and households. As Florida et al. (2013) claimed, 
people might expect to be happier in places where housing is more available, less expensive 
and more affordable. This chapter is going to examine how housing conditions affect people’s 
life satisfaction
77
 in urban China, especially how housing conditions affect housing 
satisfaction and overall happiness. The existing literature on subjective wellbeing in China is 
thin and mainly focuses on the determinants of general happiness rather than the effects of 
specific housing conditions.  
This chapter will use the 2006 Chinese General Social Survey data and most common method 
of ‘Ordered Probit Model’ to estimate the effects of housing determinants on individual 
subjective wellbeing. Three models are included: the first one tests the effects of these 
determinants of people’s housing satisfaction; the second one is to estimate the effects of 
these determinants on householders’ overall happiness; and the last model explains the 
individual overall happiness based on the same independent variables, but including the 
housing satisfaction measures as explanatory variables as well.  
The robustness checks are employed, by dropping some factors with high correlation 
coefficients and transforming the ordered choice dependent variable into a 0-1 binary variable. 
In order to test the different effects of housing conditions on different groups of people, we 
will divide the full sample into two groups by age (young/old) and income (rich/poor). The 
Chow test will be used to detect the significance of our divisions by age and income. 
Furthermore, both separate and interaction effects of age groups and income groups will be 
estimated by dummy variables in the overall regression.  
Additionally, housing satisfaction may be correlated with the error term in the life satisfaction 
equation, because some people may be more easily ‘satisfied’ with both their life and their 
house. Thus, a Ramsey RESET procedure is applied to rescue the latent problem of 
misspecification by using the predicted value of housing satisfaction in the overall happiness 
function. Another original innovation is to add the money equivalent effects of housing 
                                                 





conditions on overall happiness, where we will concentrate on the impact of one more square 
meter of a house on life satisfaction controlling for a certain level of annual income.   
Our findings reveal that the housing characteristics affect different groups of people 
differently. Generally speaking, the housing-related conditions impact individual’s housing 
satisfaction more directly and significantly than overall life satisfaction. But the individual 
features affect people’s general happiness more significantly than housing satisfaction. 
Meanwhile, the housing satisfaction has played an important role in general happiness. The 
money equivalent analysis supports the view that the poorer the householders, the easier it is 
to increase their happiness.               
There are six sections in this chapter: the first two are the ‘Introduction’ and the ‘Literature 
Review’ as usual; the third part on ‘Data Sources and Date Description’ describes the 
questionnaires of the survey and the primary statistics of the dataset; the following section is 
‘Methodology’, which explains the various estimations and tests; the ‘Empirical Results’ part 
comprehensively exhibits our innovative findings; the last section is the ‘Conclusion’ to 
summarise this chapter. 
5.2 Literature Review 
The empirical studies on the all-pervasive determinants of subjective well-being/life 
satisfaction/happiness have experienced a worldwide increase over recent years, such as 
Oswald (1997) and Guven & Sorensen (2012) on the United States; Ferrer-i-Carbonell and 
Gowdy (2007) on the United Kingdom; Saris (2001) on Russia; Abbott & Sapsford (2006) on 
post-Soviet Russia and Ukraine; Cattaneo et al. (2009) on Mexico; Ambrey & Fleming (2013) 
on Australia; Posel & Casale (2011) on South Africa; Borooah (2006) on Northern Ireland; 
Camfield et al. (2009) and Zanuzdana et al. (2013) on Bangladesh; Cunado & Gracia (2012 
& 2013) on Spain; Frey & Stutzer (2000) and Kahlmeier et al. (2001) on Switzerland; Groot 
& Van Den Brink (2002) on Netherlands; Oswald et al. (2003), Dittmann & Goebel (2010), 
and Nakazato et al. (2011) on Germany; Dumludag (2012) on Turkey; Noor et al. (2012) on 
Malaysia; Gray et al. (2013) on Thailand; Elsinga & Hoekstra (2005), Diaz-Serrano (2009), 






Table 5.1: Literature on Different Categories of Determinants of Life Satisfaction 
Determinants Literaures 
Economic factors (income, 
relative income, GDP, savings, 
debt, employment and so on) 
Oswald (1997) on US, Abbott and Sapsford (2006) on post-soviet 
Russia and Ukraine, Camfield et al. (2009) on Bangladesh, 
Jagodzinski (2010) on Asia and Europe, Posel and Casale (2011) 
on South Africa, Dumludag (2012) on Turkey, Guven and 
Sorensen (2012) on US, Noor et al. (2012) on Malaysia 
Demographic factors (age, 
gender, education, marital 
status, health and so on) 
Oswald (1997) on US, Groot and Van Den Brink (2002) on 
Netherlands, Abbott and Sapsford (2006) on post-soviet Russia and 
Ukraine, Borooah (2006) on Northern Ireland, Cunado and Gracia 
(2012) on Spain, Zanuzdana et al. (2013) on Bangladesh, Ambrey 
and Fleming (2013) on Australia. 
Social Factors (social class, 
family or non-family 
relations, institutional trust, 
democracy factors and so on) 
Frey and Stutzer (2000) on Switzerland, Hudson (2006) on 
European countries, Guven and Sorensen (2012) on US, Noor et 
al. (2012) on Malaysia, Gray et al. (2013) on Thailand 
Cultural and religious factors 




and so on) 
Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Gowdy (2007) on UK, Dittmann and 
Goebel (2010) on Germany, Cunado and Gracia (2013) on Spain 
 
Housing related factors 
(housing conditions, housing 
qualities, homeownership and 
so on) 
Kahlmeier et al. (2001) on Switzerland, Oswald et al. (2003) and 
Nakazato et al. (2011) on Germany, Elsinga & Hoekstra (2005) 
and Diaz-Serrano (2009) on Europe, Cattaneo et al. (2009) on 
Mexico, Clapham (2010) 
This literature has paid attention to different aspects of factors associated with life satisfaction. 
According to the review on the factors affecting subjective well-being by Dolan et al. (2008), 
Table 5.1 presents several major categories of determinants commonly studied by previous 
scholars. More specifically, there are some studies presented focusing on the housing related 
factors of life satisfaction. For example, Kahlmeier et al. (2001) use the example of the north 
western region of Switzerland to indicate that an improvement in the perceived housing 
environmental quality significantly contributes to an increase in subjective well-being; 
Oswald et al. (2003) states housing/life conditions play an important role for elderly people 
in two rural regions of Germany; Elsinga & Hoekstra (2005) and Diaz-Serrano (2009) 
demonstrate the effects of homeownership on life satisfaction particularly on housing 
satisfaction; Cattaneo et al. (2009) specifically elaborate on the negative impact of dirty 
floors on child health and adult happiness; Clapham (2010) suggests the importance of 
housing policy in improving the self-esteem and positive identity of residents; Nakazato et al. 
(2011) illustrate the influence of changes in living conditions on subjective well-being in 
Germany. 
Because the empirical studies on life satisfaction adopt large survey data in terms of ordered 





different target determinants associated with subjective well-being, the most common model 
is an Ordered Probit Regression (Dolan et al., 2008). The general form is: )(hrSWBreport  , 
where the self-reported SWB, often a response to a single life satisfaction or overall 
happiness question, is some reporting function (r) of the true SWB (h), and the true SWB is 
determined by a range of social, economic and environmental factors (X’s). This is usually 
modelled empirically as an additive function: 
itititit XXSWB   2211                                                                                     (5.1) 
where individual differences in reporting are captured within the error term. 
Although there is now a large literature on the linkages between housing and happiness, most 
studies have focused on developed countries. The literature on subjective well-being in China 
is rather thin. Contemporary China is an interesting case study for this topic, since it has 
experienced rapid and sustained economic growth for the last three decades, as has the 
Chinese housing market. Housing is an item on which Chinese people spend a great deal of 
thought, effort, and financial resources due to the long tradition of preferring to live and work 
in peace and contentment (‘An Ju Le Ye’ in Chinese). In recent years, there has been a rising 
concern over the issue of life satisfaction in China (Ji, Xu, and Rich, 2002; Fleischer, 2007; 
Knight and Gunatilaka, 2010 & 2011; Appleton and Song, 2008; Smyth et al., 2008 & 2010; 
Knight et al., 2009; Nielsen et al., 2010; Shek, 2010 & 2011; Chyi and Mao, 2012; Davey 
and Rato, 2011; Wang and VanderWeele, 2011; and Hu, 2013). However, only very few 
studies partially include or focus on the relationship between housing and happiness (Knight 
and Gunatilaka (2010 & 2011), Knight et al. (2009) include the comparable variable of 
‘living standards’; Chyi and Mao (2012) use ‘number of rooms’ as one of the explanatory 
variables; Hu (2013) pays attention to homeownership). 
Ji, Xu and Rich (2002) use as their sample the 1993 China Housing Survey in Shanghai and 
Tianjin to explore the determinants of family life satisfaction among married people in urban 
China. They draw the following connected network to forecast the factors affecting family 
happiness (Figure 5.1). While in each section of the determinants, they include more specific 
explanatory variables as shown in Table 5.2. Take the section of ‘Individual and Family 
Resources’ for example, the factors include health status, family income, satisfaction with 





and satisfaction with job. 
They use a general OLS regression model:   XY , where Y is a vector of observations 
on the dependent variable, family life satisfaction; X is a matrix containing observations on 
the independent variables; β is a vector of regression coefficients; and ε is an error vector. 
They find that the family relationship, such as co-residence and frequent contact with parents, 
and satisfaction with relative relations, is a significant determinant of family life satisfaction, 
indicating Chinese filial norms that favor the family over individualism. Additionally, the 
formal and informal ties are important for predicating family life satisfaction in urban China, 
such as respondents linked with the Party, colleagues, supervisors, and especially unit 
managers. 
 
(Source: Ji, Xu and Rich, 2002, Figure 1, p.171) 
Figure 5.1: Predicting Family Life Satisfaction in Reforming Urban China: An Integrated 
Model 
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Source: Ji, Xu and Rich (2002) 
Knight and Gunatilaka (2010), and Knight et al. (2009) use the 2002 Chinese Household 
Income Project (CHIP) data to comprehensively estimate the determinants of subjective well-
being of rural-urban migrants and the rural population in China respectively. In 2011, Knight 
and Gunatilaka further studied the effects of economic growth on happiness in China using 
the same household survey. Their basic models are of the form  
iii XW                                                                                                                      (5.2) 
where Wi is a cardinal measure of happiness and Xi is a vector of explanatory variables, or of 
the form  
iii XW  
*
                                                                                                                 (5.3) 
where Wi
*
 is a latent variable and what is observed are different categories of an ordered 
categorical variable. Equation 6.2 is estimated by OLS and Equation 6.3 uses an ordered 
probit estimator. However, in line with the methodological analysis by Ferrer-i-Carbonell and 
Frijters (2004), no substantive differences were found between the results using the two 
estimations. Table 5.3 summarises the explanatory variables involved and findings of their 
work respectively. It can be seen that they not only use the same database but also adopt the 
same common models—OLS estimation and Ordered Probit estimation—involving the study 
of life satisfaction. However, for different target population groups, they select relatively 
distinct explanatory variables. For instance, for the group of rural-urban migrants, Knight and 
Gunatilaka (2010) use some harshness of city life variables, such as number of relatives and 
friends in city, child still in village, urban living happier, house area per capita, living in own 
house and so on; for the group of rural population, Knight et al. (2009) select some 
community and attitudinal variables, such as number of phones, satisfaction with clinic, hilly 





group of urban people, Knight and Gunatilaka (2011) adopt some insecurity variables, such 
as unemployed, corruption, social polarization, immorality, and so on. 
Although the above scholars (Knight and Gunatilaka, 2010 & 2011; Knight et al., 2009) 
investigate the determinants of happiness for rural-urban migrants, rural population and urban 
citizens in China respectively, they get some identical conclusions on some demographic 
factors: generally speaking, the age has a significant negative effect on individual’s happiness 
but the square of age has a positive effect; female is happier than male; married people are 
happier than divorced and widowed population; the good health status and income positively 
affect subjective well-being; also, the unemployment status makes people less satisfied with 
overall life. 
Appleton and Song (2008) also use the 2002 CHIP dataset to explore the components and 
determinants of life satisfaction in urban China including unemployment, income, marriage, 
sex, health and age; inter alia, focusing on the influence of social networks, Communist Party 
membership and political participation. They suggest that economic growth and low inflation 
contributed to people’s overall happiness. Political roles significantly raise life satisfaction as 
well. Generally, people are dissatisfied with over pollution, but this—like job insecurity—
does not appear to have a direct impact on life satisfaction in urban China. Of course, it may 
have indirect effects via health. 
However, Smyth et al. (2008) use  the 2003 China Mainland Marketing Research Company 
(CMMRC) survey in 30 Chinese cities to further analyse the linkage between the 
environment and subjective well-being in urban China and they draw the conclusions, that 
citizens in urban China report significantly lower levels of satisfaction ceteris paribus with 
high levels of atmospheric pollution, environmental disasters and traffic congestion, while 
people show a significantly higher level of subjective well-being ceteris paribus with greater 
access to parkland. 
Later, Smyth et al. (2010) and Nielsen et al. (2010) adopt the Personal Well-being Index 
(PWI) to ascertain the happiness of the urban population and off-farm migrants in China 
respectively. Both papers illustrate the statistical relationship between gender, age, income 
and well-being through the methods of item-total correlations, domain inter-correlations, 





Recently, Shek (2010, 2011) introduces the background knowledge of quality of life (QOL) 
of Chinese people in a changing world and employ a new survey—‘Chinese General Social 
Survey (CGSS)’, which is broadly used by later researchers on the study of life satisfaction in 
China. Wang and VanderWeele (2011), Chyi and Mao (2012), and Hu (2013) use the 2003, 
2005 and 2006 CGSS survey datasets to explore the determinants of happiness in different 
Chinese population groups.  
Wang and VanderWeele (2011) investigate the factors that related to the subjective well-being 
of Chinese urban residents including both common demographic variables (such as gender, 
income, marital status, employment, education, party membership) and some inventive 
factors—fashionable consumption and relative deprivation. They find that there is a U-shaped 
relationship with age; also, the married status, the higher income and the employment 
significantly increase individual’s happiness; however, the effect of education is not 
significant. 
Chyi and Mao (2012) examine the determinants of happiness of the Chinese elderly and 
particularly pay attention to whether living with their children and whether living with their 
grandchildren affects the happiness of the elderly. Their findings suggest the good health and 
living with grandchildren play an important role in elder’s life satisfaction; while living with 
the children makes old people less happy. More interestingly, people feel happier with the 
increase of age among the elder population. 
Hu (2013) explores the effect of homeownership status on individual subjective well-being 
indicators in urban China, which is the first time the relationship between homeownership 
and life satisfaction has been investigated in the setting of China. Hu’s work indicates the 
negative effect of age and the positive effect of the age’s square. In addition, he shows that 
the female gender, the married status, the higher income, the higher education and the better 
health status significantly increase urban citizens’ overall happiness. More importantly, there 
is strong evidence of the determinant of homeownership playing a crucial role in subjective 
well-being. Table 5.4 summarises the above recent work on Chinese happiness and exhibits 
their methodologies and hypothesised factors. 
To sum up, according to the existing literature on Chinese happiness studies, most researches 
include the common basic demographic factors of happiness, such as age, gender, marital 





of different Chinese groups, scholars focus on distinct comparable determinants. The 
prevalent models used in the issue of life satisfaction are either OLS regressions or Ordered 
Probit regressions; in particular instances,  instrumental variables are used to address an 






Table 5.3: The Methodologies and Findings of Knight and Gunatilaka (2010, 2011) and Knight et al. (2009)’s Works 
 Knight and Gunatilaka (2010) Knight et al. (2009) Knight and Gunatilaka (2011) 
Title of the 
paper 
Great Expectations? The Subjective 
Well Being of Rural-Urban Migrants in 
China 
Subjective Well-being and its Determinants in 
Rural China 
Does Economic Growth Raise Happiness in China? 
Models OLS, Probit, Ordered Probit and Instrumented Probit estimations 
Data The 2002 CHIP survey data 
Dependent 
variable 













Male and married 
In good health 
Education (years) 
Unemployed 
Duration of urban residence (years) 
Duration of urban residence, squared 
Conventional economic variables: 
Log of per capita household income 
2002 
Net financial assets 
Working hours 
Comparison variables: 
Expect big increase in income over 
next 5 years 
Expect small increase in income over 
next 5 years 
Expect decrease in income over next 5 
years 
Log of average per capita urban income 
in city of current residence 
Log of average rural income in 
province of origin 








Ethnic minority dummy 
Education (years) 
Unemployed 
In good health 
In a good mood 
Absolute income variables: 
Log of per capita household income 2002 
Net financial assets 
Working hours 
Comparison variables: 
Lived outside township for at least a year 
Household income much above village average 
Household income above village average 
Household income below village average 
Household income much below village average 
Current living standards better than 5 years ago 
Current living standards worse than 5 years ago 
Expect big increase in income over next 5 years 





















for at least 











In good health 
Conventional economic 
variables: 





Extent of fairness, income 
distribution in China 
Extent of fairness, income 
distribution in city 
Living standard in second 
highest quarter in city 
Living standard in third 
highest quarter in city 
Living standard in lowest 
quarter in city 
Expect big increase in income 



























Living with family members 
Number of relatives and friends in city 
Child still in village 
No heating 
Urban living happier 
House area per capita 
Living in own house 
Permanent or long-term contract work 
Temporary work 
Satisfaction with job 
Index of discrimination 
Can find another job in 2 weeks 
Can find another job in 1 month 
Can find another job in 2 months 
Can find another job in 6 months 
Need more than 6 months to find 
another job 
 
Expect decrease in income over next five years 
Gini Coefficient at county level 
Community variables: 
Phone 
Satisfaction with clinic 
Extent to which spokesman represents interests 




Degree of harmony among lineages 
Degree of harmony in village 
Agree that money is important 
Importance of family 
Importance of friends 
Importance of religion 
over next 5 years 
Expect small increase in 
income over next 5 years 
Expect decrease in income 
over next 5 years 




Corruption is most important 
social problem 
Unemployment or laid-off 
work most important problem 
Social polarization is most 
important social problem 
Immorality is most important 
social problem 
Enterprise made high profit 
Enterprise made loss 
Laid off work some time in 
2002 
Findings 
They make three basic hypotheses: 
migrants had false expectations about 
their future urban conditions, or about 
their future urban aspirations, or about 
their future selves. Their findings imply 
that certain features of migrant 
conditions make for unhappiness, and 
that their high aspirations in relation to 
achievement, influenced by reference 
groups, also make for unhappiness. 
Rural China is not a breeding ground of life 
dissatisfaction. Subjective well-being is 
influenced by relative income within the village 
and relative income over time, both in the past 
and expected in the future. Although the poverty 
of rural China, social functioning, attitudes and 
expectations are important to happiness, income 
and various proxies for ‘capabilities’ and 
‘functioning’ appear as arguments. 
They emphasise the importance of relative income, rising 
urban insecurity, rapid urbanization, and changing reference 






Table 5.4: The Summary of Recent Happiness Studies in China 
 Wang and VanderWeele (2011) Chyi and Mao (2012) Hu (2013) 
Title of the 
paper 
Empirical Research on Factors Related to the Subjective Well-Being of 
Chinese Urban Residents 
The Determinants of 
Happiness of China’s Elderly 
Population 
Homeownership and Subjective Wellbeing in 
Urban China: Does Owning a House Make 
You Happier? 
Data The 2003 CGSS survey The 2005 CGSS survey The 2006 CGSS survey 
Dependent 
variable 
The subjective well-being of Chinese urban residents 
Happiness of China’s elderly 
population 




Demographic factors (gender, age, marital status, employment, party 









Lives with children 
Lives with grandchildren 
ln(family income) 
Owns estate 










Age of eldest child 














Log of household income 
 
House-related characteristics: 
Number of rooms 
Have a living room 
Have a bathroom 
House type 
Models 
The complementary log-log link regression model (McCullagh and 
Nelder, 1989; Long, 1997): 
][)]([ 2211 mmj
T
jj XXXXxlink     
where here ‘link is chosen as complementary log–log and γj(x) is the 
cumulative probability of the for ‘jth’ category with covariate values x i.e. 
the probability of being in category j or less, θj is the threshold of the ‘jth’ 
category; X1 – Xm are the independent variable of and β1 – βm are the 
OLS estimation with 
instrument variables (the 
number of alive children of an 
elderly person, the age of the 
elderly person’s eldest child 
and its squared term) 
The ordered probit model to quantify the effect 
of homeownership status on individual 
subjective well-being: 
  XHOy ** 21  
where y denotes individual housing 
satisfaction or overall happiness, HO is the key 
explanatory variables of interest, indication 





regression coefficients of these variables. The log–log link is used so as 
to avoid issues of misinterpretation of odds ratios which arise with 
common outcomes; qualitative conclusions, however, are similar 
irrespective of how the outcome is modeled. Coefficients for the model 
are exponentiated to obtain percentage increases in the log probability of 
higher SWB. 
vector X includes the three categories of 
variables: individual characteristics, household 
characteristics and house-related features. 
Conclusion 
Higher happiness can be predicted by factors of female gender, high-
income class, marriage, employment, fashionable consumption, less sense 
of relative deprivation, and party membership. Inter alia, the sense of 
relative deprivation has the strongest explanatory power. This suggests 
that the most direct threat to current subjective well-being in urban China 
is that its residents are living in a society with dramatic change, 
competition and increasing inequalities. 
They suggest that, conditional 
on living with a grandchild, 
living with one’s child has a 
negative effect on the elderly’s 
happiness. Furthermore, 
elderly Chinese who live with 
grandchildren are associated 
with a much higher degree of 
happiness than their 
counterparts. 
Their results suggest that the homeownership 
status does have a strong positive effect on 
both one’s housing satisfaction and overall 
happiness in urban China. The homeownership 
status might also contribute to other possible 
aspects of life satisfaction except for housing 
satisfaction; because controlling for housing 
satisfaction in the equation, the 
homeownership status still positively affects 
one’s overall happiness. Additionally, in terms 
of housing satisfaction, females seem to value 
much more on owning a house than males, 
while the subjective benefits of owing a house 








5.3 Data Sources and Data Description 
This chapter uses the dataset from the 2006 Chinese General Social Survey (the 2006 
CGSS)
78
, a nationwide comprehensive characteristic social survey exploring the current life 
situations of China’s citizens. The 2006 wave of the CGSS survey applies the four-phase 
stratified sampling approach to identify the sampled households: county (district), town 
(street), village (neighbourhood committee), and household. The interviewees, who have 
stayed or will stay in the household for more than one week, are selected stochastically 
among members aged between 18 and 69. It contains a total of 6013 urban households in 28 
provinces, municipalities, and autonomous regions of China
79
. 
The 2006 CGSS urban household questionnaire includes plentiful material on personal 
characteristics of household members, especially the respondents, such as their gender, age, 
ethnic group, education, religion and employment. Of course, the survey contains general 
household features as well, such as marital status, family size, income, social activities and 
living standards. Impressively, the project also draws a general image of the current housing 
situation in urban China by asking the interviewees about their housing conditions, which can 
contribute to our research on the Chinese urban housing market. This category of housing 
questions involves the homeownership status (for example, whether the individual rents the 
house or owns the house), the housing conditions (for instance, structure/usable areas of the 
house, number of bedrooms, whether they have a living room or a bathroom), and the 
housing type (shanty town, affordable housing, commodity housing, housing units purchased 
by individuals from their work units, and other types of houses).  
In the self-evaluation section about the individual’s life satisfaction, two subjective wellbeing 
indicators of interest, housing satisfaction and overall happiness, are analysed. Personal 
housing satisfaction is documented as the following question and options: ‘Are you satisfied 
with your current housing situation? (1) very unsatisfied (2) unsatisfied (3) satisfied (4) very 
satisfied (5) unknown’. The individual overall happiness assessment is based on a 5-point 
ranking system which is ‘(1) very unhappy (2) unhappy (3) neutral (4) happy (5) very happy’. 
In summary, Table 5.5 outlines the original questionnaire responses used as variables in our 
                                                 
78 CGSS 2006 is conducted cooperatively by the Sociology Department of Renmin University of China and the Survey 
Research Centre of Hong Kong University of Science and Technology in September and October, 2006. 
79 There are totally 31 provinces in mainland China. The three missing provinces in the survey are Qinghai, Ningxia and 
Tibet. The omission of these 3 provinces would not affect the nationwide representativeness of the survey, as the population 






Excluding the missing and invalid answers of the questionnaire dataset, in order to investigate 
the preliminary statistical relationship between these variables, Table 5.6 shows the 
correlation coefficients between subjective wellbeing variables (housing satisfaction qe485 
and overall happiness qe49) and other explanatory variables. Regarding people’s housing 
satisfaction, we can see that self-rated health, homeownership, house size and number of 
bedrooms have quite high correlations (coefficients>20%); having living rooms and having 
bathrooms have relatively high correlation (10%<coefficients<20%); while other variables 
have very small coefficients. Regarding overall happiness, only housing satisfaction has a 
high correlation with overall happiness more than 20%, and the correlations of all house-
related variables have been reduced. But the correlations of individual variables become 
stronger. Moreover, there exist extremely high correlations between certain explanatory 
variables, for instance, between age and job status (53.53%), house size and number of 
bedrooms (65.23%), number of living rooms and number of bathrooms (53.48%). Therefore, 
one of the robustness checks that can be employed is by dropping one of these two highly 
correlated variables (such as job status, number of bedrooms and number of bathrooms) to 
compare with the original regressions.  
To explore the further relationship between these factors and an individual’s life satisfaction, 
Table 5.7 reviews the statistical features of the relevant variables. We are particularly 
interested in the responses of different groups. As young people and old people probably have 
different perspectives about housing, this chapter divides the urban sample into two groups 
divided by the age boundary of 42 resulting in 2202 ‘young people’ and 2242 ‘old people’. 
According to the literature (Chen and Short, 2008; Chyi and Mao, 2012), the living 
arrangements, such as whether living with family (spouse, children or grandchildren), have 
an important effect on the happiness of senior citizens in China. This may be because the 
traditional culture of happiness for elderly people in China is being able to ‘play with 
children and grandchildren, enjoy life with no worries’. Therefore, older people may typically 
spend more time in the house than younger ones, at least in some localities, and hence for 
older people housing conditions may be more important than for younger ones.  
In addition, the householder income is quite important for the housing purchase; because with 





lots of rooms, convenient location, or high-grade commercial housing. Income also facilitates 
the purchase of durable and other goods and services which can enhance the quality of the 
home. Also, plenty of studies (Knight and Gunatilaka, 2010 & 2011; Appleton and Song, 
2008; Smyth et al., 2008; Knight et al., 2009; Chyi and Mao, 2012; Wang and VanderWeele, 
2011; and Hu, 2013) support that the income plays an important role in an individual’s 
subjective well-being in China. Thus, an additional category is in terms of householder 
income with approximate size by the annual income boundary of 10000 (2386 low-income 
households and 2056 high-income households). As above literature suggest, generally 
speaking, the income significantly affects people’s happiness in a positive way, which means 
people feel happier with higher income. 
From Table 5.7, it can be seen that most people (53.15%) are either satisfied (45.61%) or very 
satisfied (7.54%) with their general housing situation. From now on, we refer to this group as 
‘being at least satisfied’. While there are more old people (55.67%) satisfied or very satisfied 
with their housing than young people (50.59%); and people with higher income (56.15%) 
have significantly higher housing satisfaction (‘being at least satisfied’) than low-income 
individuals (50.88%), this is as expected because high-income citizens can afford better 
houses and the Tiebout hypothesis suggests that as people age they move to locations and by 
implication houses which they find more favourable. For the overall happiness, the statistics 
indicate that there are conspicuous differences between the young population (51.68%) and 
old population (43.48%) and between the low-income group (40.49%) and high-income 
group (55.74%), who are happy or very happy about their lives.  
From Table 5.7, we can also see that the homeownership rate in urban China is 74.11%, 
which is relatively high compared to developed countries, reflecting the traditional belief of 
Chinese people preferring owning houses to renting houses (Chien, 2010; Wang, 2011). 
Besides, under the marketization and commercialization of the Chinese housing market, the 
welfare housing system has become less important; and most people need to purchase 
commodity houses from the housing market, only a few middle- or low-income individuals 
can purchase or rent affordable houses from the government. Therefore, the portion of 
commercial houses is significantly larger than the portion of affordable houses in all the 
groups of people. Of course, younger people (26.52%) own more commercial houses
80
 than 
                                                 
80 In the 2006 CGSS categories, ‘commercial houses’ include two types of houses: ordinary commodity house and high-





elder (21.47%), as they probably need to buy commodity houses over  recent years but elder 
people might have purchased their welfare houses before the housing reform. It is also 
reasonable for rich people (30.06%) to own more commercial houses than poor people 
(18.73%). With respect to other housing conditions, 81.47% of houses have living rooms and 
83.16% of houses have bathrooms; furthermore, the younger or richer groups of people have 
higher percentages of living rooms/bathrooms than the older or poorer groups of people. This 
maybe because the younger people purchased relatively newer houses than their elders, and 
rich people are able to afford higher-standard houses as well. 
In order to do a preliminary investigation of the effects of housing conditions on people’s 
housing satisfaction or overall happiness, we present separate tables for the determinants of 
homeownership, house type, house size, number of bedrooms and having living rooms or 
bathrooms (see Table 5.8). According to the statistics in  
 
Table 5.8, there are a much higher percentage of people having homeownership and who are 
happier (higher percentages of satisfaction) with their housing conditions (60.79%) and 
overall life (51.21%) than people with no homeownership (31.30% and 37.04%). Moreover, 
citizens who live in commercial housing also show a little more happiness for both subjective 
wellbeing indicators (57.19% for housing satisfaction and 53.43% for overall happiness) than 
the ones who live in the lower-standard houses—economically affordable housing (52.20% 
and 50.89% respectively).  
In addition, there is substantial evidence that the percentage of satisfied or happy people 
grows with the increase of the house size and number of bedrooms. For instance, individuals 
living in housing larger than 90 m
2
 are characterised by 77.42% of housing satisfaction and 
57.70% of overall happiness, but these two ratios for individuals living in housing smaller 
than 42 m
2
 are only 25.64% and 33.67% respectively. The same situation happens among the 
people having 9 bedrooms; their satisfaction levels are as high as 90% and 70% respectively, 
while only 30.31% and 37.46% of people with 1 bedroom are satisfied with their housing and 
overall life. Of course, this could also reflect income or the number of people living in the 
house. Furthermore, more people having living rooms or bathrooms are happy with both 
indicators than people having no living rooms or bathrooms. More specifically, with living 
rooms, 56.78% or 49.24% of people are happy with their housing or overall life; while 





people are happy with overall life. People with bathrooms show higher percentages of 
housing satisfaction (56.77%) and overall life satisfaction (48.94%) than people without 
bathrooms (35.29% and 40.64% respectively) as well. 
Overall, from the primary results, the housing-related variables appear to play a crucial role 
in the individual subjective well-being—both housing satisfaction and overall happiness. The 
statistical data illustrates that people are much more likely to be satisfied with both indicators 
of homeownership, larger house space, more bedrooms, having living rooms/bathrooms, or 
living in better-standard houses (such as commodity houses). In particular the difference 
between different housing conditions causes a distinct difference in housing satisfaction than 
for overall happiness, which can be explained because housing conditions affect individual 
housing satisfaction more directly than people’s overall life. However, correlation does not 
imply causation and we now turn to examine causal impacts with the ordered probit model to 
further investigate the significance of these house-related determinants and how they affect 














qe485 Housing satisfaction 1) very unsatisfied 2) unsatisfied 3) satisfied 4) very satisfied 5) unknown 
qe49 Overall happiness 1) very unhappy 2) unhappy 3) neutral 4) happy 5) very happy 
Individual 
characteristics 
age Age - 
qa01 Gender 1) male 2) female 
qd01 Marital status 1) single 2) cohabiting 3) married 4) separated 5) divorced 6) widowed 
qa05a Education level 
1) never educated 2) literacy class 3) primary school 4) junior high school 5) vocational high school 6) senior 
high school 7) technical secondary school 8) technical school 9) junior college (Continuing Education) 10) 
junior college (Regular Higher Education) 11) undergraduate college (Continuing Education) 12) 
undergraduate college (Regular Higher Education) 13) postgraduate or above 14) others 
qe484 Self-rated health 1) very poor 2) poor 3) good 4) very good 5) unknown 






0000000. (None) 9999997. (Inapposite) 9999998. (Unknown) 9999999. (Refuse to answer) 
qd27a Homeownership 
1) rent the house of work units 2) rent the public house 3) rent the private house 4) private house (Inheritance 
or self-build) 5) homeownership (part-owned) 6) homeownership (full-owned) 7) dormitory 8) living with 








areas) 998. (Couldn’t remember)   999. (Refuse to answer) 
The respondents only need to answer one of the two household size questions; thus, when structure areas 
(qd28a) are not available, use usable areas (qd28b) instead. 
qd28c Number of bedrooms 
qd28d 
Number of living 
rooms 
qd28e Number of bathrooms 
qs42 House type 
1) shanty town 2) the old town without development 3) community unit of industrial and mining enterprises 
4) community unit of public institutions or government institutions 5) economically affordable housing 6) 
ordinary commodity house 7) high-grade commercial housing or villa house 8) urban village 9) immigrant 





Table 5.6: Correlation between Subjective Wellbeing Variables and Other Explanatory Variables 
 qe485 qe49 age qa01 qd01 qa05a qe484 qb01a qd35a qd27a qd28a qd28c qd28d qd28e qs42 
qe485 1.0000 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
qe49 0.2998 1.0000 - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
age 0.0448 -0.0979 1.0000 - - - - - - - - - - - - 
qa01 -0.0198 0.0152 -0.0032 1.0000 - - - - - - - - - - - 
qd01 0.0517 0.1062 0.2865 -0.0190 1.0000 - - - - - - - - - - 
qa05a 0.0352 0.1711 -0.3643 -0.0608 -0.0862 1.0000 - - - - - - - - - 
qe484 0.2412 0.2823 -0.2501 -0.0645 -0.0310 0.1609 1.0000 - - - - - - - - 
qb01a 0.0077 -0.0872 0.5353 0.1861 0.0432 -0.2633 -0.1877 1.0000 - - - - - - - 
qd35a 0.0334 0.0769 -0.1403 -0.1266 -0.0571 0.2380 0.0649 -0.2261 1.0000 - - - - - - 
qd27a 0.2874 0.1308 0.1948 0.0211 0.1451 -0.0503 0.0059 0.1204 -0.0800 1.0000 - - - - - 
qd28a 0.2737 0.1168 -0.0205 -0.0318 0.0801 -0.0220 0.0512 -0.0323 0.0111 0.2558 1.0000 - - - - 
qd28c 0.2428 0.1036 0.0347 -0.0192 0.0943 -0.0289 0.0353 -0.0145 -0.0071 0.2718 0.6523 1.0000 - - - 
qd28d 0.1621 0.0664 -0.0383 -0.0051 0.0394 0.0548 0.0000 -0.0664 0.0536 0.1269 0.2628 0.1220 1.0000 - - 
qd28e 0.1607 0.0729 -0.0339 0.0206 -0.0005 0.1306 0.0023 -0.0657 0.1068 0.1488 0.2038 0.1171 0.5348 1.0000 - 







Table 5.7: The Summary of Statistical Features of Relevant Variables 
Variables Total 











Housing satisfaction (%)  
very unsatisfied 11.21 11.58 10.85 11.74 10.60 
unsatisfied 35.64 37.83 33.48 37.38 33.61 
satisfied 45.61 42.87 48.30 43.42 48.51 
very satisfied 7.54 7.72 7.37 7.46 7.64 
Total ‘Satisfied’ and ‘Very Satisfied’ 53.15 50.59 55.67 50.88 56.15 
Overall happiness (%)  
very unhappy 0.97 0.77 1.16 1.34 0.54 
unhappy 5.67 3.95 7.37 8.21 2.72 
neutral 45.81 43.60 47.99 49.96 41.00 
happy 41.83 45.05 38.66 35.21 49.51 
very happy 5.72 6.63 4.82 5.28 6.23 
Total ‘Happy’ and ‘Very Happy’ 47.55 51.68 43.48 40.49 55.74 
Individual characteristics 
Age (mean) 44 32 55 45 41 
Gender (%)  
male 48.65 49.64 47.68 39.15 59.68 
female 51.35 50.36 52.32 60.85 40.32 
Marital status (%)  
married 80.44 72.75 87.99 80.93 79.86 
unmarried (single/cohabiting/separated/divorced/widowed) 19.56 27.25 12.01 19.07 20.14 
Education level (%)  
low education (never educated/literacy class/primary school) 16.34 6.40 26.12 25.15 6.13 
middle education (junior high school/vocational high school/ 
senior high school/technical secondary school/technical school) 
65.7 67.35 64.06 67.35 63.76 
high education (junior college/undergraduate college/postgraduate 
or above) 
17.96 26.25 9.82 7.50 30.11 
Self-rated health (%)  
very poor 2.61 1.32 3.88 3.52 1.56 
poor 19.56 12.13 26.88 23.47 15.03 





very good 17.38 22.93 11.92 15.05 20.09 
Job status (%)  
employed 59.57 82.88 36.65 45.60 75.78 
unemployed (unemployed but had a job before/never work) 40.43 17.12 63.35 54.40 24.22 
Householder 
characteristics 
Householder income (mean) (yuan) 14204 16745 11706 6175 23520 
Homeownership (%)  
homeownership (private house (inheritance or self-
build)/homeownership (part-owned)/ homeownership (full-
owned)) 
74.11 67.03 81.07 76.87 70.91 
no homeownership (rent the house of work units/rent the public 
house/rent the private house/dormitory/ living with friends or 
relatives/others) 
25.89 32.97 18.93 23.13 29.09 
House-related 
characteristics 
House size (mean)  (m
2
) 71.99 73.03 70.96 71.64 72.39 
Number of total rooms (mean) 
(the sum of bedrooms, living rooms and bathrooms) 
3.86 3.87 3.84 3.80 3.92 
Number of bedrooms (mean) 2.21 2.19 2.22 2.21 2.20 
Number of living rooms (mean) 0.93 0.95 0.92 0.90 0.97 
Having living rooms (%) 81.47 83.47 79.51 79.97 83.22 
Number of bathrooms (mean) 0.89 0.90 0.87 0.82 0.96 
Having bathrooms (%) 83.16 84.65 81.70 78.33 88.76 
House type (%)  
economically affordable housing 13.85 14.67 13.04 12.78 15.08 
commercial housing (ordinary commodity house/high-grade 
commercial housing or villa house) 
23.98 26.52 21.47 18.73 30.06 
others (shanty town/the old town without development/urban 
village/immigrant communities/ community units of industrial and 
mining enterprises/community units of public institutions or 
government institutions/others) 
62.17 58.81 65.49 68.48 54.86 
Sample Size 4442 








Table 5.8: The Descriptive Results between Individual Subjective Well-being and Housing Conditions 
Variables 















homeownership (74.11%) 7.17 32.05 51.49 9.30 100 0.91 4.80 43.07 44.50 6.71 100 
no homeownership 
(25.89%) 




13.98 33.82 48.62 3.58 100 1.14 3.09 44.88 45.69 5.20 100 
commercial housing 
(23.98%) 
7.79 35.02 49.58 7.61 100 0.28 3.94 42.35 48.08 5.35 100 





0—42 (20.19%) 27.87 46.49 21.40 4.24 100 0.78 9.70 55.85 30.10 3.57 100 
42—57 (19.99%) 10.36 43.24 41.78 4.62 100 1.58 4.73 52.25 37.16 4.28 100 
57—69 (17.86%) 9.08 38.59 45.52 6.81 100 0.63 5.30 43.13 44.26 6.68 100 
69—90 (22.22%) 5.17 31.51 54.31 9.02 100 1.11 3.55 41.44 46.91 6.99 100 
>90 (19.74%) 3.76 18.81 64.54 12.88 100 0.68 5.25 36.37 50.63 7.07 100 
Number of 
bedrooms 
1 (19.83%) 22.81 46.88 25.77 4.54 100 0.91 8.51 53.12 34.05 3.41 100 
2 (54.50%) 10.29 36.80 45.85 7.06 100 0.95 5.12 46.92 41.14 5.87 100 
3 (19.05%) 4.85 26.12 58.75 10.28 100 0.83 4.61 39.24 47.87 7.45 100 
4 (3.42%) 3.29 23.03 61.18 12.50 100 1.97 5.92 33.55 50.66 7.89 100 
5 (0.95%) 0.00 23.81 69.05 7.14 100 2.38 2.38 50.00 42.86 2.38 100 
6 (1.04%) 2.17 15.22 69.57 13.04 100 2.17 2.17 30.43 60.87 4.35 100 
7 (0.11%) 0.00 20.00 80.00 0.00 100 0.00 0.00 20.00 60.00 20.00 100 
8 (0.43%) 0.00 15.79 68.42 15.79 100 0.00 10.53 21.05 63.16 5.26 100 
9 (0.68%) 3.33 6.67 70.00 20.00 100 0.00 3.33 26.67 63.33 6.67 100 
Living rooms 
having living rooms 
(81.47%) 
8.65 34.57 49.32 7.46 100 0.80 5.31 44.65 43.60 5.64 100 
no living rooms (18.53%) 22.48 40.34 29.28 7.90 100 1.70 7.29 50.91 34.02 6.08 100 
Bathrooms 
having bathrooms (83.16%) 8.80 34.43 49.54 7.23 100 0.81 4.87 45.37 43.34 5.60 100 






According to Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Frijters (2004, pp. 643-644) on which the following is 
based. There are three main assumptions that have been used in the interpretation of the 
satisfaction questionnaire survey. Increasing in restrictiveness, these are: 
“A1 General satisfaction is a positive monotonic transformation of an underlying 
metaphysical concept called welfare and denoted by W(.): if GSit >GSis then Wit>Wis. 
A2 General satisfaction is interpersonally ordinally comparable: if GSi>GSj then Wi>Wj. 
A3 General satisfaction is interpersonally cardinally comparable: (Wi - Wj)=ω(GSi, GSj) with 
ω(.) a function that is known up to a multiplicative constant. Normally ω(GSi, GSj) is taken to 
be (GSi, GSj).” 
The assumption A1 implies a correspondence between what is measured, GSit, and the 
metaphysical concept researchers are actually interested in, Wit. Obviously, welfare is not a 
physical phenomenon that can be easily and objectively measured. 
The assumption A2, ordinal comparability, implies that individuals share a common opinion 
of what happiness is. This relies on supporting evidence from two psychological findings. 
The first is that individuals are somewhat able to recognise and predict the satisfaction level 
of others. The second finding is that individuals in the same language community have a 
common understanding of how to translate internal feelings into a number scale. 
The assumption A3 usually amounts to assuming that the difference between a satisfaction 
answer of, a 3 and a 4 is the same as the difference between a 5 and a 6. 
Furthermore, Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Frijters (2004, pp. 644-645) state the statistical 
assumptions made, hinge on the existence and effects of unobserved factors in the data set: 
“S1 There are time-varying unobserved factors, εit, related to observables in an unknown way. 
S2 There are time-invariant unobserved factors, νi, related to initial levels of observed factors, 
and there are time-varying unobserved factors, εit, unrelated to observed factors: cov(εit, 
xit)=cov(νi, ∆xit)=0 and cov(νi, xit)≠0. 
S3 Unobserved factors, εit or νi, are either unrelated to observed factors or their relationship 
is known: cov(εit, xit)=
1
itz , and cov(νi, xit)=
2





The statistical assumption S1 would seem to arise very often according to economic theory: 
because individuals continuously make decisions based on constraints and future expectations, 
anything unobserved that affects GS and also changes expectations or constraints will 
influence observed decisions. Under an S1 situation causal inferences cannot be made. 
Under S2, all relevant time-varying factors are thought to be observed. For instance through 
randomised experiments or rich data sets, all the unobserved variables appearing under S1 are 
then known or exogenous.  
Under S3, there may be unobserved factors, but they are either orthogonal to what is observed 
and hence do not normally bias the results, or their relation to what is observed is (due to 
some assumed structure) known and hence can be controlled for. This would seem to apply 
reasonably only in cases where the data used are extremely rich and simultaneous account 
can be taken of all this information. 












                                                                                                  (5.4) 
where εit xit; 

itGS  is the latent variable and itGS  is observed general satisfaction. Depending 
on the assumed distribution of the error-term εit, this leads to an ordered probit, this can be 
solved by maximum likelihood methods. In order for the ensuing estimator to be causally 
interpreted, S3 has to hold. Therefore S1-S3 are still relevant, that despite the lack of a time 
dimension for our cross section data set. This is the model most used by economists (Dolan et 
al., 2008; Knight and Gunatilaka, 2010 & 2011; Knight et al., 2009; Hu, 2013).  
Clearly, the life satisfaction indicators (housing satisfaction and overall happiness) used in 
this chapter are ordinal variables, we use the Ordered Probit Model to investigate the effects 
of various determinants on subjective wellbeing (Greene 2007, Chapter 23, pp. 831-835; 
Brooks 2008, Chapter 11, pp. 529-533): 
  iii Xy                                                                                                                   (5.5) 
As usual, 






What we do observe is 
0iy  if 0

iy  
1iy   if 10  

iy  




Jyi   if 

  iJ yJ 1  
The μ’s are unknown parameters to be estimated with β. In an opinion survey, the respondents 
have their own intensity of feelings, which depend on certain measurable factors X and 
certain unobservable factors ε. 
If we assume that ε is normally distributed across observations, then we have the following 
probabilities by normalising the mean ad variance of ε to zero and one: 
   
     
     


























In our model, 

iy  denotes individual housing satisfaction or overall happiness. In line with the 
relevant literature (Appleton and Song, 2008; Chyi and Mao, 2012; Diaz-Serrano 2009; 
Dolan et al., 2008; Elsinga and Hoekstra, 2005; Hu, 2013; Knight and Gunatilaka, 2010 & 
2011; Knight et al., 2009; Wang and Vander Weele 2011), the vector X includes three major 
categories of explanatory variables: individual characteristics (the personal information about 
individual householders), householder characteristics (householder’s information relating to 
the resident housing) and house-related features (housing conditions affecting housing 
qualities). 
The variables for individual characteristics contain age, gender (male and female), marital 
status (married, with ‘unmarried’ as default group including ‘single/cohabiting/separated 
/divorced/widowed’), education level (middle education including ‘junior high school 
/vocational high school/ senior high school/technical secondary school/technical school’, 





‘low education’ as default group including ‘never educated/literacy class/primary school’), 
self-rated health status and job status (employed, with ‘unemployed’ as default group). 
Because age might have a nonlinear relationship with people’s happiness, both age and age 
squared are included in the model. The health status is based on a 4-point measurement, 
ranging from ‘very poor’ to ‘very good’. It is expected that there should be a positive impact 
of the self-rated health status on individual subjective well-being. 
Additionally, some householder-level features (such as homeownership and householder 
annual income) can be impact on individual happiness indicators, omitting them from the 
regression may lead to biased estimates of β in Equation 5.5. Therefore, this chapter includes 
homeownership (homeownership including ‘private house (inheritance or self-
build)/homeownership (part-owned)/ homeownership (full-owned)’, with ‘no homeownership’ 
as the default group including ‘rent the house of work units/rent the public house/rent the 
private house/dormitory/ living with friends or relatives/others’), and house size 
(construction areas or usable areas, m
2
) into the regression. Moreover, the analysis includes 
some independent variables of housing conditions, such as number of bedrooms, whether 
having a living room and whether having a bathroom in the current residence. These are 
included as Diaz-Serrano (2009) suggests that it is most likely that these variables are closely 
related with individual’s housing satisfaction and overall happiness, which can be indicative 
of the living comfort. Finally, the house types might have different effects on subjective well-
being. For example, Hu (2013) finds that people living in commercial houses show a higher 
housing satisfaction than people staying in affordable houses. Hence, the type of house is 
included as one of the explanatory variables as well by dividing it into three groups: 
commercial housing including ‘ordinary commodity house/high-grade commercial housing 
or villa house’, other types of houses including ‘shanty town/the old town without 
development/urban village/immigrant communities /community unit of industrial and mining 
enterprises/community unit of public institutions or government institutions/others’, with 
‘economically affordable housing’ as the default group. 
Nevertheless, although we can include a much richer set of relevant housing-related 
determinants in the model, the estimation of happiness may still be biased. On the one side, 
the estimation may suffer from measurement error bias as these variables are only about 
individual’s current residence given the available information in the dataset. There are many 





(such as risk attitude or social capital) that influence the existing explanatory variables also 
affect their happiness, and then our model may still be biased, if these variables impact on the 
independent variable set which we use. Moreover, due to the restrictions of the survey, we 
cannot include more relevant factors of housing conditions affecting subjective well-being, 
such as access to gas, heating, water and so on. 
The robustness checks need to be employed to test the efficiency of our model. As mentioned 
before, one of the robustness checks can be achieved by dropping one of the two explanatory 
variables with high correlation coefficients (age vs job status, house size vs number of 
bedrooms, having living rooms vs having bathrooms). The other robustness check we can 
apply is to use the ‘binary response model’ (Wooldridge, 2012, Chapter 17, pp.584) or 
‘binary choice model’ (Greene, 2012, Chapter 17, pp.724). Specifically, by making our 
dependent variable y
*
 in Equation 5.5 a binary variable, wherein yi is 1 if ‘satisfied’ or 
‘happy’, yi is 0 if ‘un-satisfied’ or ‘un-happy’. In our case, we define that the groups of 
housing satisfaction with ‘satisfied’ and ‘very satisfied’ and the groups of  overall happiness 
with ‘happy’ and ‘very happy’ as 1, while the rest of responses from housing satisfaction and 
overall happiness as 0. 
Since we will divide the whole sample into different groups by age category and income 
category, it is necessary to justify the divisions of the sample by age and income. As 
Wooldridge (2012) suggested, the Chow test, a simply F test, can be used to determine 
whether a multiple regression function differs across two groups. We can apply that test to 












                                                                                       (5.6) 
where SSRu is the sum of squared residuals for unrestricted model, SSR1 and SSR2 is the sum 
of squared residuals for two different groups, N is the total number of observations, and k is 
the total number of parameters (including dependent variable and explanatory variables). The 
test statistic follows the F distribution with k and N-2k degrees of freedom. 
As we can see, the Chow test, following the F distribution, is only used in linear regressions, 
which is not applicable to our ordered probit model. But, Gould (2013a) has resolved the 





According to him, the ‘Chow Test is a term used by economists in the context of testing a set 
of regression coefficients being equal to 0, which is equivalent to pooling the data, fitting the 
fully interacted model, then testing the group coefficients against 0’.  
In our case, there are separate models for two groups: 
 1,1,11   ii Xy   for group=1                   
2,2,22   ii Xy   for group=2 
Next, we need to generate a dummy variable D for group 2, and other dummy variables by 
multiplying each explanatory variables as DiXi. Then, run the following regression again: 
  iiiiii XDDXy                                                                                            (5.7) 
The last step is to test the coefficients γ and δi against 0 in the above pooled regression. In the 
case of the discrete choice model, the LR test statistics follow the Chi-square distribution. 
Rejecting the null means the coefficients are significantly different with 0, which indicates 
our age or income division is sufficient. In addition, Equation 5.7 also indicates the 
interactive effects between age/income dummies and other explanatory variables through 
testing the joint significance of coefficients δi.                      
Furthermore, in order to investigate the separate effects and interaction effects of age groups 
and income groups in the overall regression, we create dummy variables of the age division 







jjiii DXy                                                                                                  (5.8) 
where D1 is 1 if age>42, and 0 if not; D2 is 1 if income>10000, and 0 if not; D3 is the 
multiplication of D1 and income; while D4 is the multiplication of D2 and age. The dummies 
D3 and D4 indicate the interaction effects between age groups and income groups. 





some people may be more easily ‘satisfied’ with both their life and their house. Hence 
housing satisfaction may be correlated with the error term in the life satisfaction equation. 
The Ramsey RESET (Regression Specification Error Test) test can be implemented to detect 
functional form problems (Greene, 2013, Chapter 5, pp.177-178; Wooldridge, 2012, Chapter 
9, pp.306-307). To apply RESET, we have to decide how many functions of the fitted values 
to include in an expanded regression. Although there is no consensus on this issue, the 
squared and cubed terms have proven to be useful in most applications. Let yˆ denotes the 




ˆˆ yyXy iii                                                                                             (5.9) 
The null hypothesis is that the original equation is correctly specified. It is also equivalent to 
test the coefficients δ1 and δ2 against 0. Rejecting the null indicates that the original 
regression is misspecified, and the predicted value of housing satisfaction in Equation 5.9 
should be used in the overall life satisfaction regression.    
5.5 Empirical Results 
Generally, our estimations utilise two dependent variables, namely housing satisfaction and 
overall happiness and three groups of explanatory variables: individual characteristics 
(including age, age square, gender, marital status, education level, self-rated health and job 
status), householder features (including log of householder annual income and 
homeownership), and housing-related conditions (including house size, number of bedrooms, 
having living rooms or bathrooms, and house type). By using the ordered probit model, three 
models are regressed: the first one is to test the effects of these determinants of people’s 
housing satisfaction; the second one is to estimate the effects of these determinants on 
householders’ overall happiness; and the last model explains the individual overall happiness 
based on the same independent variables, but including the housing satisfaction measures as 
explanatory variables as well. 
5.5.1 The Effects on Housing Satisfaction 
As shown in Table 5.9, the overall picture is that most of the determinants we used have quite 





gender, marital status, education level, and job status. As the literature suggested (Appleton 
and Song, 2008; Knight et al., 2009; Knight and Gunatilaka, 2011; Wang and VanderWeele, 
2011; Hu, 2013), age is a quite significant factor for individual subjective wellbeing. In our 
model, there is a U-shaped relationship between age and individual housing satisfaction, as 
the coefficients of age and age square are -0.0327847 and 0.0004398 respectively, reaching 





 years. That means housing 
satisfaction is declining with the increase of age for the people who are younger than 37; 
afterwards, housing satisfaction is accelerating with the increase of age. As documented in 
relevant studies in China (Hu, 2013), also the health factor has a significantly positive impact 
on subjective housing satisfaction. 
Both coefficients of the householder characteristics for full sample in Table 5.9 (householder 
income and homeownership) are significant at the 1% level. In line with other happiness 
literature (Diaz-Serrano, 2009; Hu, 2013), householder income is one important determinant 
of one’s housing satisfaction. To some extent, higher income means higher affordability for 
the better houses and also facilitates better furnishing and decoration, etc. of the house; also 
the deep-rooted notion of owning houses for Chinese people explains the significance of 
homeownership. Finally, as housing-related variables can represent the housing quality, these 
conditions can reflect the comfort experienced by people (Elsinga and Hoekstra, 2005); thus, 
it is consistent with previous findings (Hu, 2013). All the variables for housing conditions are 
positively significant for individual housing satisfaction, such as house size, number of 
bedrooms, having living rooms or bathrooms, and the type of houses. However, Hu suggests 
having bathrooms has no significant impact on housing satisfaction; our improved dataset 
amends Hu’s results, since our sample excludes the missing and invalid answers of the 
questionnaire dataset (using 4442 valid answers from 6013 urban questionnaires).  
Specifically, compared with people living in commercial houses and other houses, those 
living in economically affordable houses show a lower housing satisfaction. Wu et al. (2012) 
argued a possible explanation for this is the relative distance from city centres and the poor 
infrastructure regarding living facilities; since the affordable houses are usually provided for 
middle-low income families with much lower purchase prices than commercial buildings. In 
                                                 
81 Suppose we have the equation   2XXy , differentiate the equation with respect to X, then we can get





fact, the satisfaction with the area people live may affect the housing satisfaction as well. In 
the survey, there is a question of ‘are you happy with the residential community you live in’ 
indicating the quality of housing environment. Adding the satisfaction with housing 
environment as another explanatory variable, the regression results show that there is a 
significant positive effect of housing environment on individual’s housing satisfaction. Thus, 
we can see that the housing type indicates the effects of the quality of houses on the housing 
satisfaction, while the housing environment indicates the effects of the quality of area people 
live on the housing satisfaction. 
As explained in the methodology, the robustness checks are produced to detect the 
appropriateness of our results. Due to the high correlation coefficients between age and job 
status, house size and number of bedrooms, having living rooms and having bathrooms in 
Table 5.6, the explanatory variables of job status, number of bedrooms, and having 
bathrooms are excluded from the robust function. But the results are identical with the 
original estimations. Except for gender, marital status, and education level, the other 
independent variables still have significant impact on housing satisfaction. The alternative 
robustness check by making dependent variable as 0-1 binary variable has solely changed the 
effect of house type, where the house types have no significant effects any more. 
Additionally, the coefficients of cut off points in the regressions also need to be interpreted. 
In our case, the ordered dependent variable of housing satisfaction has been divided into four 
categories (see Table 5.7): (1) very unsatisfied, (2) unsatisfied, (3) satisfied, (4) very satisfied. 
There are three cut off points (‘cut1, cut2, cut3’ in Table 5.9) for four sections. These 













                 (5.10) 
And for the predicted value of yˆ , the respondents will fall into category (1) if yˆ <cut1, into 
category (2) if cut1< yˆ <cut2, into category (3) if cut2< yˆ <cut3, into category (4) if yˆ >cut3. 
For example, from Table 5.9, we can tell that, the respondents feel ‘very unsatisfied’ about 





‘satisfied’ with yˆ between 3.207 and 4.929, ‘very satisfied’ with yˆ more than 4.929. More 
specifically, if the estimated value of y from Equation 5.5 is under 1.899, the people will feel 
‘very unsatisfied’ about their housing conditions. Of course, if we change the answers of 
housing satisfaction into binary options, either ‘unsatisfied’ or ‘satisfied’, the value of unique 
cut off point is 3.396 (in Table 5.9), which means householders feel ‘unsatisfied’ under 3.396 
and ‘satisfied’ above 3.396. 
In order to detect the different effects of housing characteristics between different groups, we 
will divide the full sample into two groups respectively, by age or income. Here, the age 
boundary is 42 and the income boundary is 10000 yuan/year. These boundaries roughly 
divide the sample into two equal halves, but also it is plausible, for example, to regard those 
aged 42 or less as ‘young’ and those over this age as ‘old’. Prior to interpreting the 
coefficients of sub-sample regressions, an analogical method to the Chow test—running a 
regression and testing certain coefficients against zero—is used to test the significance of our 
divisions. Table 5.10 shows the results for testing the structural changes, and it suggests that 
our age and income divisions are both significant at the 10% level. 
In addition, in order to estimate the separate and interactive effects of age groups and income 
groups in the overall regression, Table 5.11 demonstrates the results from Equation 5.9. 
Adding dummies generated from age and income groups do not change the effects of the 
determinants on housing satisfaction. The individual effects of two groups are only 
significant at the 10% level. And the interaction effect between the age dummy and the 
income is significant at the 10% level, but the interaction effect between the income dummy 
and the age is not significant. Overall, neither individual effects nor interactive effects have 
significant influence on housing satisfaction at the 5% level. But, of course this does not 
mean that the impact of other variables is the same in the two regressions.     
By dividing respondents into two groups of youngsters and elders in Table 5.12, the effect of 
householder income is not significant for elder people; while the homeownership is still an 
influential factor for housing satisfaction for both groups. Interestingly, all the house-related 
characteristics are quite significant for old people; comparatively, only house size and 
number of bedrooms play a vital role in young people’s housing satisfaction and it does not 
matter whether they have living rooms or bathrooms, or which type of houses they live in. 





younger people need to work or socialise more than older ones and spend less time at home 
(Chen and Short, 2008; Chyi and Mao, 2012). 
In the groups of low-income and high-income householders in Table 5.12, homeownership 
and house size are quite significant for both groups at the 1% level. Apart from having living 
rooms, the other housing conditions have a significantly positive impact on low-income 
people’s housing satisfaction. The number of bedrooms and having bathrooms has significant 
impacts on low-income populations rather than high-income populations. While the housing 
type and having living rooms has the opposite consequence, affecting rich people more 
significantly than poor people. Because affordable housing, as a kind of social welfare, is just 
for the middle-/low-income population, and richer people need to purchase commercial 
apartments from the housing market. This can explain why housing type does not have a 
prominent influence on rich people’s housing satisfaction. 





Drop Indep. Var. Binary Dep. Var. (0-1) 
Coef. Pro. Coef. Pro. Coef. Pro. 
Individual 
characteristics 
Age -0.033(3.46) 0.001*** -0.034(3.61) 0.000*** -0.028(2.42) 0.016** 
Age square 0.0004(4.15) 0.000*** 0.0005(4.47) 0.000*** 0.0004(3.30) 0.001*** 
Gender (default group: male) 
Female 0.019(0.56) 0.574 0.029(0.84) 0.402 0.021(0.51) 0.609 
Marital Status (default group: unmarried) 
Married 0.063(1.30) 0.194 0.065(1.34) 0.179 0.033(0.56) 0.573 
Education level (default group: low education) 
Middle education  -0.050(-
0.99) 
0.320 -0.042(0.83) 0.408 -0.010(0.17) 0.867 
High education 0.066(1.00) 0.318 0.081(1.23) 0.218 0.131(1.65) 0.099* 
Self-rated health 0.448(17.29) 0.000*** 0.445(17.20) 0.000*** 0.382(12.21) 0.000*** 
Job status (default group: unemployed) 
Employed 0.019(0.42) 0.674 - - 0.004(0.08) 0.938 
Householder 
characteristics 
Log of householder 
income (yuan) 
0.058(2.63) 0.009*** 0.065(3.09) 0.002*** 0.078(2.93) 0.003*** 
Homeownership (default group: no homeownership) 





) 0.004(7.31) 0.000*** 0.005(12.48) 0.000*** 0.006(7.93) 0.000*** 
Number of bedrooms 0.080(4.00) 0.000*** - - 0.111(4.13) 0.000*** 
Having living rooms 0.172(3.33) 0.001*** 0.239(5.32) 0.000*** 0.149(2.36) 0.018** 
Having bathrooms 0.174(3.17) 0.002*** - - 0.232(3.48) 0.001*** 
House type (default group: economical affordable housing) 
Commercial housing 0.138(2.44) 0.015** 0.138(2.44) 0.015** 0.025(0.38) 0.707 
Others 0.124(2.47) 0.013** 0.106(2.13) 0.033** 0.007(0.11) 0.911 
Cut Off Points Coef. (S. E.) 
z 
statistics 
Coef. (S. E.) 
z 
statistics 
Coef. (S. E.) 
z 
statistics 
cut1 1.899(0.315) 6.04*** 1.821(0.288) 6.31*** 3.396(0.384) 8.85*** 
cut2 3.207(0.316) 10.14*** 3.121(0.290) 10.76*** - - 
cut3 4.929(0.320) 15.41*** 4.841(0.294) 16.47*** - - 
Number of Observations 4442 4442 4442 
Note: 
(1) For explanatory variables, ( ) denotes the t statistics of the respective coefficients; for cut off points, ( ) denotes the standard errors. 






Table 5.10: Group Division Tests for Housing Satisfaction  
Group Division Tests for Housing Satisfaction 
Groups Chi-square Prob>Chi-square 
By Age 27.18 0.0555* 
By Income 26.76 0.0618* 
Note:  
*** indicates significance at 1% level, ** indicates significance at 5% level. * indicates significance at 10% level. 
 
Table 5.11: The Separate and Interactive Effects of Age and Income on Housing Satisfaction   
Variables 
Without Dummies With Dummies 
Coef. Pro. Coef. Pro. 
Individual characteristics 
Age -0.033(3.46) 0.001*** -0.043(-4.11) 0.000*** 
Age square 0.0004(4.15) 0.000*** 0.0005(4.50) 0.000*** 
Gender (default group: male) 
Female 0.019(0.56) 0.574 0.015(0.44) 0.659 
Marital Status (default group: unmarried) 
Married 0.063(1.30) 0.194 0.081(1.65) 0.100 
Education level (default group: low education) 
Middle education  -0.050(-0.99) 0.320 -0.057(-1.10) 0.273 
High education 0.066(1.00) 0.318 0.067(1.01) 0.314 
Self-rated health 0.448(17.29) 0.000*** 0.452(17.39) 0.000*** 
Job status (default group: unemployed) 
Employed 0.019(0.42) 0.674 0.011(0.25) 0.803 
Householder 
characteristics 
Log of householder income 
(yuan) 
0.058(2.63) 0.009*** 0.125(3.29) 0.001*** 
Homeownership (default group: no homeownership) 





) 0.004(7.31) 0.000*** 0.004(7.28) 0.000*** 
Number of bedrooms 0.080(4.00) 0.000*** 0.080(4.00) 0.000*** 
Having living rooms 0.172(3.33) 0.001*** 0.712(3.32) 0.001*** 
Having bathrooms 0.174(3.17) 0.002*** 0.177(3.23) 0.001*** 
House type (default group: economical affordable housing) 
Commercial housing 0.138(2.44) 0.015** 0.143(2.52) 0.012** 
Others 0.124(2.47) 0.013** 0.129(2.55) 0.011** 
Dummy Variables 
D(age) - - 0.840(0.444) 0.059* 
D(income) - - -0.277(-1.82) 0.069* 
D(age)*income - - -0.079(-1.65) 0.098* 
D(income)*age - - 0.005(1.48) 0.140 
Number of Observations 4442 4442 
Note: 
( ) denotes the t statistics of the respective coefficients. *** indicates significance at 1% level, ** indicates significance at 5% level. * 







Table 5.12: The Effects on Housing Satisfaction by Groups  
Variables 
Housing Satisfaction 
By age By income (yuan) 
Young (<=42) Old (>42) Low (<=10000) High (>10000) 
Coef. Pro. Coef. Pro. Coef. Pro. Coef. Pro. 
Individual characteristics 
Age -0.56(1.37) 0.171 0.033(0.72) 0.474 -0.34(2.73) 0.006*** -0.033(2.20) 0.028** 
Age square 0.001(1.13) 0.260 -0.0002(0.41) 0.685 0.0005(3.31) 0.001*** 0.0005(2.63) 0.008*** 
Gender (default group: male) 
Female 0.054(1.12) 0.263 -0.014(0.27) 0.788 -0.009(0.20) 0.844 0.058(1.13) 0.260 
Marital Status (default group: unmarried) 
Married 0.079(1.13) 0.257 0.095(1.29) 0.197 0.016(0.25) 0.801 0.122(1.69) 0.091* 
Education level (default group: low education) 
Middle education  -0.048(0.48) 0.633 -0.056(0.92) 0.359 -0.029(0.48) 0.629 -0.119(1.10) 0.270 
High education 0.101(0.91) 0.364 0.080(0.08) 0.935 0.059(0.57) 0.568 0.011(0.10) 0.921 
Self-rated health 0.387(10.10) 0.000*** 0.504(14.21) 0.000*** 0.510(14.77) 0.000*** 0.371(9.37) 0.000*** 
Job status (default group: unemployed) 
Employed 0.007(0.10) 0.924 0.016(0.26) 0.793 0.039(0.71) 0.476 -0.040(0.49) 0.621 
Householder characteristics 
Log of householder income (yuan) 0.088(2.86) 0.004*** 0.025(0.77) 0.439 0.072(1.98) 0.048** 0.095(1.82) 0.068* 
Homeownership (default group: no homeownership) 




) 0.004(5.64) 0.000*** 0.003(4.58) 0.000*** 0.004(5.71) 0.000*** 0.004(4.78) 0.000*** 
Number of bedrooms 0.071(2.39) 0.017** 0.090(3.27) 0.001*** 0.095(3.60) 0.000*** 0.050(1.62) 0.106 
Having living rooms 0.116(1.52) 0.128 0.220(3.09) 0.002*** 0.059(0.85) 0.393 0.317(4.04) 0.000*** 
Having bathrooms 0.027(0.34) 0.736 0.306(4.06) 0.000*** 0.197(2.87) 0.004*** 0.179(1.91) 0.056* 
House type (default group: economical affordable housing) 
Commercial housing 0.109(1.42) 0.157 0.177(2.11) 0.034** 0.212(2.56) 0.011** 0.072(0.92) 0.357 
Others 0.085(1.22) 0.223 0.167(2.29) 0.022** 0.198(2.81) 0.005*** 0.054(0.75) 0.456 
Cut Off Points Coef. (S. E.) z statistics Coef. (S. E.) z statistics Coef. (S. E.) z statistics Coef. (S. E.) z statistics 
cut1 1.512(0.689) 2.20** 3.535(1.308) 2.70*** 2.075(0.443) 4.68*** 2.107(0.641) 3.29*** 
cut2 2.857(0.690) 4.14*** 4.815(1.309) 3.68*** 3.430(0.445) 7.71*** 3.368(0.642) 5.24*** 
cut3 4.494(0.693) 6.49*** 6.632(1.311) 5.06*** 5.120(0.450) 11.37*** 5.138(0.647) 7.95*** 
Number of Observations 2202 2240 2386 2056 
Note: 
(1) For explanatory variables, ( ) denotes the t statistics of the respective coefficients; for cut off points, ( ) denotes the standard errors. 





5.5.2 The Effects on Overall Happiness 
Table 5.13 illustrates the effects of the various determinants on individual overall happiness. 
Broadly speaking, in line with the existing happiness literature in China (Appleton and Song, 
2008; Knight et al., 2009; Knight and Gunatilaka, 2011; Chyi and Mao, 2012; Wang and 
VanderWeele, 2011; Hu 2013), most of the individual characteristics, except for job status, 
significantly affect people’s overall happiness, such as age, gender, marital status, education 
level and self-rated health. Similarly, the householder features of both annual income and 
homeownership exhibit a great degree of significance on overall happiness. Nevertheless, the 
housing-related characteristics have less impact on people’s overall happiness than on 
housing satisfaction. For example, only house size has any effects in the full sample at the 5% 
significance level. 
Again, the results of the robustness check by dropping highly correlated variables coincide 
with the original function. Most individual features are significant, and most housing-related 
factors are not. However, making the dependent variable as 0-1 binary variable has changed 
the effects of several housing-related determinants, where having bathrooms and other house 
types are significant at the 5% level. The coefficients of cut off points in Table 5.13 can be 
interpreted as that, people felt ‘very unhappy’ about overall life satisfaction with yˆ less than 
0.520, ‘unhappy’ with yˆ between 0.520 and 1.463, ‘neutral’ with yˆ between 1.463 and 3.232, 
‘happy’ with yˆ between 3.232 and 4.913, ‘very happy’ with yˆ more than 4.913. And if change 
the answers of housing satisfaction into binary options, either ‘unhappy’ or ‘happy’, the value 
of unique cut off point is 3.387 (in Table 5.13), which means householders feel ‘unhappy’ 
under 3.387 and ‘happy’ above 3.387.  
Furthermore, the division tests for overall subjective wellbeing in Table 5.14 imply that, the 
age and income divisions are significant at the 1% and 5% level respectively. That indicates 
our divisions are more important for overall happiness estimations than housing satisfaction 
estimations. Again, from Table 5.15, both separate and interactive dummies make no change 
on the significance of factors. However, the dummies of individual income division and 
interactive relationship between income dummy and age have the significant impact on 
overall happiness at the 5% level, while the dummies of separate age division and interactive 





For the groups of householders distinguished by age in Table 5.16, regardless of old or young 
people, the individual characteristics—gender, marital status, education level and self-rated 
health—have significant impacts on overall happiness; however, the age only affects the 
young populations under 42. Again, there is no evidence of the job status affecting 
individual’s subjective well-being. The factors of income and homeownership have a strong 
influence on both age groups of interviewees at the 1% level. However, the only powerful 
determinants of housing-related features are house size and having bathrooms, where the 
former affects the old and the latter affects the young respectively.  
For the categories of householders classified by income in Table 5.16, other than the job 
status, the other individual features have strong impacts on both rich and poor people’s 
overall happiness. Meanwhile, the job status is more important to individual’s overall 
happiness for high-income populations. Once again, similar to the full sample and people 
with different age groups, the householder characteristics of income and homeownership 
have a remarkable consistent influence on both rich and poor individuals. As mentioned 
above, the housing-related factors exhibit less impacts, only house size affects low-income 
householders at the 1% level and having living rooms affects high-income householders at 
the 5% level. Furthermore, having bathrooms marginally influences the rich people at the 10% 
level. 
The stronger effects of individual features and the weaker impact of housing conditions on 
overall happiness indicate that people’s overall life is more related to individual situations, 
and the housing conditions affect housing satisfaction more straightforwardly than overall life. 
This is not to say they might not be significant given a larger sample size. Even so, the 
homeownership is always powerful in explaining both subjective well-being indicators for all 
the groups of people. In addition, we can see that housing characteristics do impact on 
different groups of people, for instance, having a bathroom on the young and having living 
room on the rich, which may be reflective of life styles. 





Drop Indep. Var. Binary Dep. Var. (0-1) 
Coef. Pro. Coef. Pro. Coef. Pro. 
Individual 
characteristics 
Age -0.096(9.94) 0.000*** -
0.096(10.04) 
0.000*** -0.103(8.94) 0.000*** 
Age square 0.001(9.56) 0.000*** 0.001(9.82) 0.000*** 0.001(8.68) 0.000*** 





Female 0.174(4.97) 0.000*** 0.171(4.94) 0.000*** 0.160(3.85) 0.000*** 
Marital Status (default group: unmarried) 
Married 0.543(11.03) 0.000*** 0.547(11.12) 0.000*** 0.569(9.44) 0.000*** 
Education level (default group: low education) 
Middle education  0.195(3.82) 0.000*** 0.191(3.75) 0.000*** 0.202(3.30) 0.001*** 
High education 0.356(5.36) 0.000*** 0.350(5.29) 0.000*** 0.431(5.47) 0.000*** 
Self-rated health 0.432(16.56) 0.000*** 0.433(16.62) 0.000*** 0.423(13.46) 0.000*** 
Job status (default group: unemployed) 
Employed -0.010(0.22) 0.822 - - -0.014(0.25) 0.799 
Householder 
characteristics 
Log of householder 
income (yuan) 
0.199(8.91) 0.000*** 0.198(9.26) 0.000*** 0.223(8.35) 0.000*** 
Homeownership (default group: no homeownership) 





) 0.001(2.53) 0.011** 0.002(4.26) 0.000*** 0.002(3.63) 0.000*** 
Number of bedrooms 0.028(1.42) 0.157 - - 0.043(1.82) 0.068* 
Having living rooms 0.067(1.29) 0.199 0.033(0.72) 0.472 0.112(1.80) 0.072* 
Having bathrooms -0.064(1.17) 0.244 - - -0.134(2.04) 0.042** 
House type (default group: economical affordable housing) 
Commercial housing -0.013(0.23) 0.815 -0.009(0.16) 0.874 -0.013(0.19) 0.846 
Others -0.098(1.92) 0.055* -0.087(1.72) 0.085* -0.135(2.26) 0.024** 
Cut Off Points Coef. (S. E.) 
z 
statistics 
Coef. (S. E.) 
z 
statistics 
Coef. (S. E.) 
z 
statistics 
cut1 0.520(0.320) 1.62 0.524(0.294) 1.78* 3.387(0.378) 8.96*** 
cut2 1.463(0.317) 4.62*** 1.468(0.291) 5.05*** - - 
cut3 3.232(0.319) 10.13*** 3.236(0.294) 11.02*** - - 
cut4 4.913(0.323) 15.23*** 4.916(0.297) 16.54*** - - 
Number of Observations 4442 4442 4442 
Note: 
(1) For explanatory variables, ( ) denotes the t statistics of the respective coefficients; for cut off points, ( ) denotes the standard errors. 
(2) *** indicates significance at 1% level, ** indicates significance at 5% level. * indicates significance at 10% level. 
 
Table 5.14: Group Division Tests for Overall Happiness 
Group Division Tests for Overall Happiness 
Groups Chi-square Prob>Chi-square 
By Age 34.96 0.0063*** 
By Income 28.77 0.0367** 
Note:  
*** indicates significance at 1% level, ** indicates significance at 5% level. * indicates significance at 10% level. 
 
Table 5.15: The Separate and Interactive Effects of Age and Income on Overall Happiness  
Variables 
Without Dummies With Dummies 
Coef. Pro. Coef. Pro. 
Individual characteristics 
Age -0.096(9.94) 0.000*** -0.106(-10.01) 0.000*** 
Age square 0.001(9.56) 0.000*** 0.001(9.75) 0.000*** 
Gender (default group: male) 
Female 0.174(4.97) 0.000*** 0.177(5.03) 0.000*** 
Marital Status (default group: unmarried) 
Married 0.543(11.03) 0.000*** 0.547(10.93) 0.000*** 
Education level (default group: low education) 
Middle education  0.195(3.82) 0.000*** 0.169(3.25) 0.001*** 
High education 0.356(5.36) 0.000*** 0.331(4.94) 0.000*** 
Self-rated health 0.432(16.56) 0.000*** 0.432(16.51) 0.000*** 
Job status (default group: unemployed) 
Employed -0.010(0.22) 0.822 -0.019(-0.42) 0.676 






Homeownership (default group: no homeownership) 





) 0.001(2.53) 0.011** 0.001(2.51) 0.012** 
Number of bedrooms 0.028(1.42) 0.157 0.027(1.36) 0.174 
Having living rooms 0.067(1.29) 0.199 0.072(1.37) 0.171 
Having bathrooms -0.064(1.17) 0.244 -0.067(-1.21) 0.228 
House type (default group: economical affordable housing) 
Commercial housing -0.013(0.23) 0.815 -0.004(-0.08) 0.938 
Others -0.098(1.92) 0.055* -0.093(-1.84) 0.066* 
Dummy Variables 
D(age) - - 0.409(0.91) 0.362 
D(income) - - -0.335(-2.17) 0.030** 
D(age)*income - - -0.036(-0.74) 0.458 
D(income)*age - - 0.008(2.53) 0.011** 
Number of Observations 4442 4442 
Note: 
( ) denotes the t statistics of the respective coefficients. *** indicates significance at 1% level, ** indicates significance at 5% level. * 





Table 5.16: The Effects on Overall Happiness by Groups  
Variables 
Overall Happiness 
By age By income (yuan) 
Young (<=42) Old (>42) Low (<=10000) High (>10000) 
Coef. Pro. Coef. Pro. Coef. Pro. Coef. Pro. 
Individual characteristics 
Age -0.138(3.31) 0.001*** 0.053(1.14) 0.254 -0.098(7.80) 0.000*** -0.098(6.38) 0.000*** 
Age square 0.002(2.45) 0.014** -0.0003(0.75) 0.453 0.001(7.32) 0.000*** 0.001(6.42) 0.000*** 
Gender (default group: male) 
Female 0.104(2.11) 0.035** 0.249(4.90) 0.000*** 0.163(3.42) 0.001*** 0.216(4.09) 0.000*** 
Marital Status (default group: unmarried) 
Married 0.594(8.28) 0.000*** 0.569(7.63) 0.000*** 0.527(7.95) 0.000*** 0.568(7.58) 0.000*** 
Education level (default group: low education) 
Middle education  0.269(2.65) 0.008*** 0.167(2.74) 0.006*** 0.169(2.85) 0.004*** 0.140(1.29) 0.198 
High education 0.506(4.47) 0.000*** 0.212(2.19) 0.028** 0.390(3.75) 0.000*** 0.283(2.44) 0.015** 
Self-rated health 0.382(9.81) 0.000*** 0.475(13.39) 0.000*** 0.434(12.71) 0.000*** 0.419(10.28) 0.000*** 
Job status (default group: unemployed) 
Employed -0.101(1.43) 0.152 -0.008(0.13) 0.898 0.074(1.36) 0.173 -0.227(2.74) 0.006*** 
Householder characteristics 
Log of householder income (yuan) 0.165(5.21) 0.000*** 0.235(7.16) 0.000*** 0.210(5.73) 0.000*** 0.154(2.88) 0.004*** 
Homeownership (default group: no homeownership) 




) 0.001(1.29) 0.195 0.002(2.43) 0.015** 0.002(2.89) 0.004*** 0.001(0.79) 0.432 
Number of bedrooms 0.044(1.48) 0.140 0.013(0.49) 0.623 0.019(0.71) 0.476 0.029(0.92) 0.356 
Having living rooms 0.079(1.01) 0.312 0.058(0.81) 0.420 -0.015(0.21) 0.831 0.203(2.52) 0.012** 
Having bathrooms -0.165(2.01) 0.044** 0.014(0.19) 0.850 -0.019(0.28) 0.783 -0.172(1.80) 0.073* 
House type (default group: economical affordable housing) 
Commercial housing -0.043(0.54) 0.588 0.018(0.22) 0.826 0.044(0.53) 0.596 -0.048(0.60) 0.547 
Others -0.107(1.51) 0.132 -0.091(1.24) 0.214 -0.084(1.19) 0.234 -0.105(1.42) 0.154 
Cut Off Points Coef. (S. E.) z statistics Coef. (S. E.) z statistics Coef. (S. E.) z statistics Coef. (S. E.) z statistics 
cut1 -0.738(0.705) -1.05 5.079(1.312) 3.87*** 0.506(0.444) 1.14 -0.035(0.664) -0.05 
cut2 0.085(0.700) 0.12 6.119(1.312) 4.66*** 1.534(0.442) 3.47*** 0.717(0.655) 1.10 
cut3 1.907(0.701) 2.72*** 7.871(1.316) 5.98*** 3.272(0.445) 7.35*** 2.581(0.656) 3.94*** 
cut4 3.617(0.703) 5.14*** 9.525(1.319) 7.22*** 4.801(0.449) 10.69*** 4.414(0.660) 6.69*** 
Number of Observations 2202 2240 2386 2056 
Note: 
(1) For explanatory variables, ( ) denotes the t statistics of the respective coefficients; for cut off points, ( ) denotes the standard errors. 





5.5.3 The Effects on Overall Happiness of Including Housing Satisfaction as 
an Explanatory Variable 
Adding housing satisfaction as one of the explanatory variables, as in Table 5.17 
demonstrates that housing satisfaction is a major determinant of one’s overall happiness for 
all groups of the population regardless of their age or income level; because the coefficients 
of housing satisfaction are all significant at the 1% level. This finding reconfirms Hu (2013)’s 
conclusion that housing satisfaction is quite important for an individual’s overall subjective 
wellbeing. From the perspective of all respondents, Table 5.17 shows some similar findings 
with Table 5.13—apart from the job status, the other individual characteristics (age, gender, 
marital status, education level, health status) significantly affect the overall happiness of 
householders. Furthermore, the householder income and homeownership, as always, have 
significantly positive effects. 
Additionally, in Table 5.17, the results of both robustness checks are quite in accordance with 
the original function. Besides in the regression with the 0-1 binary dependent variable, the 
housing size and having bathrooms exhibit more significant effects on overall happiness at 
the 5% level. The interpretation for the coefficients of cut off points is that, individuals fell 
‘very unhappy’ about overall life satisfaction with yˆ less than 0.680, ‘unhappy’ with yˆ  
between 0.680 and 1.630, ‘neutral’ with yˆ  between 1.630 and 3.441, ‘happy’ with yˆ  
between 3.441 and 5.172, ‘very happy’ with yˆ  more than 5.172. And the binary regression 
illustrates that people feel ‘unhappy’ under 3.080 and ‘happy’ above 3.080.  
Moreover, the results of the division tests in Table 5.18 demonstrate that, both age and 
income divisions are significant at the 5% level, which is also significant for overall 
happiness estimations including housing satisfaction as one of independent variables. 
Additionally, the separate and interactive effects from Table 5.19 indicate that, only the 
multiplication of income dummy and age has played a significant role in overall subjective 
wellbeing at the 5% level, by adding hosuing satisfaction as one of explanatory variables.  
Regarding of Table 5.20, from the point of view of different age groups, most of the 
individual characteristics and householder features have significant positive effects on overall 
happiness; although the age factor just impacts on the young respondents and the job status 





have no significant impact, except having bathrooms affects the younger people significantly 
at the 5% level. Similar results are obtained for alternative groups of individuals identified by 
the annual income, most of the individual features significantly affect the overall life 
satisfaction of both groups of people; one of the exceptions is the middle level of education 
only affects the low-income population, and the other exception is the job status strongly 
impacts the high-income group at the 1% level. Again, both the income and homeownership 
play an important role in people’s overall life satisfaction with different income levels. By 
contrast, the housing-related characteristics are much less important for people’s overall life 
satisfaction. Only having living rooms and having bathrooms have an influence on rich 
people at the 1% and 5% significance level respectively. Of course these variables are in 
addition to housing satisfaction itself. Hence we would not expect them to be significant if 
their only impact upon overall wellbeing was through the quality of the house and satisfaction. 
Hence the significance of homeownership indicates it adds to wellbeing independently of its 
impact on housing satisfaction. 
As a general view, the major conclusion is that housing characteristics impact on different 
types of people differently. The findings of these three models show the variables of housing-
related conditions affect individual’s housing satisfaction directly and significantly; however, 
the overall happiness seems to be affected by individual characteristics’ variables rather than 
housing conditions. Even so, housing satisfaction has a significant impact on overall 
happiness by adding it as one of the explanatory variables. While householder features—
annual income and homeownership—persistently affect both subjective wellbeing indicators, 
which emphasizes the importance of income and homeownership for people’s life in urban 
China. 
Table 5.17: The Effects on Overall Happiness including Housing Satisfaction as an 
Explanatory Variable with Total Sample 
Variables 
Overall Happiness with Housing Satisfaction 
Total 
Robustness Checks 
Drop Indep. Var. Binary Dep. Var. (0-1) 
Coef. Pro. Coef. Pro. Coef. Pro. 
Housing satisfaction 0.331(13.67) 0.000*** 0.329(13.65) 0.000*** 0.561(12.96) 0.000*** 
Individual 
characteristics 
Age -0.091(9.40) 0.000*** -0.091(9.47) 0.000*** -0.100(8.61) 0.000*** 
Age square 0.001(8.86) 0.000*** 0.001(9.07) 0.000*** 0.001(8.16) 0.000*** 
Gender (default group: male) 
Female 0.174(4.95) 0.000*** 0.169(4.86) 0.000*** 0.157(3.75) 0.000*** 
Marital Status (default group: unmarried) 
Married 0.545(11.01) 0.000*** 0.548(11.09) 0.000*** 0.579(9.49) 0.000*** 
Education level (default group: low education) 
Middle education  0.210(4.09) 0.000*** 0.204(3.98) 0.000*** 0.217(3.49) 0.000*** 





Self-rated health 0.350(13.01) 0.000*** 0.352(13.10) 0.000*** 0.357(11.13) 0.000*** 
Job status (default group: unemployed) 
Employed -0.014(0.31) 0.756 - - -0.014(0.25) 0.801 
Householder 
characteristics 
Log of householder 
income (yuan) 
0.192(8.54) 0.000*** 0.189(8.79) 0.000*** 0.214(7.90) 0.000*** 
Homeownership (default group: no homeownership) 





) 0.001(1.09) 0.277 0.001(1.70) 0.090* 0.001(2.18) 0.029** 
Number of bedrooms 0.012(0.58) 0.565 - - 0.022(0.92) 0.356 
Having living rooms 0.031(0.59) 0.557 -0.020(0.44) 0.657 0.076(1.21) 0.226 
Having bathrooms -0.107(1.92) 0.055* - - -0.182(2.72) 0.006*** 
House type (default group: economical affordable housing) 
Commercial housing -0.041(0.71) 0.478 -0.036(0.63) 0.528 -0.014(0.20) 0.842 
Others -0.124(2.43) 0.015** -0.108(2.14) 0.032** -0.136(2.25) 0.024** 
Cut Off Points Coef. (S. E.) 
z 
statistics 
Coef. (S. E.) 
z 
statistics 
Coef. (S. E.) 
z 
statistics 
cut1 0.680(0.322) 2.11** 0.697(0.296) 2.35** 3.080(0.384) 8.03*** 
cut2 1.630(0.319) 5.11*** 1.648(0.293) 5.63*** - - 
cut3 3.441(0.321) 10.71*** 3.459(0.296) 11.69*** - - 
cut4 5.172(0.325) 15.91*** 5.188(0.300) 17.30*** - - 
Number of Observations 4442 4442 4442 
Note: 
(1) For explanatory variables, ( ) denotes the t statistics of the respective coefficients; for cut off points, ( ) denotes the standard errors. 
(2) *** indicates significance at 1% level, ** indicates significance at 5% level. * indicates significance at 10% level. 
 
Table 5.18: Group Division Tests for Overall Happiness with Housing Satisfaction  
Group Division Tests for Overall Happiness with Housing Satisfaction 
Groups Chi-square Prob>Chi-square 
By Age 30.15 0.0360** 
By Income 29.07 0.0475** 
Note:  
*** indicates significance at 1% level, ** indicates significance at 5% level. * indicates significance at 10% level. 
 
Table 5.19: The Separate and Interactive Effects of Age and Income on Overall Happiness 
with Housing Satisfaction  
Variables 
Without Dummies With Dummies 
Coef. Pro. Coef. Pro. 
Housing Satisfaction 0.331(13.67) 0.000*** 0.330(13.63) 0.000*** 
Individual characteristics 
Age -0.091(9.40) 0.000*** -0.099(-9.34) 0.000*** 
Age square 0.001(8.86) 0.000*** 0.001(8.98) 0.000*** 
Gender (default group: male) 
Female 0.174(4.95) 0.000*** 0.178(5.03) 0.000*** 
Marital Status (default group: unmarried) 
Married 0.545(11.01) 0.000*** 0.545(10.83) 0.000*** 
Education level (default group: low education) 
Middle education  0.210(4.09) 0.000*** 0.184(3.53) 0.000*** 
High education 0.350(5.24) 0.000*** 0.325(4.81) 0.000*** 
Self-rated health 0.350(13.01) 0.000*** 0.349(12.94) 0.000*** 
Job status (default group: unemployed) 
Employed -0.014(0.31) 0.756 -0.022(-0.47) 0.636 
Householder characteristics 
Log of householder income 
(yuan) 
0.192(8.54) 0.000*** 0.192(4.95) 0.000*** 
Homeownership (default group: no homeownership) 
Homeownership  0.225(5.27) 0.000*** 0.229(5.37) 0.000*** 
House-related House size (m
2





characteristics Number of bedrooms 0.012(0.58) 0.565 0.011(0.52) 0.603 
Having living rooms 0.031(0.59) 0.557 0.036(0.68) 0.499 
Having bathrooms -0.107(1.92) 0.055* -0.110(-1.97) 0.049** 
House type (default group: economical affordable housing) 
Commercial housing -0.041(0.71) 0.478 -0.033(-0.57) 0.571 
Others -0.124(2.43) 0.015** -0.121(-2.36) 0.018** 
Dummy Variables 
D(age) - - 0.244(0.54) 0.587 
D(income) - - -0.285(-1.84) 0.066* 
D(age)*income - - -0.020(-0.42) 0.677 
D(income)*age - - 0.007(2.27) 0.023** 
Number of Observations 4442 4442 
Note: 
( ) denotes the t statistics of the respective coefficients. *** indicates significance at 1% level, ** indicates significance at 5% level. * 





Table 5.20: The Effects on Overall Happiness including Housing Satisfaction as an Explanatory Variable by Groups 
Variables 
Overall Happiness 
By age By income (yuan) 
Young (<=42) Old (>42) Low (<=10000) High (>10000) 
Coef. Pro. Coef. Pro. Coef. Pro. Coef. Pro. 
Housing Satisfaction 0.319(9.36) 0.000*** 0.337(9.73) 0.000*** 0.356(10.80) 0.000*** 0.295(8.19) 0.000*** 
Individual characteristics 
Age -0.129(3.07) 0.002*** 0.046(0.99) 0.324 -0.093(7.35) 0.000*** -0.094(6.08) 0.000*** 
Age square 0.001(2.24) 0.025** -0.0002(0.65) 0.513 0.001(6.72) 0.000*** 0.001(6.04) 0.000*** 
Gender (default group: male) 
Female 0.096(1.94) 0.052* 0.256(5.02) 0.000*** 0.169(3.54) 0.000*** 0.210(3.95) 0.000*** 
Marital Status (default group: unmarried) 
Married 0.591(8.20) 0.000*** 0.564(7.53) 0.000*** 0.537(8.07) 0.000*** 0.559(7.42) 0.000*** 
Education level (default group: low education) 
Middle education  0.282(2.76) 0.006*** 0.183(2.99) 0.003*** 0.181(3.02) 0.003*** 0.162(1.48) 0.140 
High education 0.493(4.34) 0.000*** 0.214(2.21) 0.027** 0.386(3.69) 0.000*** 0.284(2.44) 0.015** 
Self-rated health 0.313(7.87) 0.000*** 0.382(10.36) 0.000*** 0.332(9.33) 0.000*** 0.360(8.66) 0.000*** 
Job status (default group: unemployed) 
Employed -0.104(1.47) 0.143 -0.011(0.17) 0.863 0.068(1.24) 0.215 -0.224(2.69) 0.007*** 
Householder characteristics 
Log of householder income (yuan) 0.150(4.73) 0.000*** 0.235(7.13) 0.000*** 0.200(5.43) 0.000*** 0.139(2.60) 0.009*** 
Homeownership (default group: no homeownership) 




) 0.0001(0.20) 0.843 0.001(1.54) 0.125 0.001(1.68) 0.092 -0.00004(0.05) 0.958 
Number of bedrooms 0.030(1.00) 0.317 -0.006(0.20) 0.838 -0.002(0.08) 0.934 0.019(0.61) 0.542 
Having living rooms 0.055(0.70) 0.486 0.011(0.16) 0.874 -0.028(0.40) 0.691 0.141(1.74) 0.082* 
Having bathrooms -0.176(2.14) 0.033** -0.056(0.73) 0.466 -0.068(0.98) 0.328 -0.212(2.21) 0.027** 
House type (default group: economical affordable housing) 
Commercial housing -0.064(0.81) 0.419 -0.016(0.19) 0.848 -0.0004(0.01) 0.996 -0.061(0.76) 0.449 
Others -0.125(1.74) 0.081* -0.127(1.72) 0.086* -0.129(1.81) 0.071 -0.116(1.56) 0.120 
Cut Off Points Coef. (S. E.) z statistics Coef. (S. E.) z statistics Coef. (S. E.) z statistics Coef. (S. E.) z statistics 
cut1 -0.519(0.709) -0.73 4.979(1.318) 3.78*** 0.641(0.447) 1.43 0.064(0.667) 0.10 
cut2 0.303(0.705) 0.43 6.030(1.319) 4.57*** 1.679(0.445) 3.77*** 0.815(0.658) 1.24 
cut3 2.162(0.705) 3.06*** 7.827(1.323) 5.92*** 3.464(0.449) 7.72*** 2.715(0.659) 4.12*** 
cut4 3.922(0.708) 5.54*** 9.529(1.326) 7.19*** 5.049(0.453) 11.15*** 4.588(0.663) 6.92*** 
Number of Observations 2202 2240 2386 2056 
Note: 
(1) For explanatory variables, ( ) denotes the t statistics of the respective coefficients; for cut off points, ( ) denotes the standard errors. 
(2) *** indicates significance at 1% level, ** indicates significance at 5% level. * indicates significance at 10% level. 
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5.5.4 The Effects on Overall Happiness Using the Predicted Value of 
Housing Satisfaction 
As mentioned before, people satisfied with their overall life may more easily feel happy 
about their houses, thus housing satisfaction may be correlated with the error term in the life 
satisfaction regression. In order to resolve the potential endogeneity problem, we generated 
the predicted value iyˆ  from the housing satisfaction equation by using the Ramsey RESET 
procedure. Firstly, we have already obtained the estimated value of housing satisfaction from 
Equation 5.5 in Table 5.9. Then, as Ramsey RESET procedure suggest, the squared and 
cubed terms of housing satisfaction has been generated as Equation 5.9, to get the predicted 






iy will indicate whether 
Equation 5.5 is misspecified or not.  
The main purpose of this regression is to generate predicted values for inclusion in a 







iy are jointly significant and the original function is misspecified; hence the predicted 
value of iyˆ from the artificial model of Equation 5.9 should be adopted to estimate the 
regression for overall happiness, and the new regression rescues the misspecification problem 













iy , all show that they are significant at the 1% level. That suggests us to use the 
predicted value of iyˆ from Ramsey RESET test in Equation 5.9. 
Table 5.21: Ramsey RESET Test for Misspecification  
Individual Test z statistic Prob>|z| 
y
2 30.15 0.000*** 
y








 36.64 0.000*** 
Note:  
*** indicates significance at 1% level, ** indicates significance at 5% level. * indicates significance at 10% level. 
 
                                                 
82 Tests for weak instruments: Stock et al. (2002) suggested that with two degrees of freedom on F statistics greater than 
11.59 indicates instruments are not ‘weak’. Testing for weak instruments with limited dependent variables is still a 
developing area of research. However, the Chi-sqaure test statistics can be linked to the F test in the limt as equal to ‘degrees 
of freedom×F statistics’ (Gould, 2013b). This suggests that Chi-square test statistics of 36.64 translates into an F statistic of 




Table 5.22 compares the regression using the predicted value of housing satisfaction with the 
original one, and two regressions show the quite similar results: the housing satisfaction plays 
an important role in people’s overall happiness; except for the employment, the other 
individual characteristics and the income have a significant impact on people’s overall life 
satisfaction; for housing-related features, only having bathroom and other housing type have 
significant effects on overall happiness. The only difference is the impact of homeownership; 
the modified equation suggests homeownership cannot significantly influence overall 
happiness any more. That is probably because the impacts of homeownership and housing 
conditions have already been captured by another predicted explanatory variable of housing 
satisfaction.  
Table 5.22: Comparisons of the Overall Happiness Regressions between the Regression using 
the Predicted Value of Housing Satisfaction and the Original Regression 
Explanatory Variables 
Regression using the 





Coef. Pro. Coef. Pro. 
Housing satisfaction 0.479(2.94) 0.003*** 0.331(13.67) 0.000*** 
Individual 
characteristics 
Age -0.080(-7.28) 0.000*** -0.091(-9.40) 0.000*** 
Age square 0.001(6.33) 0.000*** 0.001(8.86) 0.000*** 
Female 0.165(4.68) 0.000*** 0.174(4.95) 0.000*** 
Married 0.514(10.23) 0.000*** 0.545(11.01) 0.000*** 
Middle education  0.220(4.24) 0.000*** 0.210(4.09) 0.000*** 
High education 0.325(4.83) 0.000*** 0.350(5.24) 0.000*** 
Self-rated health 0.218(2.82) 0.005*** 0.350(13.01) 0.000*** 
Employed -0.019(-0.41) 0.680 -0.014(-0.31) 0.756 
Householder 
characteristics 
Log of householder income (yuan) 0.172(7.08) 0.000*** 0.192(8.54) 0.000*** 





) -0.0005(-0.61) 0.545 0.001(1.09) 0.277 
Number of bedrooms -0.010(-0.42) 0.674 0.012(0.58) 0.565 
Having living rooms -0.016(-0.27) 0.790 0.031(0.59) 0.557 
Having bathrooms -0.148(-2.38) 0.017** -0.107(-1.92) 0.055* 
Commercial housing -0.080(-1.30) 0.195 -0.041(-0.71) 0.478 
Others -0.157(-2.88) 0.004*** -0.124(-2.43) 0.015** 
Number of observations 4442 (full sample) 
Note: 
( ) denotes the t statistics of the respective coefficients. *** indicates significance at 1% level, ** indicates significance at 5% 
level. * indicates significance at 10% level. 
 
To some extent, the use of the modified predicted value of housing satisfaction solves the 
endogeneity problem and improves our estimations. Additionally, the modified explanatory 
variable of housing satisfaction captures the effects of homeownership and housing-related 
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characteristics. It is difficult to capture the impact of characteristics such as house size, 
having a bathroom, the number of rooms, as they will tend to be correlated. Nonetheless we 
have established that these impact on housing satisfaction and the latter impacts on overall 
life satisfaction. Hence, these housing characteristics also impact on people’s overall 
wellbeing. 
5.5.5 The Money Equivalent Effects of Housing Conditions on Overall 
Happiness 
In order to investigate the interactive relationship between the income and housing conditions, 
this chapter employs the money equivalent analysis to estimate what kind of housing 
conditions can cause the same degree of individual overall happiness with a certain level of 
income. Table 5.13 and Table 5.16 illustrate the regression results of the impacts of different 
determinants on people’s overall happiness. As we can see from the coefficients, only one of 
the housing conditions, namely house size, plays a significant role in the overall happiness of 
the full sample, old or low-income interviewees; therefore, the monetary equivalent analysis 
shows that one more m
2
 of a house will increase the same level of life satisfaction with a 
certain level of annual income. Although with the homeownership, one of the householder 
features significantly affects the life satisfaction of all groups of the population, but due to the 
discreteness of this variable, it does not make sense to estimate the money equivalence of it. 
Since the money equivalent estimation focuses on the linkage between the house size and the 
annual income of the full sample, old or low-income groups, the coefficients of these two 
variables from different groups can be obtained from the regressions in Table 5.17. Let the 
coefficient of house size is α and the coefficient of the log of annual income is β. One more 
m
2
 of house size can increase the happiness by an α unit. However, an α unit increase of 
happiness can also be caused by an α/β unit increase of the log of income. That is a one m2 
increase in house size increases wellbeing by the same amount as an increase in the log of 
income of α/β. As indicated by the survey data, if the average annual income of the group is γ, 
then the natural log of average annual incomes is )ln( . With an   unit increase, the log 
of income is  )ln( , and the annual income after the increase is 
 )ln(e , which is 
equal to 
 e . Eventually, the income has been increased by )1(  e  or (   e ). 
Specifically, one more m
2
 of house size can make people as happy as the )1( 
 e  increase 
of income. Table 5.23 displays the process of the money equivalent analysis with regard to 
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house size affecting people’s overall happiness.  
Table 5.23: The Money Equivalent Effects of House Size on Overall Happiness 








the coefficient of house size 
(from Table 5.17) 
0.0012190 0.0017462 0.0019014 
the coefficient of the log of 
income 
(from Table 5.17) 
0.1994581 0.2346353 0.2100606 
one more m
2
 increase the 
happiness by 
0.0012190 0.0017462 0.0019014 
the increased happiness can 
be caused by the increase of 










the average annual income 
in the different groups 
(from Table 5.7) 
14204 11706 6175 
































the increase of income above 










The money equivalent 
effects of one more m
2
 in 
house size is equal to the 
increase of income by: 
(yuan) 
87.07 87.44 56.15 
 
As indicated by the survey data, the average annual incomes of the full sample, old and low-
income groups are 14204, 11706 and 6175 yuan respectively; Table 5.23 deduces that the 
money equivalent effects of the house size with one more m
2
 on individual’s overall 
happiness are 87.07, 87.44 and 56.15 yuan income for the three groups respectively. The 
second number is more than the first, despite income being lower as they are based on 
different regressions. That implies that one more m
2
 of house size can increase the same 
degree of life satisfaction as an 87 yuan increase of income for overall respondents and old 
people; however, it produces the smallest increase in income (56 yuan) for the low-income 
population to get the same level of happiness by one more m
2
. We can see that the average 
income of poor people (6175 yuan) is much lower than the overall level (14204 yuan) and the 
old people group (11706 yuan); to this extent, in order to get the same level of happiness with 
one more m
2
 of house size, it takes less of an increase of income (56 yuan) to satisfy the low-
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income people than the overall and older age groups (87 yuan). That indicates it might be 
easier for the low-income householders to be satisfied with their overall life with less of an 
income increase.  
5.6 Conclusion 
Since the housing reform of the late 1980s in urban China, the housing system has gradually 
transferred from the social welfare housing system to a market-oriented commercial housing 
system. With the development of the housing market, the housing standards of urban people 
have been greatly improved. Since then, the Chinese commodity house prices have 
experienced a rapid growth. To a great extent, the living conditions affect all aspects of 
people’s life. This chapter is the first attempt to investigate how the residential environment 
impacts on individual subjective wellbeing in urban China, such as housing satisfaction and 
overall happiness.  
This chapter adopts the ordered probit model to estimate the effects of various determinants 
on subjective wellbeing indicators, by using the questionnaire dataset of the 2006 CGSS for 
householders in urban China. The individual subjective indicators used in this chapter include 
housing satisfaction, denoting the specific demand for housing, and the overall happiness, 
denoting the satisfaction about the general life situation. The possible factors affecting 
housing satisfaction have been grouped into three categories: individual characteristics (age, 
gender, marital status, education level, self-rated health and job status), householder 
characteristics (householder annual income and homeownership) and house-related 
characteristics (house size, number of bedrooms, having living rooms, having bathrooms, 
house type). Three models have been regressed by using different indicators as the dependent 
variables: (i) using housing satisfaction, (ii) using overall happiness, and (iii) using overall 
happiness again but including housing satisfaction as one of the explanatory variables.  
For the full sample, the empirical results suggest that both householder features and housing 
conditions have significant effects on someone’s housing satisfaction, which indicate these 
factors are empirically closely related to people’s housing satisfaction For example, according 
to the ‘Report on the Status of the Cities in China 2010/2011’, by the end of 2008, 4.5% and 
83% of urban householders live in single buildings and apartment units respectively, which 
are much more than householders (12.5%) living in tube-shaped apartments or bungalows. 
The great improvement of housing type has significantly increased people’s housing and life 
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satisfaction. However, housing conditions have less impact on people’s overall happiness and 
the individual characteristics become significant except for the job status. Householder 
income and homeownership still play an important role in both housing satisfaction and 
overall happiness. That indicates housing-related features just influence housing satisfaction 
in a straightforward way rather than general life, and these factors are good indicators to 
explain personal housing satisfaction. But, including housing satisfaction as independent 
variables, suggests it is also one of the major significant variables for explaining the overall 
life satisfaction, which is consistent with our assumption that housing satisfaction is closely 
related to people’s overall life. Furthermore, both robustness checks, by dropping high 
correlated variables or transferring ordered dependent variable as 0-1 binary variable, have 
confirmed the above findings.
83
   
It is not surprising that it is difficult to identify the individual significance of characteristics 
such as house size, number of rooms, whether a bathroom etc, as they are closely correlated. 
But in establishing their impact on housing satisfaction and of that on life satisfaction, we 
have made the case that housing characteristics do actually impact on peoples’ wellbeing. 
Moreover we have shown that they impact on different groups of people in different ways. 
This is important, regression analysis often proceeds on the assumption that the same 
equation is equally applicable to all. Our analysis has shown that this is not always the case. 
By dividing the full sample of interviewees into groups, the housing factors have distinct 
effects on different population’s housing satisfaction. Prior to interpreting the regressions for 
different groups, the Chow tests justify that the divisions of the sample by age and income are 
significant for three models, especially for the estimations of the effects on overall happiness. 
However, the dummy variables for the individual and interactive effects of age groups and 
income groups indicate that, their effects are not always significant in the regressions.     
More specifically, for young people, the housing conditions are less important than for the 
elders; since they seem to  care less about the type of house and having living 
rooms/bathrooms or not. While, old people care about all aspects of housing conditions; and 
one possible reason is that elders spend more time at home than the youngsters. In terms of 
income groups, the general picture is that there are more significant housing variables for 
lower-income householders but not for higher-income householders. For example, apart from 
                                                 
83 I have also estimated the regression by using robust errors, which corrects the standard errors and t statistics for certain 
problems. That still does not change the significance of other explanatory variables. 
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having living rooms, homeownership, house size, number of bedrooms, having bathrooms 
and housing type all have significant positive effects on poor people; by contrast, only 
homeownership, house size and having bathrooms significantly affect rich people’s housing 
satisfaction. This again makes sense in that richer people have a greater ability to buy the 
houses they want. Hence, if they choose a small house, that is what they want, whereas for a 
poorer person that is what they may be constrained to have. 
Another important step is to resolve the misspecification problem of housing satisfaction and 
overall happiness. As the Ramsey RESET test suggests, adding the squared and cubed 
dependent variable is used to improve the predicted values from the regression of housing 
satisfaction on exogenous variables. Thus, the actual value of housing satisfaction has been 
replaced by the modified fitted value in the new overall life satisfaction regression. And the 
new regression presents quite similar findings with the original one, and suggests the effects 
of homeownership and housing conditions may be captured by the predicted housing 
satisfaction. 
Finally, the money equivalent analysis of house size indicates that one more m
2
 of house size 
can cause the same increase of life satisfaction as an 87.07, 87.44 and 56.15 yuan increase of 
annual income for the full sample, older group and low-income group respectively. 
Meanwhile, the average annual income of the low-income householder (6175 yuan) is much 
less than the full sample group (14204 yuan) or old group (11706 yuan), which indicates that 
it is easier for poorer people to feel satisfaction with overall life, if they are given a little more 
money. 
To sum up, the householder income and homeownership significantly affect both subjective 
wellbeing indicators—housing satisfaction and overall happiness, regardless of the groups of 
the population. As MOC (2006) points out, the ratio of homeowners in urban residents with 
‘Hukou’ is as high as 81.62% in 2005, and has reached to 87.8% by the ‘Report on the Status 
of the Cities in China 2010/2011’. The importance of homeownership corroborates the 
traditional idea of Chinese people preferring to purchasing houses rather than renting. Overall, 
the housing conditions used in our model significantly impact on householders’ housing 
satisfaction, which indicates the close relationship between housing qualities and subjective 
wellbeing. In addition if you own your own house, you can make changes as you wish to the 
house, which you cannot do if it is not yours. Nevertheless, the specific housing conditions 
heterogeneously influence different groups of the population.  In addition, the housing 
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satisfaction, as an explanatory variable, is one of the most important determinants in people’s 
overall life satisfaction.  
Even though this chapter achieves some findings of the effects of housing conditions on 
individual subjective well-being; there might be more powerful factors related to housing 
satisfaction. However, due to the restriction of the CGSS survey, our model just contains 
limited indicators of housing-related features. With the development and improvement of the 
social survey, we can create more reliable estimates by including other typical housing 
variables in the model, such as the location of apartments, the neighbourhood’s environment 
and so on. But clearly along with rising income, rising quality of housing accommodation is 




6.1 Main Empirical Findings 
Against the background of the prosperous development of China’s economy, the Chinese 
housing market has become one of the most popular areas to be studied by many Chinese and 
foreign academics in recent times. This thesis discusses several important issues on the 
Chinese housing market, such as the determinants of house prices, convergence and ripple 
effects of regional house prices, and the relationship between housing conditions and 
individual subjective well-being.  
After introducing the development of the Chinese housing market and summarising the 
existing literature, the first empirical chapter employs two dynamic panel data models—one-
step system GMM estimation and two-step system GMM estimation—to estimate the 
effective factors that affect house prices in China by using a sample of 30 provinces/cities 
through 1999 to 2009. Some prevailing factors have been included, such as disposable 
income, urban population, unemployment rate, statutary reseve ratio, consumption factors, 
housing demand-supply factors, construction costs, land factors and investment factors. 
Meanwhile, in order to increase the effectiveness of our estimations, improvements have been 
made in the way these explanatory variables are included in the analysis. Moreover, the 
robustness checks verify our findings by using different explanatory variables or different 
estimation approaches, such as FE or RE. 
The autocorrelation test (Arellano-Bond test) and overidentification test (Hansen test) imply 
our regressions are efficient to a great extent, because there is no evidence of autocorrelation 
and all instruments are jointly valid. The dynamic models with the lagged house prices 
indicate that the lagged house price significantly impacts on current house prices. Also, 
redefined independent variables, which have not been widely used before in this type of study, 
such as per capita disposable income of urban households, statutory reserve ratio, excessive 
housing demand this year, urban land use tax, and investment actually completed by 
enterprises for real estate development this year, have prominent explanatory power 
regarding the fluctuations in Chinese real estate prices, where their effects are more important 
in the long run than in the short run. However, Chinese house prices cannot be significantly 
explained solely by the urban population proportion, urban unemployment rate, construction 
costs and the housing consumption of urban households. 
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By using the house price index for 35 cities from 1998Q1 to 2010Q4, the second empirical 
chapter studies the convergence and ripple effects of regional house prices in China, through 
univariate/panel unit root tests (Levin et al., Im et al., ADF, PP, and Hadri tests), σ-/β-
convergence analysis, panel regression models, cointegration tests and Granger causality tests. 
One of the innovations in this chapter is to revise the original link index for house prices into 
a continual index, which makes our estimations more valid and efficient.  
By adopting the modified house price indexes, the results of both univariate and panel unit 
root tests suggest that there is non-convergence of regional house prices. However, by 
defining different ‘clubs’ within cities, panel unit root tests illustrate a limited convergence 
for some cities, such as Beijing, Shanghai, Shenzhen, Urumchi and Yinchuan. As for the 
alternative approaches, both the σ-convergence test and the β-convergence test imply the non-
convergence of regional house prices as well. But, for the sub-sample of variation starting 
from 2004Q1, the panel regression suggests there is strong evidence of the β-convergence 
between regional house prices.  
Although there is no significant evidence of convergence, some cities’ house prices can 
‘ripple out’ to others’. As well as this, the pairwise Engle-Granger cointegration tests suggest 
that there is a long-run cointegration relationship between a few specific cities, such as two-
way cointegration between Dalian and Fuzhou, Hohhot and Taiyuan, Changchun and 
Guiyang, Changchun and Urumchi, Nanchang and Qingdao, Shenzhen and Zhengzhou, 
Hohhot and Jinan. In addition, the results of the Johansen system cointegration test for 
multivariate series indicate house prices in most cities have a long-run equilibrium 
relationship with the core cities—Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou.  
The panel regression estimation verifies the primary indication of the Johansen system 
cointegration test, that show house price shocks in Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou affect 
other cities’ house price changes in both the short-run and the long-run . Also, the previous 
house price changes significantly influence the current house prices negatively in the short 
run (in terms of quarter) and positively in the long run (in terms of year). The quarterly 
change may be more influenced by random stochastic factors than the annual figure, which 
will be dominated perhaps more by the underlying trend. This suggests that the stochastic 
factors are corrected for, whilst the long term factors have a continuing impact.  
Additionally, the panel regressions show that, the distance factors from Shanghai and 
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Guangzhou significantly impact house price changes in other cities in the short run, but this 
effect becomes less significant in the long run, which with a diffusion model is exactly as one 
would expect. More interestingly, the house price changes in Beijing have a positive effect on 
other cities’ house prices in the short term but a negative effect in the long run. One 
explanation is that the effect of Beijing’s house price change is felt more quickly than other 
core cities and not diluted by distance. Therefore when year lagged effects are considered in 
order to reflect their own prices, the house prices of Beijing perform the role of a correction 
factor. The pairwise Granger causality tests investigate the short-run relationship of house 
price changes between each of two cities and finds complementary evidence of the significant 
impact of house price fluctuations in Beijing and Shenzhen; however, the panel regression 
models indicate their influence has weakened over time. 
Overall, the empirical findings imply non-convergence between Chinese regional house 
prices during this period. However, there is evidence of ripple effects of some core cities in 
three major economic zones, especially in the short run. House price shocks in some core 
cities have ripple effects on other cities’ house price changes, wherein Beijing, Shanghai, 
Hangzhou, Guangzhou and Shenzhen are the original regions of nationwide house price 
swings. 
In order to investigate how the residential environment and housing conditions affect people’s 
housing satisfaction and overall happiness, the third empirical chapter uses the 2006 CGSS 
survey data in urban China and the ordered probit model. The empirical results of the full 
sample indicate that both householder features and housing conditions have significant 
effects on people’s housing satisfaction but less impact on people’s overall happiness. But, 
when housing satisfaction is included as one of the explanatory variables in the overall 
happiness regression, it greatly impacts the overall happiness. Householder income and 
homeownership always play an important role in both housing satisfaction and overall 
happiness. Meanwhile, the results of the robustness checks have coincided with the above 
findings, by dropping highly correlated variables or transforming ordered dependent variable 
to 0-1 binary variable.  
Through dividing the respondents into different groups, the housing factors have different 
effects on different population’s subjective well-being. The Chow tests justify that both age 
and income divisions are significant for three models, especially for the overall happiness. 
But, the dummy variables for the separate and interactive effects of age groups and income 
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groups indicate that, their effects are not always significant in the estimations. More 
specifically, the housing conditions are less important for the young than for the elderly, but 
old people care about all aspects of housing conditions. In respect to income groups, housing 
variables affect lower-income householders more significantly than higher-income ones. Only 
homeownership, house size and having bathrooms significantly affect rich people’s housing 
satisfaction; comparatively, poor people’s housing satisfaction are impacted by 
homeownership, house size, number of bedrooms, having bathrooms and housing type as 
well. 
In addition, the Ramsey RESET test is used to generate the predicted value of housing 
satisfaction for the estimation of overall happiness. That rescues any misspecification 
problem of our estimations, to some extent. And the new regression presents similar findings 
with the original one, and suggests the effects of homeownership and housing conditions may 
be captured by the predicted housing satisfaction.  
Moreover, the money equivalent analysis of house size implies that one more m
2
 of house 
size can cause the same increase of life satisfaction as an 87.07, 87.44 and 56.15 yuan 
increase of annual income for the full sample, old people and low-income people samples 
respectively, whose average annual income are 14204, 11706 and 6175 yuan respectively. 
This suggests the poorer the people are, the easier it is to increase people’s satisfaction with 
overall life by the provision of extra income and housing quality. 
To sum up, the determinants of Chinese house prices are mainly dominated by the 
government policies and the speculative demand rather than the urbanization process and 
demographic factors. Secondly, although there is very limited evidence of convergence 
between regional house prices in China, however house prices in some core cities have ripple 
effects on other cities’. Finally, housing conditions significantly affect individual’s subjective 
well-being, but they impact on different groups of the population in different ways. 
6.2 Implications 
In accordance with the empirical evidence, house prices in urban China are significantly 
influenced by government policies, such as monetary policy and land policy, but not affected 
by the urbanization process and demographic elements. Because the statutory reserve ratio 
and urban land use tax denoting government policies, play important roles in house prices; 
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however, the urban population proportion and the unemployment rate denoting the 
urbanization process and demographic elements, are not significantly related to house prices. 
That is consistent with the non-fully market-oriented status quo of the Chinese housing 
market. Also, the important roles of excessive housing demand and real estate investment on 
the real estate prices indicate that, the vigorous boom of the Chinese housing market has 
benefited from the lack of other efficient investment channels and the speculative demand of 
individuals and institutions. Thus, administrating and regulating house prices through the 
policy instruments is feasible and effective for the central and local authorities. 
The fact that we have ripple effects but not convergence may imply that the effect from one 
city to another exists, but is not in itself enough to ensure convergence. For the record, we 
need to note that this is an extraordinary period of economic growth in China over this time 
period, and when growth stabilises in the future we may see the convergence of house prices. 
To a great extent, the non-convergence of regional house prices can be explained by the 
recent inequality in China. The current social situation reveals that the housing inequity for 
householders with different incomes has already been one of major problems in Chinese 
housing market.  
Therein, the divergence evidence of Chinese house prices over 1997 and 2003 is most 
probably due to the extraordinary growth of the real estate market during this period. Because 
the State Council announced the final termination of the housing allocation system in 1998; 
the salient development of China’s housing market initiates the divergence of house prices in 
this period. However, the relatively smooth development has aroused the apparent 
convergence of house prices within cities since 2004. That is most likely because the new 
‘bidding-auction-listing’ land transferring system has been finally established in this year. 
Since then, the land using right has been marketized, and land use cost has become the major 
cost for real estate developers. The rapid economic growth of three big economic zones has 
contributed to the ripple effects of house prices in some core cities, such as Beijing in BTT-
EC, Shanghai and Hangzhou in YRD-EC, Guangzhou and Shenzhen in PRD-EC. Their 
advanced economic status is the most important reason for their profound influence on other 
cities’ housing markets. 
The econometric analysis of the 2006 CGSS survey supports the theory that the living 
conditions and housing features have played important roles in individual’s subjective well-
being in urban areas, especially housing satisfaction and overall happiness. In China, people 
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value their life by the four most essential necessities—‘Yi Shi Zhu Xing’, which refers to 
clothing, food, housing and transportation respectively. The importance of homeownership 
and housing conditions on people’s housing satisfaction and overall life satisfaction 
corroborates the traditional culture of ‘land is wealth’ in Chinese people’s belief. Therefore, 
improving people’s living conditions and housing facilities has great significance for the 
overall life satisfaction and happiness in China. However, the analysis has revealed 
substantial differences in the impact of houses, and housing characteristics, on different 
individuals according to their age and income. With respect to the former, policy makers 
should be aware that certain characteristics become more important as people age. This 
tentatively suggests that it may be optimal for people to move houses during the course of 
their adult life.  
6.3 Further Research 
In conclusion, this thesis has achieved a number of important conclusions about the Chinese 
housing market, and has given a series of constructive implications and suggestions as well. 
However, there are still many unexploited topics worthy to be studied about the Chinese 
housing market. For instance, the subsequent study on the determinants of house prices can 
focus on the distinguishing effects of these factors between the different regions. Since the 
market-oriented housing system has been truly established only after 1998, the dataset we 
used are too limited to separate them. As time goes on, as we get larger datasets, it will be 
interesting to divide the regions/provinces of China into different groups by geographical 
basis or economic basis. That will be able to reveal how the different determinants affect the 
house prices in different regions.  
By using the modified house price indexes, this thesis suggests that a certain degree of 
convergence has appeared since 2004 and house prices in several core cities ripple out to 
other cities in China. However, a number of alternative approaches, such as SURADF 
(Seemingly Unrelated Regression Augmented Dickey-Fuller) test and ‘half-life’ analysis, are 
relevant in the field of convergence study, which have not yet been applied into the Chinese 
cases. Besides, the current work about the convergence between Chinese regional house 
prices, including the existing literature and this thesis, employs the house price indexes rather 
than the real house prices. The same methodologies we used would possibly display some 
different findings by applying the real prices. 
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Even though this thesis shows the effects of housing conditions on individual subjective well-
being; there might be more powerful indicators related to housing satisfaction. Due to the 
restriction of the survey, only limited factors of housing-related features are contained in our 
model. With the development and improvement of the social survey, further estimates can be 
calculated by including other typical housing variables, such as the location of apartments, 
the neighbourhood’s environment and so on. In addition, to remedy the endogeneity problem, 
the more advanced IV (instrument variable) techniques, developed by Chesher (2010) and 
Chesher & Smolinski (2012), can be employed for the ordered probit model in future 
research. But clearly along with rising income, the rising quality of housing accommodation 
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